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Introduction
GREGORY V. BUTTON and MARK SCHULLER
Given their graphic and often horrifi c natures, events traditionally labeled 
as disasters capture everyone’s imagination including journalists, politi-
cians, humanitarians, policy-makers, academicians, and the public. How 
these events are perceived and contextualized plays a decisive role in 
not only how we respond to calamity, but also how we envision calamity 
prevention. The goal of this book is to gain a greater understanding of 
disasters by contextualizing them in hopefully new and diff erent ways by 
paying close attention to two decisive factors: narration and globaliza-
tion, which on various levels are two reoccurring themes throughout the 
volume. Deeply embedded in both themes is the notion of vulnerability, 
which as Hilhorst and Bankoff  ( , ) trenchantly observe, is “critical to 
discerning the nature of disasters.”
We usually perceive of disasters as isolated and abnormal events. What 
is missing from this perspective is that disasters are grounded in a larger 
social, political, historical, and spatial context that very often refl ects the 
historical processes that surround the economic and political processes 
of both the nation-state and the global economy. The phenomena that 
we label disasters often belong to a larger series of spiraling events that 
are often translocal (Button ). Scholars (e.g., Button ; Wisner et 
al. ) note the diff erence between more common, everyday disasters 
and the less common but more spectacular catastrophes. This volume 
discusses both.
We need to view disasters more as routine, normal, and connected 
to one another along various social fault lines and as a direct product of 
culture and not something to be imagined as simply exceptional events 
(Button ). Conceiving of disasters in this manner allows us to move 
beyond the bounded unit of analysis that has too often typifi ed traditional 
disaster studies and popular media narratives.
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Disaster researchers and media outlets devote considerable attention 
to iconic catastrophes like Hurricane Katrina or the earthquakes in Haiti or 
Nepal but fail to recognize everyday disasters, which, upon examination, 
disclose the larger processual contexts in which many disasters evolve 
in both space and time. To see disasters in this manner is a very diff erent 
approach than the one that has traditionally dominated disaster stud-
ies. Doing so challenges us, among other things, to think about where 
disasters begin and where they end and even how they are sometimes 
imbricated in one another (Button ). One goal of disaster studies and 
anthropology in particular should be to challenge the traditional axiomatic 
and unproblematic concepts, which are employed to analyze disasters. 
In short, analysis often requires seeing beyond the specifi c details of any 
particular disaster in order to uncover wider patterns found in adjacent or 
similar cases (Button ).
Disaster Narratives
One crucial way in which we can gain a greater understanding of disasters 
in a broader, processual context is the interrogation of disaster narratives. 
Competing disaster narratives have no doubt accompanied disasters from 
time immemorial, however the debate over disaster narratives on a global 
level fi rst emerged in the wake of the Lisbon earthquake of . Accord-
ing to Russell R. Dynes ( ), this massive earthquake, which aff ected 
the fourth largest city in Europe, generated a heated series of debates re-
sulting in newspaper discussions, books, essays, and fi ctional works. While 
these debates occurred during the Enlightenment, there are parallels to 
today: both epochs are characterized by vigorous intellectual debate 
about the roles of science and religion. Then, as now, issues of progress 
and modernity are being debated among clergy, common folk, and in-
tellectuals. Most notable among these Enlightenment debates was the 
discussion that ensued between two major fi gures, Voltaire and Rousseau 
(Dynes ; Molesky ). As Dynes observes, it was Rousseau who un-
wittingly set the stage for a modern day social science approach to disas-
ters by arguing, contrary to Voltaire’s more moral/religious perspective, 
that rather than God or nature, “man” (we would now say humankind or 
society) was to blame for the ravages of the earthquake by arguing that 
if the tens of thousands of houses in Lisbon were less densely occupied 
and dispersed throughout the city there would have been fewer fatalities. 
Immanuel Kant was ahead of his time on this issue—even though he could 
not see beyond the contemporary attachment to slavery—arguing that 
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there would have been much less harm infl icted if the city was better pre-
pared for an earthquake (Molesky ).
This historical debate, unearthed at the dawn of the new millennium 
by Dynes and others, highlights the contested nature of narratives about 
disaster, that they are products of society and also shape our understand-
ing of responses. It also underscores who gets to tell, to narrate, the story 
of disaster. In contemporary society, competing narratives continue to 
emerge in the wake of disasters large and small not only because of how 
small the world seems to have become as a result of recent technological 
advances, but also because disasters have become globally imbricated in 
the broader context of late capitalism, neoliberal policies and of course 
climate change.
Thus, narratives continue to play a vital role in our perception of disas-
ters and, on multiple levels, shape how we respond to them. Traditional 
media narratives commonly portray disasters as isolated events rendering 
invisible the global/transnational forces that produce them. Too often in-
accurate framing can constrain our notion of what is both possible and 
desirable given the realities of prevailing ideologies.
News stories are, for the most part, anecdotal accounts and not sys-
temic analyses of disasters and the larger historical circumstances that 
shape and determine them. In other words, such accounts ignore the 
disaster continuum by focusing almost exclusively on the middle of the 
continuum or the triggering event, without attention to the historical se-
quence of the events leading up to the disaster and the long-term recovery 
process. This process collapses media accounts into a very narrow frame 
and ignores fuller, more complete explanatory approaches—thereby re-
inforcing the notion that disasters are exceptional events, which are not 
refl ective of everyday life and the material world that shapes them. This 
decontextualized scenario deters us from studying the nature of the so-
cial and cultural construction of reality. The neglect of the longitudinal 
evolution of disaster serves to reinforce the neglect of systemic forces, 
asymmetrical power relations, and the long-term impact of disasters on 
human communities. As one evacuee in the Houston Astrodome stated, 
“The news don’t tell you everything.” Yet another evacuee said, “The me-
dia tells you what it wants to tell” (Button ).
As illustrated in the chapters that follow, survivors and their families 
struggle in the wake of disaster not only to regain control of their lives, 
but also to refute the supposedly objective frames of the disaster off ered 
by the media and offi  cial government accounts. As Donald Brenneis ( ) 
reminds us, the world does not come to us already narratized. Whose 
disaster narratives are heard and whose are ignored is a vital part of the 
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contestation of meaning about disasters and the ongoing debate about 
who is to blame for either the disaster or the failure to adequately respond 
to the calamity (e.g., Brenneis ; Button , ; Steinberg ; 
White ). McGee and Nelson ( ) observe that moral narratives are 
too often obliterated by privileged or hegemonic narratives. Often au-
thorities’ frustrating failure to prevent disasters and their ineptitude in 
responding to them causes people to question the social order. Disaster 
victims ask, “Why me?” “Why here?” “Why didn’t the government prevent 
this from happening?” “Why aren’t people being held accountable?” The 
assignment of blame and responsibility often becomes an integral part of 
this struggle to fi nd meaning (e.g., Barton ; Baum, Fleming, and David-
son ; Button ; Drabeck and Quarantelli ). In most instances, 
these accounts can take the form of counter-narratives that challenge the 
offi  cial accounts off ered by offi  cials and the media. These narratives can 
provide valuable insights into the disaster survivors’ perception of class, 
race, and power. Narratives are also important because they play a forma-
tive role in the creation of the subjectivity of those aff ected by calamitous 
events. Focusing on the subjectivities that are revealed in these narratives 
off ers us additional, rich, theoretical insights about the nature of disasters.
Disasters as Global or Translocal Processes
Another crucial way in which we can gain a greater understanding of di-
sasters, their translocality, and their inherently processual nature (Hewitt 
; Oliver-Smith ; Wisner et al. ) is to examine them in the 
context of the ever-increasing international economic and social forces 
that shape our contemporary world. Arguably, disasters since the advent 
of capitalism can be seen as deeply interconnected with global forces, 
whether they be in the form of colonialism or late state capitalism, or neo-
liberal forces. In other words, the ever-changing political economy of cap-
italism has mediated the social forces that have infl uenced the production 
of hazards and disasters in extremely complex ways—ways that shape 
how we understand, investigate, and talk about catastrophes. Today, 
many social scientists and practitioners researching disaster risk reduc-
tion view disasters in a processual light, not only in an eff ort to uncover 
the origins of disaster but also to sharpen our focus on the processes that 
produce vulnerability, as well as the successes, failures, and social changes 
that disaster response inspire.
One of the major contributions of disaster scholarship in changing pol-
icy and practice is the concept of vulnerability. As David Alexander ( ) 
noted in a twentieth anniversary issue of Disasters, the word “vulnerabil-
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ity” successfully entered the conversation in policy and aid circles regard-
ing disasters in the last two decades of the Twentieth Century. However, 
as Frerks and Bender ( ) point out in the conclusion to Mapping Vul-
nerability, vulnerability reduction had not been included in development 
institutions’ stated goals and agendas. That said, in recent times some 
development institutions have modifi ed this stance, at least on paper.
Greg Bankoff  ( ) off ers a critical discussion about the historical and 
cultural geography of disaster, in which most of the world was depicted 
by early European explorers as being dangerous places requiring inter-
vention. Drawing on David Arnold’s ( ) account of the emergence of 
tropical medicine in warmer climates, Bankoff  utilizes Arnold’s notion of 
how Western medicine defi ned equatorial parts of the world as ridden 
with disease and contagion, thereby perceiving tropical regions as vulner-
able and underdeveloped and thus justifying the colonial intervention of 
Western medicine. Thereafter, the discourse moved from a geographical 
discourse to a cultural one about inferiority and otherness.
In the same volume, Oliver-Smith ( ) challenges scholars and prac-
titioners to address the issue of uneven experiences of risk and vulnera-
bility, and particularly the geographical distance between producers of 
risk—those who reap benefi ts from exploitation of natural resources—
and those who are subjected to increased hazards. In an increasingly 
global economy, this distance increases, as the headquarters of multina-
tional corporations that emit toxic waste are often thousands of miles 
away from populations—the workers and residents near production sites 
or factories—who are exposed to waste, and often across national bor-
ders from them.
As Oliver-Smith ( ) rightly acknowledges, one of the more balanced 
approaches to globalization has been off ered by Ankie Hoogvelt ( ). 
Hoogvelt notes that, the contemporary globalized world is distinctly dif-
ferent from the world in the beginning of the twentieth century in that 
multinationals have geographically dispersed production systems that ex-
ert new forces on domestic supplies of capital, labor, and companies. This, 
in turn, means that national boundaries can no longer protect workers, 
companies, or the environment, thus making it increasingly diffi  cult to 
cope with vulnerabilities imposed by both natural and technological haz-
ards (see also Oliver-Smith ). In , at the UN’s World Conference 
on Disaster Reduction in Kobe, Japan, the resulting Hyogo Framework for 
Action noted that offi  cial development programs can lead to greater vul-
nerability (Wisner and Walker ); thus, reducing vulnerability became 
an explicit goal.
The current geopolitical and economic world order, often character-
ized by the terms “globalization” or “neoliberalism,” or some connection 
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of the two such as “neoliberal globalization,” has produced both wealth 
and inequality at an unprecedented scale. Following the demise of the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc, capitalism has emerged as the dominant 
economic paradigm, expressed as triumphalism, as found in Fukuyama’s 
phrase “End of History” ( ) or in Margaret Thatcher’s declaration, 
“There is no alternative.” Social science research has debated the con-
tours of the transformation of state authority, responsibility, and ability 
engendered by globalization. Activists, particularly those from the global 
South such as Walden Bello, Arundhati Roy, and Vandana Shiva, denounce 
what they see as neoliberal globalization’s erosion or undermining of state 
authority (e.g., Bello ; Danaher ; Danaher and Burbach ; 
Mander and Goldsmith ; Sassen ; Starr ).
Ethnographic research has qualifi ed some of these claims, pointing out 
that global governance regimes, even policies referred to as neoliberal, 
can entail the strengthening of some, which could be defi ned as “mascu-
linized,” facets of the state such as border patrols, customs regimes, and 
militaries (e.g., Chalfi n ). That said, states’ roles as protector (of work-
ers’ rights, environmental standards, or building codes) or provider (of 
services deemed basic including drinking water and sanitation, and others 
deemed social including education and health care) steadily eroded as a 
result of debt deals, austerity, and structural adjustment (Harrison ; 
McMichael ; Sassen ; Stiglitz ; Tsing ). Called the New 
Policy Agenda, the Washington Consensus, or simply neoliberalism, these 
policies and fi nancial fl ows also favored the nongovernmental organiza-
tion (NGO) sector, deemed the magic bullet (Edwards and Hulme ).
Given this global political and economic restructuring, it makes increas-
ingly less sense to think about the disaster continuum—from vulnerability 
production to disaster responses—only in relation to nation-states and 
borders. Put more simply, disasters, and the processes that give rise to 
and shape them, are increasingly global, as the chapters in this book doc-
ument. Neoliberal globalization increases the distance and speed with 
which both benefi ts and harms can travel, thus exacerbating the uneven 
development of risk and vulnerability.
Union Carbide, now Dow Chemical, acted within the logic of maximiz-
ing profi ts for shareholders, accumulating wealth and profi t in its U.S. 
headquarters, while externalizing risk, minimizing payments to workers, 
and undercutting safety. On December , , an explosion in a plant in 
Bhopal, India, released toxic gas, killing at least six thousand and injuring 
even more. Thirty years later the local community is still experiencing ele-
vated health risk. Bhopal is a clear case of the globalization of the produc-
tion of risk and vulnerability, and increasing distance between diff erential 
direction of environmental benefi ts like clean air and water, spaces for 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
Introduction • 
recreation, and so on, along with environmental risks—pollution, hazard-
ous waste, radiation, susceptibility to infectious diseases, and so on. As 
Button and Eldridge’s chapter documents, these risks constitute potential 
environmental hazards, disasters waiting to happen. 
While large industrial disasters like Bhopal, Chernobyl, or Fukushima, 
are easier to conceptualize within this frame, the globalization of risk and 
vulnerability shapes natural events like earthquakes as well. For example, 
Oliver-Smith ( ) discusses how Spanish colonial policy set into motion 
practices, relationships, exploitation of resources, and processes that ex-
acerbated the destructiveness of a  earthquake in Peru, calling it a 
-year earthquake. The January , , earthquake that devastated 
Haiti off ers another clear example of socially produced vulnerability as a 
result of neoliberal policy and practice. Although most donors claim that 
,  people perished, the Haitian government estimates that ,  
died as a result of the quake. A debate was triggered when an unpublished 
report commissioned by United States Agency for International Develop-
ment (USAID) (Schwartz, Pierre, and Calpas ) declared the death toll 
was only ,  people, thus providing us with a perfect example of how 
disasters often engender confl icting narrative accounts (Button ).
There is, however, no question the event in Haiti on January  was far 
deadlier than the Chilean earthquake that occurred six and a half weeks 
later, which was fi ve hundred times more powerful and killed  people, 
according to offi  cial sources (see Parson chapter, this volume). One of the 
reasons for the dramatic diff erence in death is the proximity of the quakes 
to urban centers (Oliver-Smith ). For an even clearer example of the 
importance of this diff erence, in September  an earthquake of similar 
magnitude to the one in Haiti, as well as similarly proximate to an urban 
center, occurred near Canterbury, New Zealand; in this instance, only one 
person died (Crowley and Elliott ).
The heightened vulnerability to disaster in Haiti was foretold in  
when tropical storm Jeanne killed ,  people. In  Haiti was slammed 
with four hurricanes: Fay, Gustav, Hanna, and Ike. While the Haitian gov-
ernment’s preparedness did result in relatively fewer deaths in  than 
in , the comparison to Cuba’s response is nonetheless stark. Cuba was 
also hit by some of the same hurricanes, but in terms of vulnerability, only 
seven Cuban as opposed to eight hundred Haitian people died. Hurricanes 
have long played a key role in the history of Cuba and were, even prior to 
the Castro government, a key factor for centuries in the development of 
modern Cuba and the nation’s sophisticated methods of preventing and 
responding to hurricanes (Perez ).
In , Oxfam published a report (Thompson and Gaviria ) distill-
ing Cuba’s formula that explains the diff erence. Between  and , 
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six major hurricanes struck the island. In that period, only sixteen people 
died in Cuba, compared to  for its island neighbors. The Oxfam report 
outlined twelve major themes, among which are communication, gov-
ernment priorities, social cohesion, and community-based institutional 
reinforcement in the civil defense and community-based disaster man-
agement approach as the keys to Cuba’s success at reducing vulnerability.
Haiti’s vulnerability is largely due to neoliberal policies that destroyed 
rural livelihoods and swelled cities like Gonaïves, the site of the deaths in 
 and most of the deaths in , and in the capital city of Port-au-
Prince. Policies championed by USAID and the World Bank triggered the 
massive urbanization that contributed to the high number of fatalities 
(Deshommes ; DeWind and Kinley ). Alex Dupuy ( ) demon-
strated that Port-au-Prince’s population quadrupled in the two decades 
since neoliberalism: from ,  in  to  million in . Coupled 
with the erosion of public services and public oversight, as a result of 
neoliberal policies households were forced to stretch what little resources 
they had and to build housing as cheaply as possible. As a result, as Yolette 
Etienne ( ) cited,  percent of the homes destroyed had been built 
since . While Haitian citizens certainly hold their own government to 
account, they also understand clearly the transnational forces, and partic-
ularly neoliberal globalization—what they call the “American Plan” or sim-
ply the “death plan.” Haiti’s earthquake was, as a result of international 
fi nancial policies, a disaster of global proportions.
A starting point for this volume is the increasing focus within disaster 
scholarship on the importance of examining the global and processual as-
pects of disaster that for too long were ignored. Building on the increasing 
ethnographic emphasis on the importance of globalization in understand-
ing the origins of disaster, this book suggests that understanding disasters 
in a translocal light is indispensable for understanding the translocal con-
struction of vulnerability and disaster.
Ethnographic insights about globalization require that processes la-
beled global, such as the global economy, are at the same time viewed as 
local (Appadurai ; Kearney ; Marcus ): for example, sweat-
shops and the workers who operate the machines are in a particular lo-
cation, as is a CEO. Scholars have adopted the term “glocal” to refer to 
this chain of localities linked together through specifi c nodes of capital. 
Disasters are expressed in much the same way. The Pressure and Release 
Model (Wisner et al. ), perhaps the most recognized equation of di-
sasters = hazards x vulnerability can be understood in this way as well 
while vulnerability, or pressure, might be built up over years and across 
borders, disasters require local agents as triggering events. The book also 
outlines three levels of vulnerability, what the authors call “root causes,” 
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“dynamic pressures,” and “hazardous conditions.” This model explains 
how local and global processes are often imbricated in one another.
A classic example of such global/translocal disasters are outbreaks 
of Ebola in West Africa. Especially devastating was the outbreak in Libe-
ria, Sierra Leone, and Guinea in  that has been confi rmed in almost 
,  cases and resulted in over ,  deaths as of May , only fi f-
teen months after the fi rst case was offi  cially registered. Emerging in-
fections like Ebola exemplify not only diseases’ indiff erence to borders 
(Markel ), but the forces of political economies’ indiff erence as well. 
Like more traditionally defi ned disasters, narratives of emerging infection 
outbreak narratives (Wald ) closely resemble disaster narratives in 
their attempt to explore the legitimization and reproduction of power.
Contemporary accounts by Western (more appropriately Northern 
since these trends are also visible in Japan) governments, the media, and 
the public represent continuities in Arnold’s ( ) thesis cited above: 
commonly-circulated tropes include “contagion,” Africa as a “disease-
ridden region,” the pathologization of poverty seeing aff ected popula-
tions as “weak” and “passive”—all of which are terms that Hewitt ( ) 
defi nes as central concepts of vulnerability (Bankoff  ). Thus, one 
could say that history not only prefi gures disaster, but also prefi gures our 
response to disaster.
The Ebola outbreak triggered a massive public health response, partic-
ularly in countries in the global North. Responses were mapped onto ex-
isting geopolitical, national, and racial inequalities, as increasingly severe 
quarantines reinscribed the isolation and marginalization of West African 
individuals (and aid workers, who were portrayed as innocent victims). 
While the rapid spread of the virus highlights the connectivity of people 
across borders, particularly via travel, the response highlights the pro-
cesses of localization.
Disasters profi led and analyzed in this volume are also experienced as 
particular, localized expressions of glocal vulnerabilities, such as Hurricane 
Sandy (also referred to as Superstorm Sandy) that Melissa Checker dis-
cusses in her chapter in this volume. Sandy is a perfect example of a single 
event having particular ramifi cations in local contexts: in Haiti the storm 
destroyed a season’s harvest in the south of the country, killing hundreds. 
In the New York metropolitan region, it fl ooded the subway system, 
knocked out power, and displaced thousands of people, further isolating 
individuals and communities that were already marginalized. Moreover, 
the fact that a hurricane could track so far north, and so late in the hurri-
cane season, has been cited as a harbinger of global climate change, sim-
ilar to the typhoon almost exactly a year later in the Philippines, thereby 
suggesting that disasters of global proportion seem to be increasing.
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As Bankoff  and Borrinaga remind us, and Checker, Parson, and Ma-
rino and Lazrus aptly demonstrate, storms also have local meanings as 
well that are often expressed in the narrative accounts of local residents. 
Because of these multiple and varied meanings, always rooted in local 
cosmologies, histories, political structures, gender ideologies, economies, 
and lived experiences, we use the term “translocal” instead of “global” 
or “glocal.” This book off ers case material from ten recent disasters—in-
cluding six events since  and two unfolding disasters resulting from 
global climate change—that to varying degrees are all translocal. Each of 
the case studies is unique in the contours of causality, risk, and vulnerabil-
ity, and certainly in the ways in which they were perceived, experienced, 
and responded to on the ground. Beyond these discrete events, this book 
off ers a range of theoretical tools that, as the title suggests, aid us in con-
texualizing disasters.
Outline of Chapters
We begin this volume with a contribution by Gregory V. Button and Erin R. 
Eldridge on the chemical spill in West Virginia’s Elk River ( ). Their chap-
ter is a “thick description” (in the broadest and best sense of the notion 
in a post-post-modernist world) of a disaster that examines how disasters 
are sometimes imbricated in one another in uncanny ways (Button , 
) and are often part of a larger sedimented cluster of disasters (Button 
). Moreover, their approach embraces the notion that disasters are 
best viewed as processes (Wisner et al. ). Their in-depth approach 
harkens back to Hewitt’s idea ( ) of the necessity to recognize the “on-
going societal and environment relations that prefi gure disaster” ( ). 
Thus they take a historical/processual approach to the socioeconomic and 
environmental conditions in West Virginia, which serve to uncover not 
only the uneven development of capital in the region (Smith ), but 
also the translocal infl uences of conditions that range from nearby states 
to locations halfway around the world, as far away as India and Europe, 
thereby underscoring the infl uence of the global forces of late state cap-
italism. In this manner, the authors tell a small story that uncovers and 
interprets larger historical and economic structures that enlarges our un-
derstanding of the evolution of disasters through space and time.
Continuing this idea of the disaster narrative, the chapter by Greg Ban-
koff  and George Emmanuel Borrinaga discusses the Category  storm that 
hit the Visayan Islands of the Philippines on November , . This event 
has two names: internationally it is referred to as Typhoon Haiyan, and 
on the archipelago it is known as Yolanda. The article discusses the two 
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ways in which the disaster is understood; according to the chapter these 
two diff erent nomenclatures have come to represent two quite diff erent 
discursive narratives about the typhoon and its aftermath. Bankoff  and 
Borrinaga argue that Typhoon Haiyan made international headline news 
and engendered analysis of climate change, freak storms (numerical cal-
culation of risk), and poverty. Typhoon Yolanda, on the other hand, has a 
storyline to do with history, accusations of incompetence (national versus 
local), and stubborn people at fault. These very diff erent discourses about 
blame and responsibility lie at the heart of the fundamental diff erence in 
the way disasters are viewed from the standpoint of the developed and 
developing worlds. Importantly, how the storm is understood shapes the 
response to it.
Assembling historical evidence and interviewing two local journalists, 
the provocative chapter stretches the concept of disaster narrative to 
its limit; perhaps, indeed, the single weather event might be better un-
derstood as two disasters. Invoking Quarantelli’s three phases of under-
standing disasters, Bankoff  and Borrinaga conclude with a series of critical 
questions that help to sharpen the focus on disaster scholarship. Whereas 
in the global North (or the developed world) disaster policy and practice 
has focused on resilience, the authors contend that in the global South (or 
the developing world) the conversation has remained focused on large-
scale vulnerability, and what renders them more vulnerable. This blame 
game is typically focused on outsiders, specifi cally advanced industrial 
nations and transnational institutions, which according to the authors can 
also serve developing nations as ideological cover to continue high-carbon 
economic development strategies.
As the chapter by Mark Schuller demonstrates, Haiti’s earthquake be-
came a global event that hailed global citizens to act. The multinational 
response broke new ground; it truly became the model for a global di-
saster. To paraphrase Ralph Waldo Emerson in his writings about the bat-
tles of Lexington and Concord that triggered the Age of Revolution, on 
January , , the tremors were felt round the world. The times are 
very diff erent, but Benedict Anderson’s ( ) insights in the role media 
play in forging “imagined communities” are useful to understand the con-
temporary era. The response to Haiti’s earthquake was one of the most 
generous in recent memory. This is in no small part because of the event’s 
high media profi le. As several analysts have noted, disaster aid feeds off  
media coverage.
However, the high media profi le—and the generosity it inspired—came 
at a price. The stories of devastation, appearing to many foreign observers 
as hell on earth, with phrases like “state failure” often repeated, foreign 
media coverage also naturalized foreign control of the response. Schull-
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er’s chapter explores this phenomenon, looking at how what might be 
called “disaster narratives” shape responses. The transnational nation 
building, the global imagined community, thus triggered a chain of events 
that empowered foreign agencies and actors. Foreign agencies assumed 
de facto control over Haiti’s governance apparatus. Framed by the contin-
ued media coverage, this foreign control was naturalized through a series 
of discourses about Haiti being a “failed state,” requiring a “republic of 
NGOs” to step in and take over. Schuller’s chapter contrasts foreign me-
dia coverage with Haitian understandings, following this discussion with 
an exploration of the connection between foreign media coverage with 
aid delivery, particularly four tropes: a weak state, dehumanization, the 
photo op, and the blame game. Schuller’s chapter ends with a series of 
refl ections on the disaster narrative.
Nia Parson’s chapter discusses powerful, competing discourses, linked 
to material, political, and economic actions and allocation of resources 
that have emerged in Chile following the  earthquake. The chapter 
centers on the contests over the offi  cial story or disaster narrative. The 
Chilean state has claimed that recovery has been moving along well, that 
Chile is a technologically sophisticated, democratic, and modern state. 
Parallel to this narrative and in response to the inaction of the government 
to address chronic disaster, social movements critique disaster capitalism 
in particular and neoliberal inequalities in general. In addition, the state 
seized on the creation of what Noam Chomsky called a pseudo-event, 
in the rescue of the thirty-three miners trapped months after, and also 
on the obvious diff erences from the response in Haiti, in eff ect directing 
attention away from systemic inequalities, also expressed in offi  cial recon-
struction. Playing to the global stage, the Chilean state portrayed itself as 
modern and advanced, and technology as the solution.
Parson’s chapter draws from insights from other scholars that diff erent 
groups create confl icting narratives of disasters and their aftermaths, as 
they negotiate old and new stakes of what matters, materially and mor-
ally, in post-disaster social and environmental contexts. States, private 
enterprises, and local, national, and global actors have diff erent stakes in 
the construction, maintenance, appropriation and contestation of offi  cial 
narratives in the aftermath of a disaster. Drawing lessons from the social 
movements organized in opposition to the newly elected neoliberal gov-
ernment, Parson’s analysis chapter builds upon the unresolved questions 
of citizenship and what it means to be human, specifi cally Agamben’s 
notion of the homo sacer—literally the “sacred man” or often translated 
as “bare life,” and the dilemmas of a supposedly universal humanity iden-
tifi ed by anthropologists such as Michel Agier ( ) and Didier Fassin 
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( ). This chapter off ers a compelling ethnographic case to move the 
conversation forward.
Bridget Love’s analysis of the problem of reconstruction in coastal mu-
nicipalities in northeast Japan in the wake of /  provides a fi nely tex-
tured analysis of the infl uence of the global economy on reconstruction 
eff orts. Japan’s postwar recovery policies that promoted accelerated eco-
nomic growth gradually faced increasing criticism for what many termed 
“Tokyo-centric development,” which made remote regions economically 
more vulnerable. Criticism of these economic policies, heightened by de-
cades of recession, and major shifts in the global economy eventually pro-
moted neoliberal approaches and a decentralized economy that would 
purportedly make rural regions more autonomous while simultaneously 
creating a more robust national economy by promoting resilience and 
innovation in outlying regions.
Unfortunately, as Love trenchantly demonstrates, these optimistic 
claims failed to produce more-robust regional economies and fell far short 
of developing regional self-suffi  ciency and innovation. In fact, the neolib-
eral policies did just the opposite and made rural communities more vul-
nerable in struggling to meet the needs of increasingly aging populations 
in an era of increasingly less government support. In the aftermath of the 
triple disasters of / , diminishing state support and massive devastation 
increased the rural communities’ vulnerability rather than making them 
more resilient. Love’s account calls into question not only Japan’s logistics 
of reconstruction, but also the negative eff ects of late state capitalism’s 
promotion of neoliberalism. On a subtler level, Love’s account also forces 
us to examine more critically global and nonlocal factors that adversely 
aff ect issues of vulnerability and resilience.
The chapter by Roberto E. Barrios reviews a number of anthropological 
insights concerning the application and production of expert knowledge 
in disaster reconstruction, based on two ethnographic studies conducted 
in Honduras after Hurricane Mitch and in New Orleans following Hurricane 
Katrina. The evidence included in these case studies problematizes two 
representations of expert knowledge. The fi rst is how technoscientifi c 
knowledge-making is often represented by its practitioners as an opti-
mal and culturally unbiased way of knowing and representing the social 
and material worlds, like the Chilean state discussed in Parson’s chapter. 
Second, technoscientifi c knowledge is often represented as a universally 
relevant basis for making prescriptions as to how people should live (or 
recover from disasters) across human societies.
Barrios leverages two compelling ethnographic case examples, each 
highlighting the shortcomings of this technoscientifi c knowledge. Both 
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case examples off er powerful evidence of the importance of local knowl-
edge and priority setting. In New Orleans, following Hurricane Katrina, 
planners made people invisible in their redevelopment plans that Barrios 
argue were directed at the unobstructed fl ow of capital, not rebuilding 
residents’ social ties and the local economies that emerged to meet their 
needs. Accessing local knowledge is also the key factor in the diff erence 
in relocation settlements in Honduras following Mitch: the textbook top-
down NGO settlement quickly degenerated into disrepair and even vio-
lence, whereas residents of a settlement that from its outset played an 
oppositional role were able to leverage what scholars call social capital. 
While the importance of local knowledge is almost too obvious a point to 
mention, Barrios’s chapter off ers both compelling case evidence and a rich 
discussion of the epistemological frames themselves, elements of what 
Button ( ) called disaster culture. To disaster scholarship, this chapter 
off ers disaster knowledge.
Like Barrios, in the next chapter Elizabeth Marino and Heather Laz-
rus call into question the privileging of technoscientifi c knowledge over 
that of local knowledge in their respective ethnographic accounts of two 
particularly vulnerable communities already experiencing what used to 
be termed slow-moving disasters, one aspect of what Rob Nixon ( ) 
termed slow violence. Marino and Lazrus base their analysis on their 
long-term research in Tuvalu (an island nation-state in the Pacifi c) and 
Shishmaref, Alaska. Shishmaref is situated on an ice shelf; because of 
melting glaciers and ice caps, planning authorities deem it necessary to 
relocate the entire town. Tuvalu, an island that never is more than a few 
meters above sea level, also faces the slow but devastating onset of cli-
mate change and the prospect of their community relocating thousands 
of miles away from home. The authors argue that in these very diff erent 
settings culturally held notions of time, fl exibility, and uncertainty do not 
necessarily conform to bureaucratically held notions of preparedness and 
response. For instance, fl exibility in the face of uncertainty about how 
and when global climate change will manifest locally is critically linked to 
personal and community interactions with time that do not necessarily 
resemble the one-size-fi ts-all notions of the bureaucratic response to di-
saster. The conclusion of the chapter underscores Button’s ( ) obser-
vation of the importance of contextualizing uncertainty in the domain of 
culture in order to arrive at a comprehensive idea of the role uncertainty 
plays in a given society.
In the fi nal chapter, Melissa Checker undertakes an in-depth investiga-
tion of the political ecology of Superstorm Sandy and the long history of 
Staten Island’s ecological degradation. Like Button and Eldridge’s chapter, 
she trenchantly demonstrates in her own way how “disasters are deeply 
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entangled in extensive political and economic webs that stretch across 
time and space.” Her highly nuanced, complex account uncovers several 
deep-seated webs of signifi cance that converge to make the island and 
its inhabitants vulnerable to not only the wrath of Superstorm Sandy, but 
also centuries of ecological degradation and gradual dense urban devel-
opment situated in and around numerous toxic waste sites. The historical 
roots of these sites date from colonial times to the Manhattan Project, 
to the creation of a massive toxic waste site (that was for a long time the 
largest site of its kind in the world), to the dumping of toxic waste from 
the ravages of /  and numerous other environmental follies. She some-
how also manages to recount how the development of the Panama Canal, 
rising sea levels, and late state global capitalism compounded the harm 
infl icted on Manhattan’s fi fth borough, often referred to by its inhabitants 
as the city’s forgotten borough. As if that is not enough, she convincingly 
argues that Staten Islanders’ complex, in-depth understanding of Super-
storm Sandy and the “ways in which it connects to other disasters, sug-
gest potential new trends in post-storm activism.”
Gregory V. Button is an internationally recognized disaster researcher and 
a former faculty member at the University of Michigan’s School of Public 
Health as well as the Department of Anthropology at the University of 
Tennessee, Knoxville, where he was a codirector of the Disasters, Dis-
placement, and Human Rights Program. As a congressional fellow, he 
wrote pathbreaking legislation for the U.S. Senate on a variety of environ-
mental issues. Over the past four decades, his scholarly work has focused 
on several aspects of disasters. He is the author of two books, Disaster Cul-
ture: Knowledge and Uncertainty in the Wake of Human and Environmental 
Catastrophe ( ) and Everyday Disasters: Rethinking Iconic Events (forth-
coming). He has served as consultant to several national and international 
agencies and NGOs. Button’s current research focuses on the evolution 
of the chemical industry and its infl uence on environmental health policy.
Mark Schuller is associate professor of anthropology and NGO leadership 
and development at Northern Illinois University and affi  liate at the Faculté 
d’Ethnologie, l’Université d’État d’Haïti. Supported by the National Sci-
ence Foundation Senior and CAREER Grant, Bellagio Center, and others, 
Schuller’s research on NGOs, globalization, disasters, and gender in Haiti 
has been published in two dozen book chapters and peer-reviewed arti-
cles, as well as in public media, including a column in Huffi  ngton Post. He 
is the author of two monographs, including Humanitarian Aftershocks in 
Haiti ( ) and coeditor of fi ve volumes, including Tectonic Shifts: Haiti 
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Since the Earthquake ( ). He is codirector/coproducer of the documen-
tary Poto Mitan: Haitian Women, Pillars of the Global Economy ( ). Re-
cipient of the Margaret Mead Award, Schuller is board chair of the Lambi 
Fund of Haiti, and is active in several solidarity eff orts.
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CHAPTER 
A Poison Runs Through It
The Elk River Chemical Spill in West Virginia
GREGORY V. BUTTON and ERIN R. ELDRIDGE
In our culture we tend to view disasters as isolated, exceptional events. 
We need to instead view them as connected to one another along various 
social fault lines and as a direct product of socioeconomic processes that 
transcend traditional boundaries of time and space. By placing disasters 
back into the dynamic fi eld of social processes and translocal boundaries, 
we gain a greater understanding of their origins.
Like the accounts of chemical contamination in other chemical corri-
dors around the nation, such as the notorious Cancer Alley in Louisiana, 
the strip along the Gulf Coast of Texas, the chemical corridor in New En-
gland (a legacy of the Industrial Revolution), the chemical corridor in west-
ern New York and Ontario, Canada (stretching originally from the Niagara 
Falls area to the Great Lakes on both sides of the international border), 
as well as in other areas of the country including Silicon Valley, the  
Elk River chemical spill was not an isolated event bound by space and 
time. Rather, it was the manifestation of historical processes shaped by 
economic and political forces from as far away as India, France, Germany, 
Washington, DC, Tennessee, Michigan, and Atlanta, Georgia (Button ). 
Thus, the spill in the Elk River serves as a classic example of how disasters 
are unfolding processes contextualized deep into the past and richly con-
fi gured in the present.
The Spill
The year  got off  to an ill-fated start in West Virginia with what would 
become the state’s fi fth major industrial disaster in eight years (Gabriel 
and Davenport ). In the early morning hours of January , residents 
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in Charleston, West Virginia, awoke to the smell of black licorice in their 
tap water. The West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection 
(DEP) soon began receiving complaints about the disturbing odor. Before 
long, ,  people were without potable water. By midmorning, state 
investigators would discover that thousands of gallons of MCHM ( -meth-
ylcyclohexanemethanol), an organic solvent, had accidentally leaked into 
the Elk River. 
Neither the state health department nor the Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention (CDC) were familiar with MCHM, which was caus-
ing headaches, eye and skin irritation, and diffi  culty breathing. In their 
attempt to discern the potentially hazardous nature of the chemical, it 
became a case of the blind leading the blind. Before long,  people had 
been rushed to the emergency ward, with some twenty people ending up 
hospitalized. By the time the crisis was offi  cially over, four hundred peo-
ple sought medical help in emergency rooms alone. Within twenty-two 
hours, the chemical plume appeared six hundred miles away in Cincinnati 
via the Ohio River. The Cincinnati water department, serving well over 
a million people, closed its intake valves and switched over to its emer-
gency water supplies. Unlike Cincinnati and Louisville, Kentucky (which 
were later aff ected by the spill), Charleston had no backup emergency 
water supplies to provide the public with a safe alternative (Peterson 
).
At :  A.M., state employees discovered the leak in a Freedom In-
dustries’ , -gallon chemical storage tank along the Elk River, only 
.  miles upriver from the intake pipe of the company that owned and 
operated Charleston’s water supply, West Virginia American Water Com-
pany. In violation of Homeland Security regulations that require reporting 
of accidents within thirty minutes of their discovery, Freedom delayed 
reporting the leak of MCHM until :  P.M.
When a Freedom Industries representative, Bob Reynolds, fi nally called 
the West Virginia Offi  ce of Homeland Security to report the spill, he was 
asked if the material was either hazardous or harmful, to which he replied, 
“No.” When asked again about the nature of the chemical spilled, he re-
plied, “It is not a hazardous substance,” which later proved to be false 
(Youngren ). Reynolds also misled the operator by fl atly stating that 
the leak was confi ned by a containment wall and was not entering the Elk 
River. In sharp contradiction, a report by the state DEP later stated that 
the inspectors discovered, around the time Reynolds called the hotline, a 
four-foot-wide crack in the containment wall leaking MCHM into the Elk 
River. The audio recording of Reynold’s misleading statements and other 
denials of wrongdoing by Freedom offi  cials led to a U.S. Attorney’s Offi  ce 
probe of the spill (Barrett ).
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Governor Earle Ray Tomlin waited an unthinkable six hours before 
issuing a “Do Not Use” order for tap water used for drinking, cooking, 
washing, or bathing (Molenda ). Schools, restaurants, hotels, and 
other businesses were forced to close. Residents of the Kanawha Valley 
rushed to purchase bottled water, and supplies were quickly depleted. 
People were shocked and amazed that Charleston, the state capital, was 
paralyzed by the crisis. Perhaps even more surprising, at no time did an 
emergency broadcast system warn inhabitants of the unfolding disaster 
(Johnson ).
Hours later, the governor declared a state of emergency and deployed 
the West Virginia National Guard. As the national media, commentators, 
policy-makers, and public health offi  cials broadcast news of the event, 
citizens across the nation were stunned that such a disaster could occur 
in one of the world’s richest nations. Near midnight, President Obama de-
clared the spill a national emergency and directed the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) to provide assistance (Resnikoff  ). 
According to Freedom’s initial reports, only ,  gallons of MCHM 
had been released. Several days later, when evidence to the contrary sur-
faced, Freedom admitted that the leak was considerably larger. Almost a 
day after the leak was identifi ed, approximately ten thousand gallons of 
the toxic chemical had entered the Elk and Kanawha Rivers, tributaries of 
the Ohio River. Two weeks after the initial spill event, Freedom informed 
government offi  cials that a second toxic chemical, propylene glycol phenyl 
ether (PPH), had also been released into the Elk River. The delay in report-
ing thus raised further suspicions since, by Freedom’s own admission, they 
had immediately informed employees of the second chemical in an e-mail 
on the day of the spill (Associated Press [AP] ).
The History of Kanawha Valley
As has been argued elsewhere, disasters are not isolated events bound 
by space and time, or even concept, but are set in motion by a set of 
preconditioned series of events and are followed by a series of cascading 
events that continue to unfold over time (Button ; Oliver-Smith ). 
In order to comprehend why the Elk River spill is not merely a discrete 
event, we need to fi rst examine the historical circumstances in which it is 
contextualized. 
Historically referred to as the Great Kanawha River Valley and later 
called simply Chemical Valley, this narrow gorge extends ninety-seven 
miles northwest from the Kanawha River origins at Gauley Bridge to the 
river’s confl uence with the Ohio River at Point Pleasant, West Virginia 
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(Cantrell ; Davis , ). The Kanawha Valley surrounds Charles-
ton, the state capital, where the Elk River joins the Kanawha River, and 
runs through the counties of Fayette, Kanawha, Putnam, and Mason, 
which are inhabited by over ,  people collectively, according to  
census data. The valley residents are predominately white, with percent-
ages below the poverty line ranging from a little over  percent in Put-
nam County to over  percent in Fayette County. Kanawha County, which 
houses Charleston, is the most populated, with about  percent of the 
population living below the poverty line (Davis ; U.S. Census Bureau 
[USCB] ; Vincent ).
According to the  census (USCB ), the city of Charleston is pop-
ulated by ,  people and ,  households, with a population density 
of over ,  people per square mile. The inhabitants are predominantly 
white, comprising .  percent of the population. African Americans make 
up .  percent, Asians .  percent, Latinos .  percent, and Native Amer-
icans .  percent. Slightly over half the population is female ( .  per-
cent) and about  percent of the populace is sixty-fi ve years of age or 
older. Using data from the Gallup-Healthways Well-Being index, Health.
com named West Virginia the most depressed state in the United States 
and proclaimed Charleston the “most miserable city in the nation” in  
(Ghabra ). More recently, the Well-Being Index ranked West Virginia 
last in their index (Witters ).
This geographic area has long been known for its raw materials and 
mineral resources, including timber, bituminous coal, oil pools, gas pock-
ets, limestone, and brines. Comparing the region to one of the earliest 
industrial sites of England in an  geological report (Carpenter / , 
), a doctor and entrepreneur of Kanawha wrote, “With cheap salt, 
cheap coal, sulpherets, timber, labor and transportation there is nothing 
lacking … to make the Kanawha Valley the Tyne of America.” Markets 
and trade networks throughout the region preceded industrialization, but 
industrial development in the valley primarily occurred along streams and 
rivers and later along roads and railways. Raw materials extracted from 
the area passed through commercial hubs, such as Charleston, which were 
initially established at major transportation centers connected to broader 
regional and national markets (Davis ; Lewis , ).
Access to the Ohio River Valley, which has been a major artery for 
commerce since the early nineteenth century, facilitated resource de-
velopment. Indeed, the Ohio River Valley’s -mile course ranging from 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, to Cairo, Illinois, is itself a chemical corridor, 
which in  alone carried .  million tons of chemicals (Wrathall , 
). Currently, in addition to the numerous industrial plants along its 
shores, there is considerable controversy surrounding the fracking indus-
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try’s proposal to move waste down the Ohio River, which, according to 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), is the most polluted river 
in the United States (Schack ) with heightened risk levels to the river 
system and its inhabitants (Koff  ).
Even though West Virginia is a rural state, much of the state has long 
been intensely industrialized (High and Lewis ). Like other areas of 
the Appalachian South, the abundance of resources in West Virginia has 
not always translated into improvements in the well-being of the citizenry 
(Lewis , – ). West Virginia has long suff ered from what author 
Michael Harrington famously described as “grinding poverty” in his path-
breaking  book, The Other America: Poverty in the United States (Har-
rington , ). From the fl oods resulting from early timber extraction, 
to the fi res, explosions, and contamination brought about by the coal and 
chemical industries, residents have long dealt with the externalized costs 
of industrial production. The state has suff ered from some of the nation’s 
worse disasters, such as the  coal mine explosion in Monongah that 
killed  men (Mine Safety and Health Administration [MSHA] ) and 
the  Logan County Buff alo Creek disaster, resulting from the collapse 
of the Pittston Coal Company’s coal slurry dam, which killed  people, 
injured ,  residents, and destroyed more than four thousand homes 
(Erikson ; Stern ). More recently, in  the Massey Coal Com-
pany’s Upper Branch mine explosion killed twenty-nine miners working in 
the mine.
In Kanawha Valley in particular, the risks and hazards imposed by the 
chemical industry have diff erential impacts. Studies show that African 
Americans and people living below the poverty line are especially vulner-
able to the risks and hazards of the chemical industry (Perlin, Sexton, and 
Wong ; Perlin, Wong, and Sexton ). Additionally, a report by the 
Center for Eff ective Government asserts that over  percent of school-
age children in Putnam and Kanawha Counties attend schools in zones 
near high-risk chemical facilities (Frank and Moulton ).
Settlement, trade, and land surveying began in the valley in the eigh-
teenth century and the town of Charleston was founded by the early nine-
teenth century. The birth of the chemical industry in the valley is often 
attributed to early brine pumping and salt brine production (an essen-
tial component in the production of many chemicals), which was initially 
done by indigenous inhabitants in the area (Cantrell ). The fi rst salt 
furnaces of the valley date back to the late eighteenth century, but the 
Ruff ner brothers are often credited with launching the commercial salt 
economy along the Kanawha River. In an area near Charleston referred 
to as Kanawha Salines, the brothers drilled their fi rst brine well in , 
reaching nearly sixty feet below the surface. Tremendous growth in the 
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industry followed, and the valley became a top supplier of salt throughout 
the country (Cantrell , ; Crawford , ). By  sixty-fi ve salt 
wells existed along ten miles of the Kanawha River. Almost three thou-
sand laborers, including over a thousand slaves brought in from the Deep 
South and Virginia, were working in salt production by  (Dunaway 
, ; Stealey , ). Production peaked between the mid- s 
and mid- s, followed by decline due to increased competition as well 
as the Civil War (Compton and Crawford , ).
While the salt industry, as well as the production of bromides and po-
tassium salts, during the s contributed to the growth of chemical 
facilities, the chemical industry in the valley did not take off  until the early 
twentieth century. At the turn of the century, the alloy manufacturing 
Wilson Aluminum Company was bought by the Electro Metallurgical Com-
pany (later referred to as Electromet), which not only became a dominant 
force in the global market for alloys, but also was the predecessor of the 
Union Carbide and Carbon Corporation, later known just as Union Carbide. 
Prior to World War I, Germany had been the world’s leading chemical 
manufacturer, but the emerging demands of war paved the way for the 
production of chlorine and caustic soda from the salt brines of Kanawha, 
as well as the manufacturing of power for explosives (Cantrell ).
By the s the chemical industry had become the fastest-growing 
industry in the nation, and the Kanawha Valley was one the major centers 
of this growth industry (Whitehead , ). Federal investment in the 
region during World War I and World War II led to the development of an 
industrial infrastructure that enabled the birth of numerous chemical com-
panies during postwar eras. By the end of World War II, Union Carbide’s 
sales alone totaled  million, second only in the chemical industry to 
DuPont’s sales of  million (Ross and Amter , ).
Before U.S. involvement in World War I, the major powder producer 
was DuPont, but as demands increased, an explosives plant was con-
structed just outside of Charleston in an area that would eventually be-
come known as Nitro; plans were made for a mustard gas plant in Belle, 
although it was repurposed before completion for the production of 
chlorine and other chemicals. The growth was spurred again during World 
War II. With the Japanese occupation of much of Southeast Asia, access 
to raw materials for the manufacture of rubber, which was essential to 
the war eff ort, became impossible to procure. The U.S. government’s 
response was to create artifi cial rubber, the ingredients for which were 
already available in West Virginia. To meet growing demands for rubber, 
the federal government built a rubber factory in Institute, West Virginia, 
and later sold the plant to Union Carbide (Cantrell , – ). After World 
War II a number of the chemicals produced in the valley became in great 
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demand and required production quotas higher than could be produced 
within the valley, so the major corporations constructed larger facilities 
along the Gulf Coast of Texas to meet the demand. The Kanawha Valley 
chemical plants began to concentrate more on producing plastics and 
agricultural chemicals (Denham ).
Over the decades the buying and selling of companies placed some 
of the largest chemical companies in the world throughout the valley at 
various points in time, including DuPont, Union Carbide, Monsanto, BF 
Goodrich, Bayer, and Dow. By  there were twenty chemical plants 
along a twenty-mile stretch of the valley (Bukro ). While the concen-
tration of chemical facilities placed the valley at the center of research and 
development in the state for much of the twentieth century, it has also 
produced a number of industrial disasters and threats to public health and 
the environment.
The manufacturing of war-related products did not end with World 
War II. In the town of Nitro, the production of the herbicide commonly 
referred to as Agent Orange at the town’s Monsanto plant not only con-
nects the valley to the poisoning of millions of people during the Vietnam 
War, but also led to a class action suit over local contamination in the 
valley (Brady ). The suit was fi led on behalf of thousands of residents 
who were adversely aff ected by Monsanto operations and was settled in 
 (Kaskey ).
One of the valley’s fi rst major industrial disasters in the twentieth cen-
tury, known as the Hawk’s Nest Tunnel Disaster, has been regarded by 
many as “America’s worst industrial disaster.” That term was the subtitle 
of a seminal book, The Hawk’s Nest Incident, by Yale University epidemiol-
ogist Martin Cherniack ( ). Because many deaths went unreported, it 
is conservatively estimated that at least  men died in the short term. In 
the long term, no doubt many more died of prolonged illness (Cherniack 
). Despite the enormity of the tragedy, the disaster has been rele-
gated to almost obscurity in the minds of the nation.
On the brink of the Great Depression, Union Carbide’s subsidiary, Elec-
tromet, began work on a three-mile tunnel through the Gauley Mountain. 
The purpose of the tunnel was to construct an aqueduct that would pro-
vide power to a Union Carbide chemical plant in Alloy. The tunnel was dug 
through a vein in the mountain that was almost pure silica; aside from the 
few men who died from the typical tunnel digging accidents, the majority 
died of acute silicosis. The disaster has long been surrounded by contro-
versy, including cover-ups and the exploitation of migrant southern black 
workers who composed  percent of the work force. It has been alleged 
by Spangler ( , ix) and others that the tunnel’s diameter was greatly 
expanded—not to facilitate the aqueduct, but rather to enrich Union Car-
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
 • Gregory V. Button and Erin R. Eldridge
bide’s metal alloying processing activities, since silica was an essential 
chemical element in the manufacturing of the alloy. The workers were 
never informed of the dangers of silica dust nor provided with the proper 
respirators to guard against silicosis (Markowitz and Rosner , ).
Both Union Carbide and the community of Institute, West Virginia, 
loomed even larger in the public’s eye in  when they were directly 
connected to one of the worst disasters of the twentieth century and 
arguably one the worst industrial disasters of all time. In December of that 
year, there was an accidental release of forty tons of methyl isocyanate 
(MIC) at a Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India. MIC is a chemical used to 
produce carbamate pesticides, and, according to the EPA ( a), it “is 
extremely toxic to humans from acute (short-term) exposure.”
The toxic cloud left thousands of people dead. The poisonous gases 
that spread over the city of ,  people created an unprecedented 
tragedy unlike any that the world has previously experienced. While the 
Indian government claimed that approximately ,  people perished and 
another ,  were severely injured, others have alleged that perhaps as 
many as ,  people were killed and another ,  were aff ected by 
exposure to the chemical (Mukerjee , ; Shrivastav ). The U.S. 
EPA estimates that the chemical accident had “adverse health eff ects in 
greater than ,  survivors.” Deleterious eff ects include decreased 
lung function, blindness, and disorders of the reproductive system (EPA 
a).
Union Carbide has long maintained that the disaster was an act of sab-
otage, while community activists and the Indian government have argued 
that the tragedy was the result of poor management and shoddy equip-
ment maintenance. In an attempt to avoid liability for the accident, Union 
Carbide became a wholly owned subsidiary of Dow Chemical Company lo-
cated in Midland, Michigan. Despite denials of liability, the Union Carbide/
Dow merger made Dow the object of civil and criminal liability in ongoing 
litigation surrounding the Bhopal disaster (Amnesty International ).
Among other things, the tragedy turned the world’s attention to Union 
Carbide’s plant in the valley community of Institute, West Virginia, where 
MIC was manufactured. It was not the fi rst time, nor the last, that critical at-
tention was focused on the West Virginia facility. Several times in the past, 
Union Carbide had been fi ned for its unlawful release of toxic chemicals 
into the Kanawha River. These releases generated a considerable amount 
of concern among the local residents, many of whom knew friends and 
neighbors who had died of cancer (Cantrell ). As early as the s, 
epidemiological studies demonstrated that Kanawha Valley residents had 
a  percent higher rate of diagnosed cancers than the national average. 
Moreover, a study conducted by the state’s department of health that res-
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idents living downwind of Institute had twice as many cancerous tumors 
as the national average (Lapierre and Moro , – ).
In the immediate wake of the Bhopal disaster, a Union Carbide offi  cial 
assured concerned Institute residents that an accidental release of toxic 
gas could not occur at the Institute plant. Later they went so far as to state 
unequivocally that their detection system would guarantee that any acci-
dental release of gas would never drift beyond the plant campus. The hor-
rifi c tragedy in Bhopal generated considerable public debate in Institute. 
While many residents felt threatened and wanted to rid their community 
of the chemical plant, a number of Union Carbide employees and support-
ers demonstrated in defense of the corporation (Cantrell , ). 
In August of , less than a year after Bhopal, Union Carbide was 
responsible for the release of a gas cloud of aldicarb oxime in Institute, 
which led to the hospitalization of over  people who experienced burn-
ing sensations in their eyes, nose, throat, and lungs. Echoes of Bhopal 
haunted the community as  million worth of newly installed safety equip-
ment failed and plant operators waited twenty minutes to alert author-
ities after the release. The chemical release manifested after a series of 
mechanical and human errors occurring over several days. Following the 
discharge, the six employees on duty were confi ned by the vapors in a 
control room where they shared an oxygen hose until they were rescued. 
East and northeastern winds carried the toxic plume through communi-
ties and over a mountain ridge (Baron, Etzel, and Sanderson ; Cantrell 
, ). 
Residents’ concerns increased when they were warned that food 
grown in the nearby area should not be eaten. The U.S. Occupational 
Health Administration (OSHA) later cited the company for “willful ne-
glect” and the violation of a number of safety procedures at the plant 
(Weir , – ). Ironically, even though Union Carbide had gone to 
great expense to install a warning system, albeit faulty, they had failed 
to develop an evacuation plan. Ed Hoff man, a local resident and activist 
briefl y described the community’s vulnerability in an interview recorded in 
Appalshop’s video documentary, Chemical Valley (Pickering and Johnson 
). As he stood overlooking the community, he stated the challenges 
that the residents faced in evacuating the area in a timely manner (Pick-
ering and Johnson ): “Right in front of us here is the campus of West 
Virginia State College. Over there is the West Virginia rehabilitation center 
and that is a place where most of the residents are physically handicapped 
and would have great diffi  culty in moving out. The inter-state [seen in the 
distance] runs along over there but you cannot get on the inter-state with-
out going by the Carbide plant.” Shortly after the incident, Union Carbide 
sold the plant facility to Rhone-Poulene, a French chemical manufacturer. 
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Later, in , the plant merged with the German fi rm of Hoeschst AG 
(part of a large conglomerate with which Bayer Chemical is also affi  liated) 
and changed the facility’s name to Aventis Cropscience and later to Bayer 
Cropscience (Cantrell , ; GMWatch ).
While the disaster at Bhopal and the chemical release in Institute 
pushed Congress to pass the Emergency Planning and Community Right 
to Know Act (or EPCRA; EPA b), which included a provision for indus-
tries to complete a toxic release inventory, the calamities continue. In 
 an explosion at the same plant, then owned by Bayer Cropscience, 
left two dead and several injured. Bayer bought the plant to manufacture 
pesticides, and, according to the Chemical Safety Board (CSB), the disaster 
could have been prevented with adequate training and proper start-up 
protocols. Had the exploding tank launched in a diff erent direction, the 
Board also noted, debris could have pierced a holding tank of MIC, the 
same chemical responsible for the Bhopal atrocities (CSB b).
Public concern was amplifi ed just two years later as the legacy of Bho-
pal once again rippled through the valley. In a -hour period beginning on 
January , , three serious leaks occurred at DuPont’s -acre facility 
in Belle, just eight miles east of Charleston. A leak of two thousand pounds 
of methyl chloride was discovered when an alarm sounded. Investigators 
eventually learned that the leak had begun three days prior to alarm going 
off . An additional leak unfolded the following day when a pipe leaked a 
cloud of sulfur trioxide. Later the same day a phosgene leak also occurred. 
Two workers died as a result of exposure to the chemicals. The CSB at-
tributed all three leaks to “preventable safety shortcomings” (CSB a). 
This historical backdrop not only reveals that the Elk River spill rep-
resents one of many preventable catastrophes in the valley, but it also 
suggests that the production of vulnerability and hazards in the valley has 
systemic underpinnings. Like the catastrophes preceding it, numerous 
uncertainties and questions over health and safety emerged in the wake 
of the spill, as the next section will illustrate.
Health Concerns Amidst Scientifi c Uncertainty
As in the wake of many disasters, conclusive scientifi c evidence is often 
lacking, especially in the initial stages of a crisis. Scientists and public of-
fi cials struggle to obtain reliable information on which to base decisions 
and the public often feels confused and uncertain about the diff erence be-
tween real and perceived risks (Button ). After state offi  cials discov-
ered the Elk River spill, emergency responders and the public struggled to 
obtain credible information about MCHM. Troubling questions persisted 
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for months after the spill and the slow and ponderous response of Free-
dom, the state, and the CDC raised both concern and questions in the pub-
lic’s mind. Uncertainties persisted when, three months after the spill, the 
CDC still had not released a report analyzing the medical records of people 
who had sought hospital treatment (Ward b). Among the many ques-
tions that lingered in the public’s mind was, How long did the leak exist 
before it was detected? Some residents claimed they had smelled the 
licorice odor as long as two to four years before the spill was discovered. 
A statement by Karen Bowling, West Virginia’s secretary of Health and Hu-
man Resources, was less than reassuring when she declared, “There are 
unknowns” (Shogren ). During the fi rst two weeks of the crisis, the 
West Virginia Poison Center received ,  calls concerning the chemical 
(Kersey ).
Because there was limited information about the chemical, the most 
prominent questions in the minds of scientists and the public were, What 
exactly is MCHM? and What potential harm, if any, does it pose to the 
public? Making matters far more complicated, there was only one rele-
vant study on the chemical: a non-peer-reviewed study conducted by the 
Tennessee-based Eastman Chemical Company. Based on their laboratory 
tests, Eastman gave the chemical an OSHA rating of “hazardous” on their 
materials data sheet (Osnos ). Jeff  McIntyre, the president of West 
Virginia American Water, made a startling statement that added to the 
level of confusion and uncertainty, “We don’t know that the water is not 
safe. But I can’t say it is safe” (Ward k). 
Offi  cials later learned that the MCHM that spilled into the river was re-
ferred to as “crude” MCHM, which contains six other ingredients, includ-
ing -methoxymethyl, water, methyl cyclohexanecarboxylate, dimethyl 
, -cyclohexanedicarboxylate, and , -cyclohexanedimethanol (Ward 
a). This revelation made the assessment of the chemical even more 
problematic since the West Virginia American Water system originally 
tested only for MCHM, leaving the toxicity of the other components in 
question. The CDC had also based its level of safety only on the assess-
ment of MCHM, not on the six additional chemicals, thereby raising con-
siderably more uncertainty about the potential deleterious eff ects of the 
spill on humans and the environment.
Equally disturbing, within the fi rst three days of the disaster Freedom 
Industries had no contact with McIntyre’s association. Since the CDC did 
not have a previously prepared safety standard for MCHM, it could only 
rely on the manufacturer’s material data sheet. Based on what little was 
known from the Eastman study, the CDC and the West Virginia Depart-
ment of Health and Human Resources set a safety limit of one part per 
million. Many were perplexed because neither agency off ered an expla-
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nation for the basis of the standard (Ward k). By January , water 
testing had detected .  parts per million. Concern increased when almost 
two weeks later Freedom informed health offi  cials that another chemical, 
PPH, was also released in the spill (Mattise ). 
Almost a week after the spill was detected, the water restrictions were 
gradually lifted for most residents. Many people aff ected by the ban were 
suspicious and reluctant to use the tap water again. Controversy arose 
around several issues, including how long residents should fl ush their wa-
ter systems before resuming their consumption. Estimates ranged from 
ten minutes to twenty-four hours. Uncertainty was further elevated when 
Scott Simonton, a Marshall University professor and member of the state 
Environmental Quality Board, announced that he discovered traces of the 
carcinogen formaldehyde in the water he tested. Menthol is one of the 
main components of MCHM and breaks down into formaldehyde. Simon-
ton warned that residents taking a hot shower were probably inhaling the 
carcinogen (McCauley ).
While it is diffi  cult to know how many people began drinking the water 
after the lifting of the ban, one interesting fact emerged when Dr. Rahul 
Gupta, the executive director of the Kanawha-Charleston Health Depart-
ment, revealed that a month after the spill, he conducted a survey (Savoia 
) at a community meeting of approximately two hundred people and 
discovered that only two people were once again drinking the tap water 
(Cogan ). A number of residents reported that even after they fl ushed 
their water system, the smell of licorice lingered. Gupta reported that 
there was deep distrust, even among public health offi  cials, about the 
limited data the CDC had used to establish safety standards for MCHM 
(Zucchino ). Dr. Richard Dennison, a scientist with the Environmental 
Defense Fund echoed similar skepticism about the federal government’s 
reliance on Eastman Chemical’s single study saying that the methodology 
employed to set the standard was fl awed. He criticized the government 
for relying on the lethal dose in rats as the basis of their calculations for 
the potential harmful eff ect on humans (Gabriel ).
Criticism emerged when the CDC failed to advise pregnant women to 
hold off  drinking the water. Eventually, they issued a statement that an 
abundance of caution should apply to pregnant women. Many believed 
that the agency had waited too long to issue this warning. Furthermore, 
others believed that until MCHM could no longer be detected in the water, 
infants and children should also continue to use bottled water. A senior 
scientist with the Natural Resource Defense Council, Jennifer Sass, rec-
ommended infants and children be included in the warning (Ward e).
In late January, the CDC, the EPA, and the West Virginia American Water 
Company, as well as other federal and state agencies, fell under further 
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scrutiny and criticism for their lack of transparency throughout the early 
days of the crisis. The Society of Environmental Journalists (SEJ; ) 
wrote a letter to the EPA accusing both federal and state offi  cials for 
“stonewalling” and a “lack of openness” and for “feeding people’s fear 
and distrust of government credibility.” In the letter to Gina McCarthy (the 
EPA administrator), the executive director of the society criticized the EPA 
(the federal agency primarily responsible for safe drinking water) for fail-
ing to comment about the spill “for almost a week” after the emergency 
was declared. The letter also condemned the CDC for failing to respond to 
requests from the media to discuss the basis on which they made their ad-
visory recommendation. While the letter focused on the EPA and the CDC 
“for being AWOL during the emergency,” it also criticized West Virginia 
American Water for refusing to take questions directly from reporters 
during the crisis (Davidson ; SEJ ). 
Things came to a head at the CDC in March when Dr. Tanja Popovic 
resigned from her post as director the CDC’s Disease Control National 
Center for Environmental Health. Popovic was the center of controversy 
for what many people perceived as her failure to respond properly to 
the call for investigation into the cancers surrounding the ongoing water 
contamination controversy at the Marine Corp’s Camp LeJeune. She has 
additionally been criticized for her role in assuring Kanawha Valley resi-
dents that the Elk River water supply was safe for consumption and for 
the agency’s delay in providing information to the public in a timely man-
ner (Ward c). 
The unfolding fi asco in the immediate aftermath of the spill highlights 
failures of both government agencies and Freedom Industries to eff ec-
tively respond in the face of crisis. In fact, the disaster has been character-
ized as “a case study in what not to do in terms of risk communication,” 
by health director Rahul Gupta (Manuel ). Although the CSB recom-
mended that the state establish a Hazardous Chemical Release Preven-
tion Program in Kanawha Valley following the  Bayer incident and 
the  explosion in Belle, the spill demonstrates persistent problems in 
emergency planning and crisis communication in the valley.
Gupta stated that the recommendations have been on the books for 
years and that, back in , he noted that development of the program 
would not be diffi  cult. “The real question is,” he commented, “are peo-
ple going to play” (Ward j). He was referring to the obstacles that 
frequently emerge alongside new regulatory proposals. In years past, in-
dustry groups openly opposed the CSB recommendations, arguing that 
they imposed unnecessary economic burdens on businesses and the state 
(Ward j). But what industry groups and their political allies fail to men-
tion is how companies like Freedom operate without consideration of the 
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socioeconomic and ecological burdens that they shift onto communities 
by externalizing costs, as a look at Freedom Industries illuminates.
Freedom Industries
The events described above and the broader history of chemical valley 
illustrate that West Virginia is no stranger to chemical calamities and 
breakdowns in emergency planning and response. Considering the state’s 
failure to heed repeated recommendations from the CSB, it is not surpris-
ing to learn that Freedom was knowingly storing corroded and improperly 
inspected tanks of MCHM in the valley (CSB ).
According to a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) document released 
in federal court, Freedom knew about problems in the tank prior to the 
spill. The document stated that Freedom was aware of state and federal 
permit protocols to protect ground, surface, and storm water from pollu-
tion, which require a spill analysis for stored substances, pollution preven-
tion training, inspections, and preventive maintenance, and an impervious 
dike or wall for protection in the advent of a leak. In  a company hired 
by Freedom to inspect the storage tanks documented damage to the dike 
wall near tank  (the culprit of the spill), yet Freedom did not repair the 
dike. Additionally, the FBI report said Freedom not only failed to properly 
inspect tank , but also intentionally excluded tank  and a few other 
tanks from the  tank inspection because they had been tagged to be 
taken out of service. Freedom, however, never retired the old tanks. The 
company, as the document stated, also did not appreciate the warnings 
about MCHM provided by the manufacturer (Ward c).
Freedom Industries, which owes millions of dollars to creditors and 
in taxes, fi led for bankruptcy soon after the disaster. The fi ling not only 
placed numerous lawsuits against the company on hold, but also stifl ed 
investigations into whether the company has any recoverable money that 
could be used for debt repayment or possibly for clean-up eff orts (Ward 
f). Freedom has since been negotiating with the West Virginia DEP to 
allow the company to apply for a voluntary remediation program, which 
would make clean-up standards less rigorous (Ward g).
The federal investigation launched in the aftermath of the spill eventu-
ally led to charges against Freedom Industries and six individuals affi  liated 
with the company for Clean Water Act violations. Three company offi  cials 
were indicted in December of . Former president of Freedom, Gary 
Southern, was also charged with over a dozen other crimes, including 
bankruptcy fraud and lying under oath, and was indicted in late January 
of  (Ward d). While these charges, as well as the recent rejection 
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of Freedom’s bankrupsy plan by a West Virginia judge (AP ) are steps 
toward holding the company accountable, the underlying political and 
economic arrangments that allowed the disaster to unfold have not been 
addressed.
Water, Politics, and the Coal Connection
When it comes to water contamination, numerous industries share culpa-
bility throughout West Virginia. In many areas of the state, catastrophes 
and contamination are so commonplace that inadequate access to clean 
and safe drinking water has become a normalized part of everyday life. 
Citizens from both coal and chemical communities interviewed by various 
media outlets in response to the spill made statements such as “We’ve 
never been able to drink our water” (Fassinger ), or “I don’t drink 
anybody’s water. Not in this state” (Parker ). 
Although a diversity of industries, including timber, chemical, and 
petroleum, have a history in the state, West Virginia is more commonly 
known for its coal economy; studies show that Appalachian coal commu-
nities have elevated health problems, including increased mortality, birth 
defects, cardiovascular disease, and cancer (Ahern et al. ; Epstein et 
al. ; Esch and Hendryx ; Hendryx ; Hendryx and Ahern ; 
Hitt and Hendryx ; Luanpitpong et al. ; Zullig and Hendryx ). 
As the Elk River debacle unfolded, so did a criminal case involving a fi eld 
technician from Appalachian Laboratories, Inc., who—under pressure 
from coal companies in West Virginia—knowingly falsifi ed coal discharge 
water quality test results. In October  this technician pleaded guilty 
to diluting water samples in an eff ort to “maintain the business with the 
coal companies” (Ward h). He was charged with Clean Water Act vi-
olations and sentenced to twenty-one months in federal prison and three 
years of probation (Ward a).
Because it is a coal-washing agent, the MCHM held by Freedom Indus-
tries highlights the juxtaposition between two hazard-prone industrial 
forces operating in West Virginia. Once coal is extracted, it is washed to 
remove impurities, often with chemicals such as MCHM, and prepared for 
transport. The leftover waste, referred to as slurry, is typically stored in 
large impoundments; sometimes, though, it is injected into abandoned un-
derground mines, posing risks for abrupt disasters like the impoundment 
failure at Buff alo Creek or threatening water supplies through slow-moving 
seepage and contamination (Burns , – ).
Kanawha Valley communities also have a history with coal slurry. A 
 New York Times exposé on toxic water showcased a West Virginia 
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community near Charleston, highlighting the water that was “sometimes 
gray, cloudy, and oily” that emerged in homes around the same time coal 
companies began injecting and dumping millions of gallons of slurry in the 
surrounding area. According to the report, residents also began experi-
encing a variety of health problems, yet state offi  cials explained that no 
action was taken because regulators did not examine pollution records 
submitted by companies until after the statute of limitations expired 
(Duhigg ).
Although Freedom is a company that deals with specialty chemicals, 
investigations following the spill revealed that J. Cliff ord Forrest, owner 
of Rosebud Mining Company, is also owner of Chemstreams Holdings, 
Inc., the parent company of Freedom Industries (Aupperlee ). Soon 
after the disaster, a western Pennsylvania news source reported that the 
MCHM from the Elk River site had been transported to a Rosebud Coal 
facility in Pennsylvania (Erdley and Aupperlee ), raising concerns not 
only in Rosebud Mining’s home in Pennsylvania, but also in Carroll County, 
Ohio, where the company has plans to set up operations. A group called 
Carroll Concerned Citizens has requested that West Virginia’s Department 
of Natural Resources put a hold on permits with the company until a num-
ber of measures are in place to protect the community (Baker ).
Despite the company’s connection to the coal industry, the West Vir-
ginia governor was quick to state, “This was not a coal-company incident. 
This was a chemical-company incident” (Biggers ). Perhaps Governor 
Tomblin attempted to downplay the spill’s link to coal because of his own 
relationship with the coal industry. The governor’s political campaign has 
benefi ted from the generous donations from the coal industry and energy 
sector (National Institute on Money in State Politics [NIMSP] ). Such 
corporate-state relationships are familiar throughout Appalachian states, 
especially in areas heavily dependent on extractive economies. Like many 
other public offi  cials throughout the region, Tomblin openly expresses his 
allegiance to coal and disdain for the EPA’s regulatory structure as illus-
trated by his statement, on January , , just a day before the Elk River 
spill, in which he stated, “I will never back down from the EPA’s misguided 
policies on coal” (Youngren ).
It is thus unsurprising that several citizens and media sources called 
attention to the state’s slack environmental policies as not only a factor in 
the chemical spill, but also as a key factor connecting pollution across in-
dustrial sectors. Speaking with reporter Omar Ghabra, a former employee 
of the coal industry in West Virginia aptly stated, “The same loose regula-
tory environment that produced Upper Big Branch, that poisoned my well 
water growing up, that poisons the air surrounding these surface mines 
everyday also gave us the Elk River spill” (Ghabra ).
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A survey taken soon after the chemical spill revealed that seven out of 
ten people in the aff ected area believed that government regulations of 
the environment were inadequate (Savoia ). Because the state has 
been historically dependent on the coal economy, much of the discourse 
and policy processes concerning the environment are bound up with coal. 
With the decline of the coal economy in core mining areas of Appalachia, 
the governor, DEP offi  cials, and other bureaucrats frequently point to 
federal environmental regulators as the culprit in the “war on coal jobs,” 
ignoring several key factors that contribute to the loss of coal jobs, includ-
ing decades of mechanization, competition with other coal regions and 
other sources of energy, depletion of reserves, and increased production 
costs (McIlmoil and Hansen ).
By reducing the narrative to a “jobs versus the environment” frame-
work, industry-friendly legislators attempt to legitimize the state’s relaxed 
stance on environmental protections in the context of economic uncer-
tainty. In late February of , to illustrate, a number of House delegates 
in the state voted to pass the industry-backed Coal Jobs and Safety Act 
of  (Senate Bill [SB] ) that reevaluates a list of mining regulations. 
Supporters of the bill claim it will improve technology, cut red tape, and 
save money that can be used to create jobs. Opponents state that despite 
the bill’s misleading title, it actually rolls back existing mine safety laws 
and environmental protections, specifi cally by altering current protocols 
for water quality standards in the pollution permit process (Johnson ; 
Ward b).
Although much of the discourse on over-reaching regulations in the 
state centers on the coal economy, the sentiment has also shaped legisla-
tive processes since the chemical spill. Under tremendous pressure from 
citizens and activists, state legislators approved Senate Bill , which 
contains the Aboveground Storage Tanks (AST) Act and the Public Water 
Supply Protection (PWSP) Act. Governor Tomblin signed the bill on April , 
; his signature was perceived as at least a step in the right direction by 
citizens and activists (West Virginia River Coalition [WVRC] ). 
Prior to SB , regulators were uncertain about the number of above-
ground storage tanks in the state; thus, the AST Act required an inventory 
and registration of tanks. By mid-December of , more than ,  
tanks had been registered. Additionally, the Act requires tank owners to 
conduct inspections and develop spill prevention response plans and leak 
detection systems, as well as to provide fi nancial assurance that they can 
eff ectively respond in the event of a spill. The PWSP Act is an eff ort to 
locate potential contamination sources within zones of critical concern, 
which are areas near streams and upstream from drinking water intakes 
(Hansen et al. a).
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Alongside the new bill, state DEP regulars began working on a proposal 
to reclassify a -mile stretch of the Kanawha River. For decades, this 
stretch has been exempt from water protections associated with drinking 
water sources. Extension of the more stringent Category A standards for 
drinking water sources would provide opportunities to develop new wa-
ter intakes and back-up water supplies, which would have proven useful 
during the Elk River catastrophe (Ward d). The coal and manufactur-
ing associations of West Virginia expressed opposition to the proposal, 
and in December one delegate sought to attach an amendment to the pro-
posal that would remove Category A applications statewide (Ward i). 
In late February of , in the midst of debacle over a derailed oil-
train disaster in the area, the DEP rule to extend Category A protections 
along the Kanawha River advanced through the House Judiciary Commit-
tee without counter-amendments (Ward e). Considering the aff ected 
population’s concerns about regulations expressed in the aforementioned 
survey, these protections may be welcomed throughout the valley. But 
the struggle over water protections and other environmental policies in 
West Virginia is ongoing. Industry-friendly lawmakers have also introduced 
bills (House Bill  and Senate Bill ) designed to gut major protec-
tions established in SB , which they say are burdensome. If successful, 
the bills would eliminate regulations on thousands of tanks (Hansen et al. 
b; Ward b).
Conclusion
The events surrounding the chemical spill into the Elk River highlight Free-
dom Industries’ callous disregard for safety and the ongoing legacy of 
government’s failure to protect the citizenry and the environment. More-
over, both the private and the public sectors were responsible for produc-
ing an informational vacuum, which thwarted an immediate and eff ective 
response and had a confounding eff ect on the public’s ability to assess the 
threat. As much of the history of the broader Appalachian South reveals, 
such failures repeatedly occur in a political economic landscape where 
public offi  cials are beholden to industry and industries are operating in 
an economic system characterized by destructive human-environmental 
relationships.
In the contemporary political climate, eff orts to regulate polluting com-
panies face tremendous obstacles. At best, regulatory mechanisms tend 
to minimize damage rather than address deeper systemic problems that 
produce vulnerability and hazards. In Kanawha Valley, some of these prob-
lems are intimately connected to the broader historical path of develop-
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ment in the region, characterized by a heavy reliance on industries that 
have fueled the nation at large with Appalachian resources made profi t-
able and “cheap” through the processes of externalization. 
In Appalachia, this too often means that communities, already disem-
powered by historically uneven political-economic processes, are fre-
quently left to deal with the unwanted burdens of contamination and 
catastrophe. The events surrounding the Elk River disaster, as well as the 
decades of other disastrous events in the state of West Virginia, provide a 
classic example of how disasters are the outcome of translocal, sociopo-
litical, and economic processes that are deeply embedded in the past and 
broadly entangled in the present.
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CHAPTER 
Whethering the Storm
The Twin Natures of Typhoons Haiyan and Yolanda
GREG BANKOFF and GEORGE EMMANUEL BORRINAGA
Super Typhoon Haiyan, known in the Philippines as Typhoon Yolanda, 
started life as a tropical depression in the western North Pacifi c (WNP) 
somewhere southeast of Pohnpei on November , . As it tracked in 
a west-northwesterly direction, it intensifi ed into a tropical storm, then 
passed over the small island nation of Palau before developing into one of 
the strongest cyclones in world history as it struck the central Philippines. 
Making landfall near Guiuan on eastern Samar in the early morning of 
November  with maximum wind speeds around  kilometers per hour, 
the typhoon was accompanied by a storm surge with wave heights of be-
tween six and seven meters and rain that caused extensive fl ooding, even 
if it was “not very heavy in comparison to many other tropical cyclones 
making landfall in the Philippines in the past” (Neussner , ). The is-
lands of Samar and Leyte were particularly hard hit with Tacloban City, the 
capital and seat of government of Region VIII, virtually wiped off  the map: 
 percent of structures were destroyed and another  percent severely 
damaged. More than ,  people died, over  million people were left 
homeless, and perhaps as many as  million people were aff ected in some 
way. Damages amounted to as much as .  billion (PHP  billion) with 
near-total losses to agricultural production in the eastern Visayas, partic-
ularly sugarcane, rice, and copra. The regional GDP is estimated to have 
been cut by at least  percent (Daniell et al. , – ).
About twenty-fi ve tropical depressions reach storm intensity or higher 
each year over the warm waters of the WNP, mainly between April and De-
cember. In fact, the WNP accounts for about one-third of all such storms 
in the world (Elsner and Liu ; Japan Meteorological Agency n.d.). 
Tropical cyclones whose maximum wind speeds exceed  kilometers per 
hour are known as typhoons and are mainly referred to in the Philippines 
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as bagyos (Hirth ). Early-season storms mainly form south of latitude 
° North and generally move on a linear track parallel to the Intertropical 
Convergence Zone. While the wind speeds of early season typhoons tend 
to be less intense, they carry greater amounts of rain and often cause 
serious fl ooding on landfall. Late-season typhoons, on the other hand, are 
generally much larger, develop at higher latitudes, and originate farther 
out in the WNP. Their paths often take them thousands of kilometers over 
open sun-drenched ocean, allowing them to grow into “heat-driven ma-
chines of enormous destructive potential” (Longshore , ).
Super Typhoon Haiyan or Yolanda, however, was a whopper even 
by the standards of late-season typhoons. The average wind speed (a 
one-minute average) of  kilometers per hour is the fourth-highest ever 
documented, and the individual gust maximum of  kilometers per hour 
is close to the world record set by Cyclone Olivia in . Since  only 
three typhoons have recorded average wind speeds higher: Typhoons 
Nancy and Violet in  and Typhoon Ida in . Most tropical cyclones 
reach their peak and begin to weaken before they make landfall, rapidly 
losing energy as their heat reservoirs run down. A noticeable feature of 
Haiyan or Yolanda, however, was that the cyclone struck the central Phil-
ippines at near peak strength, lashing the islands of Samar, Leyte, Cebu, 
and Panay with the full force of wind and water (Walsh et al. ). While 
certainly not unprecedented in historical terms, the rapid rise in coastal 
population during the twentieth century means that the impact of such 
cyclones is now devastating.
Most typhoons that regularly strike the Philippines receive only local 
reportage and pass uncommented upon by the international media. As a 
Category  cyclone, however, this one received world attention. A notable 
feature of this coverage was the diff erent name by which people referred 
to it depending on where they were. To the world at large, the event is 
known as Typhoon Haiyan; to those who live in the archipelago, it is called 
Typhoon Yolanda. Typhoons are identifi ed each year for international avi-
ation and navigation purposes with both a number and a name.  Num-
bers are simply sequential but names are drawn from a list that includes 
people, animals, plants, astrology, places, mythological fi gures, and even 
jewelry. The World Meteorology Organization’s regional offi  ce in Tokyo is 
responsible for choosing the name according to an arranged set of proce-
dures: “Haiyan” was drawn from the Chinese list.
Each nation (and district), however, retains the discretion to decide 
whether to use this international name for internal typhoon reporting. 
Since  any tropical cyclone entering the Philippine Area of Responsi-
bility is identifi ed by assigning it a Filipino name (until quite recently only 
a woman’s nickname ending in “ng”) from one of four sets arranged al-
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phabetically by the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical 
Services Administration. One set of names is used each year so that par-
ticular names repeat themselves every four years, and each set is accom-
panied by an auxiliary list from A to G in case the number of typhoons in 
any one season exceeds the nineteen-letter Filipino alphabet. The names 
used internationally to identify tropical cyclones are only used in the Phil-
ippines as advisories to airlines and for navigation purposes as ones in the 
vernacular prove to be better heeded by Filipinos. A typhoon that causes 
damages in excess of PHP  billion ( , , ) and/or claims more than 
three hundred lives is classifi ed as destructive and the name decommis-
sioned and removed from the list (Bankoff  , ). Being a late-season 
storm, internationally designated Typhoon Haiyan was accorded a Filipino 
name beginning in Y: Typhoon Yolanda.
However, these two diff erent nomenclatures signify much more than 
a system of international and national meteorological classifi cations of 
wind intensities: they have come to represent two quite diff erent discur-
sive narratives about the typhoon and its aftermath. Typhoon Haiyan is 
headline news that explains the storm in terms of climate change, freak 
storms (numerical calculation of risk), and poverty. Typhoon Yolanda, on 
the other hand, has a storyline to do with national politics, accusations 
of incompetence (national versus local), identity, and self-worth. These 
very diff erent narratives about blame and responsibility also lie at the 
heart of a fundamental diff erence in the way disasters are viewed from 
the standpoint of the developed and developing worlds: to the former, 
the emphasis is now much more on resilience and people’s capacity; to the 
latter, disasters are still very much about vulnerability and disentitlement.
Typhoons in the Philippines
Reconstructing the histories of typhoons in the WNP is patchy prior to the 
late nineteenth century. Only with the establishment of meteorological 
observatories were statistics on wind velocities and precipitation pub-
lished on a regular basis. Many of these observatories, like the one at 
Manila founded in , were established by Jesuits. They issued timely 
warnings to shipping and coastal authorities. These daily observations on 
barometric pressures, thermometer readings, wind force and direction, 
and rainfall were usually disseminated in the form of monthly bulletins 
(Udías , – ). The staff s of such observatories, however, were 
more than simply collators of data: they were also scientists and pioneers 
in instrument improvement and design for tropical locations. A striking 
feature of the Jesuits working at the Manila Observatory, for example, 
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was the novel ways in which they adapted imported precision instrumen-
tation to local conditions. This innovation began with the simple modifi ca-
tion of an aneroid barometer in , led to combining a barometer and a 
cyclonometer into one instrument in , and culminated in the invention 
of a refraction nephoscope to determine cloud direction and velocity in 
 (Solá , – , – ).
Prior to the second half of the nineteenth century, the record of trop-
ical cyclones in the WNP is based on archival material. While systematic 
records for some counties in China exist from the Northern Song Dynasty 
( –  CE), this is unusual (Liu, Shen, and Louie ). Sources for the 
Philippines are based on a chronicle of typhoons striking the archipel-
ago between  and  compiled by Miguel Selga, the Jesuit director 
of the Manila Observatory from  to . Unlike the Chinese record 
that is exclusively about typhoons that made landfall, much of the early 
Spanish material concerns losses at sea. Typhoons have played a signif-
icant role in the maritime history of the islands not only posing a threat 
to trans-Pacifi c communications, but also sometimes devastating entire 
fl eets. During the Napoleonic Wars, for instance, a Spanish fl eet on its way 
to intercept an English convoy was wrecked by a typhoon on the night of 
April ,  (Selga ). Even during World War II, naval vessels were 
still vulnerable: U.S. Navy Task Force  that was engaged in the “liber-
ation” or re-conquest of the archipelago from the Japanese was badly 
damaged by Typhoon Cobra on December , .  
Though Selga’s data are undoubtedly incomplete, the record does pro-
vide accurate information on the historical path of typhoons that match 
present-day variability and monthly distribution (García-Herrera et al. , 
). On average, eight or nine typhoons make landfall over the Philippines 
each year (Brown ). The most common track described by Selga is 
for typhoons to form near Guam, move in an extended arc westward to 
Luzon, and from there split into two branches, one curving farther north-
ward toward Japan and Korea and the other continuing westward across 
the South China Sea (Ribera et al. , ). The northern part of Luzon 
and the Batanes Islands were (and are) the most frequently exposed re-
gion of the archipelago. Selga’s chronicle depicts a colonial society beset 
by typhoons like that of July  that was described as “the fi ercest ty-
phoon ever experienced in these islands” (Selga , ). In particular, 
the chronicle also provides mortality fi gures proving the extent of the 
damage wrought. Thus the typhoon that devastated Manila and the Ilo-
cos region in September  caused conservatively ,  deaths (Ribera, 
García-Herrera, and Gimeno , – ).
The intensity of typhoons may be categorized by wind velocity but trop-
ical cyclones and storms are also responsible for much of the precipitation 
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that falls in the Philippines. Historically, it is diffi  cult to determine how 
much rainfall and associated fl ooding was due to the passage of typhoons. 
A list drawn up from the minutes of local town chronicles held by the Ma-
nila Observatory, however, give some indication of the level of precipita-
tion as well as constituting a record of major fl oods that occurred in those 
parts of the islands occupied by the Spanish between  and . While 
again almost certainly incomplete, the list does provide an indication of 
the primary causes, geographical predisposition, and even the frequency 
of notable fl oods in specifi c areas.  In particular, the chronicles frequently 
refer to fl ooding in connection to the passage of tropical cyclones: over  
percent of all recorded fl oods might be directly attributable to typhoons 
over this period (Archives of the Manila Observatory, Box- , ; Bankoff  
). Modern estimates bear out such statistics with tropical cyclones 
held responsible for  percent of the average annual rainfall in the archi-
pelago (Rantucci , ). The close correlation between fl ooding and 
typhoons also suggests seasonality in their occurrence that corresponds 
to the greater frequency of tropical cyclones between July and November, 
the tag-ulan (rainy season).
Selga’s chronology also allows a historical reconstruction of signifi cant 
typhoons in the Samar-Leyte area that demonstrates that, while the wind 
intensity and storm surge associated with Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda were 
exceptional, they were by no means unique. While there are scattered 
references to tropical cyclones striking these islands prior to , it is 
really only from the mid-nineteenth century that a more detailed chronol-
ogy can be reconstructed. What this record reveals is the frequency with 
which people living in Samar and Leyte were exposed to the full force 
of tropical cyclones—on average several times in a lifetime. In particu-
lar, these cyclones took a heavy toll on agriculture, as when a “heavy ty-
phoon” in November  caused the total loss of the harvest in western 
Samar, or when “the violence of the winds” and “the excessiveness of the 
rain” damaged palay (rice), abaca, sugarcane, and camote (sweet potato) 
fi elds in southern Samar in November  (Selga , ). Flooding was 
also frequently associated with the passing of such typhoons. A “terrible 
storm” that lashed Leyte in mid-December  caused the Abuyog River 
to swell, forcing people to take refuge on their roofs and destroying about 
a thousand houses in the province (Selga , ).
On some occasions the track of these typhoons was virtually identical 
to that followed by Haiyan or Yolanda. The typhoon that passed over Leyte 
and Samar in October  is the best recorded example, as it also gener-
ated a tremendous storm surge that destroyed completely several towns 
and claimed about  human victims (Algue ). However, a cyclone 
on  November  reputedly “wrought enormous damage” to Capiz 
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and also partially destroyed Tacloban (“ ,  die in Philippine storm” 
).  Yet another late-season typhoon on November , , struck the 
same eastern Samar town of Guiuan before passing south of Tacloban 
and “giving rise to an unprecedented fl ood,” presumably a storm surge, 
that caused considerable damage to Leyte (Selga , ). Sometimes 
the storm did not even need to be classifi ed as a typhoon to cause ex-
tensive destruction and death. Typhoon Uring (international code named 
Thelma) was technically a tropical storm by the time it reached Tacloban 
on November – , , just fi ve months after the eruption of Mount Pi-
natubo. Nonetheless, as the storm passed over high terrain, it unleashed 
torrential downfalls up to  millimeters that fell within a three-hour pe-
riod. In particular, the Anilao-Malbasag watershed above Ormoc City was 
overwhelmed. Flash fl ooding devastated most of the city in a matter of 
minutes, killing ,  people in the urban area (Dañguilan-Vitug , – ). 
Perhaps, more than any other hazard, tropical cyclones have infl uenced 
the lives and livelihoods of Filipinos, past and present, creating a complex 
web of relationships that oscillates between disaster on the one hand and 
the timely need for rainfall and agricultural productivity on the other.
It’s All in the Name
A mature typhoon is a formidable thermodynamic engine consisting of 
an array of intense line squalls spiraling inward to a common circle or 
eye. Surface winds blow inward along the squall lines with ever-increasing 
velocity being diverted fi rst upward and then outward, with the resulting 
cloud crown spreading for hundreds of kilometers. Typhoons depend for 
energy on these inwardly spiraling winds that extract surface moisture 
and heat from millions of square miles of surrounding ocean. In the WNP 
typhoons move slowly westward with the prevailing easterlies. Their exact 
paths, however, depend on the prevailing mean pressure gradients that 
push them northward and eastward according to the seasonal oceanic 
high-pressure centers they encounter (Dorn , – ). Statistically, the 
densest concentration of typhoon tracks in the world lies between Manila 
and southern Japan, a distance of about ,  kilometers and colloquially 
known as Typhoon Alley.
To the outside world, a typhoon is either a white, whirling mass that 
appears as a satellite picture enfolding land and sea within its mantle and 
obscuring the nation over which it passes, or it is an intensely multicolored 
computer projection where the depth of shade signifi es the level of pre-
cipitation. It is given an international codename like Typhoon Haiyan and 
its history is chartered, recorded, and soon forgotten by the world’s media 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
 • Greg Bankoff  and George Emmanuel Borrinaga
and public alike. To those for whom the typhoon is not simply a media 
headline or a nightly weather anecdote, who live through the storm and 
experience its property-damaging winds and life-threatening waters, a ty-
phoon is personal, part of the narrative of life. For many who live in coun-
tries like the Philippines, it is a frequent life experience, one that, even if 
they have not completely learned how to cope with it, they have come to 
expect (Bankoff  ). The late Fr. Miguel Selga concluded that the fre-
quency of such storms induced a condition of mass fear among Filipinos 
for which he coined the word “tifonitis.” He defi ned this condition as “a 
pathological state owing to nervous over-stimulation produced by the 
frequency or extraordinary intensity of typhoons,” and then proceeded to 
describe in great detail the events of mass-induced hysteria that followed 
the passing of fi ve strong typhoons in quick succession between October 
 and December ,  (Selga , – ). In the Philippines, such 
storms are also given names, local names like Yolanda that refl ect the re-
ality of the lived-through experience. In many respects, these two names, 
the international and the national, even though they refer to the same 
typhoon, represent diff erent events. The diff erently named typhoons are 
described in diff erent ways, they are attributed to diff erent agencies, and 
they leave diff erent legacies.
Typhoon Haiyan
Apart from narratives about the human tragedy and cost, the interna-
tional reportage of Typhoon Haiyan was principally about climate change 
in which the storm’s unprecedented winds and rains were depicted as “a 
sign of what’s to come in a warmer world” (Walsh , ). This confl a-
tion of weather and climate was dramatically moved to center stage due 
to the typhoon coinciding with the opening of the annual United Nations 
Climate Change Conference in Poland on November . In particular, ex-
tensive publicity was given to the remarks of the Philippines represen-
tative and head of his country’s national climate commission, Naderev 
“Yeb” Saño. In a passionate speech, he linked Haiyan to the reality of 
climate change. “What my country is going through as a result of this 
extreme climate event is madness,” he said to  delegates. “We can 
fi x this. We can stop this madness. Right now, right here.” He challenged 
climate sceptics, urging them to “get off  their ivory towers” and see the 
impact of climate change fi rsthand (Vidal and Vaughan ). In particu-
lar, he reminded delegates that typhoons such as Haiyan represented “a 
sobering reminder to the international community that we cannot aff ord 
to procrastinate on climate change” and he vowed to stop eating until ne-
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gotiators at the conference made “meaningful” progress (Withnall ). 
He also revealed that his family came from Tacloban and that, as he spoke, 
his brother was “gathering bodies of the dead with his own two hands” 
(“Typhoon Haiyan: Is Climate Change to Blame?” ). He sat down, sob-
bing, to a standing ovation.
This was not the fi rst occasion at which Yeb Saño had broken down 
during such an address. At the previous year’s conference held in Doha, he 
had made a similarly impassioned plea to the assembled delegates just as 
Typhoon Bopha (aka Pablo), the strongest tropical cyclone to ever hit the 
southern Philippines, cut a swathe of destruction across Mindanao, leav-
ing thousands homeless and causing more than  fatalities. “I appeal to 
all, please, no more delays, no more excuses” he said. “Please, let Doha be 
remembered as the place where we found the political will to turn things 
around. Please, let  be remembered as the year the world found the 
courage to fi nd the will to take responsibility for the future we want. I ask 
of all of us here, if not us, then who? If not now, then when? If not here, 
then where?” (Vidal ). Both the typhoon’s southerly trajectory and 
its intensity, he continued, comparing it to Hurricane Sandy that had hit 
New York, Haiti, and Cuba the month before, were clear signs of climate 
change. Again, the hall rose and applauded. Such international dramatics 
help convey the notion that countries like the Philippines are on the front-
line of climate change, a condition caused by the carbon-intensive econ-
omies of the developed world who have failed to curb their greenhouse 
emissions. The implication, of course, is that such governments should 
acknowledge their responsibilities and provide large-scale compensation 
to those countries and people most aff ected by climate change (Bello 
, ).
There is some scientifi c evidence that appears to support Yeb Saño and 
the Philippine government’s claims. As has already been stated, Typhoon 
Haiyan was reputedly the strongest storm ever to make landfall and two 
of the other top fi ve storms with the highest wind speeds, Typhoon Zeb 
( ) and Typhoon Megi ( ), also struck the Philippines (Alexander 
). It was the third time, too, in less than a year that a powerful ty-
phoon had struck the archipelago: the previous August, Typhoon Trami 
had caused massive fl ooding on the island of Luzon, and fl ash fl oods had 
led to hundreds of deaths when Typhoon Bopha cut across a sleeping Min-
danao in December  (Schiermeier ). Future projections based on 
high resolution models indicate that such scenarios are likely to become 
more commonplace as greenhouse warming causes the average intensity 
of tropical cyclones to rise –  percent by  (Knutson et al. ). The 
Pacifi c Ocean, too, is warming—possibly faster than at any time in the past 
ten thousand years. Logic would suggest a clear relationship between the 
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intensity of storms and a warming world: a warmer world will probably 
feature more-extreme weather. As regards the Philippines, government 
statistics also suggest that typhoons are getting stronger: from –
, the recorded highest wind speed of a typhoon was  kilometers 
per hour; between  and , it was  kilometers per hour; and in 
the past thirteen years the highest wind speed was  kilometers per 
hour, recorded with Typhoon Reming in November  (Vidal and Car-
rington ). Sea levels are also rising. Since , sea levels around the 
world have risen on average by eight inches and the rate of increase has 
nearly doubled in the past two decades. Changes in wind patterns have 
meant that rises in the Philippines have been the highest anywhere in the 
world, three times more than the global average (Lean ). All this taken 
together with Tacloban’s location at the end of a long funnel-like bay un-
doubtedly contributed to the height of the storm surge that November 
morning.
The problem, however, is that science is never quite so defi nitive or 
clear-cut. In fact, there is little real evidence to support the contention 
that global warming is making for a higher number of storms. For a start, 
the average surface temperature of the planet seems to have increased 
far more slowly in the past decade that it did over previous ones: just 
. ° Centigrade between  and  compared to the . ° Centigrade 
decadal rise since . The planet is still warming, but natural climate 
variability and the eff ect of the oceans that absorb  percent of heat en-
ergy may account for what climatologists expect to be only a temporary 
respite (Lepage ). Moreover, fi gures vary greatly according to how 
and where they are calculated.
Perhaps, more importantly, the number of tropical cyclones around the 
world over the past forty years has remained fairly stable at around ninety 
a year. These fi gures are reliable since they are based on satellite technol-
ogy. Although global warming may increase the thermodynamic potential 
for tropical cyclones, their frequency depends on several other factors like 
shear winds (winds blowing in opposite directions and diff erent intensities 
at diff erent altitudes) that often decrease the likelihood of storms as the 
climate warms. In fact, models actually project a decrease of between 
 and  percent in the global average annual frequency of tropical cy-
clones even if their intensity in the North Atlantic is set to increase over 
the next century (Emanuel ; Knutson et al. ; Schiermeier ). 
The most recent report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) suggests that the global frequency of tropical cyclones will 
either decrease or remain essentially unchanged in the twenty-fi rst cen-
tury. Though there is lower confi dence in region-specifi c projections, there 
is general agreement that the physical and social impact of such storms is 
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likely to substantially increase in some ocean basins (IPCC , – ). All 
these projections, however, have an underlying fl aw in that they are based 
on a historical record that is unreliable and patchy. Even so, certain trends 
are discernible and suggest a pronounced poleward migration over the 
past thirty years in the average latitudes at which tropical cyclones achieve 
their lifetime-maximum intensity. This shift in cyclogenesis away from 
tropical regions is plausibly linked to the expansion of the tropical zone as 
the result of anthropogenic factors (Kossin, Emmanuel, and Vecchi ).
Typhoon Haiyan, however, was not solely attributed to climate change. 
Another, much more familiar trope also surfaced as a causal agent or cul-
prit. Some international news reports blamed the actions or inactions of 
humans, or, to put it another way, on Filipinos, for the tropical cyclone and 
held that their poverty, mismanagement, and corruption was responsible 
for the extent of the destruction that ensued. Brian McNoldy, a senior re-
search associate at the University of Miami is reported to have attributed 
–  percent of the devastation to human causes (Borenstein ). Peo-
ple are vulnerable, the meteorologists argue, because they have moved 
in large numbers to exposed coastal areas where they live in poorly con-
structed houses. Four out of ten Filipinos now reside in storm-prone cities 
of more than , , according to a recent UN HABITAT study ( ). 
Tacloban is no exception: the population has tripled in the past forty years 
from ,  to ,  inhabitants. About a third of these people live in 
houses with wooden exteriors, and one in seven has a grass roof. The 
mangrove forest, too, that used to protect the city from storms has largely 
been felled (Lean ). Such cities, according to Richard Olson, the direc-
tor of the Extreme Events Institute of Florida University, are “urban time 
bombs” (Borenstein ).
But just as human factors can make a disaster worse, so, it is implied, 
do people have it in their power to make themselves more resilient by 
reducing the risk “through stronger buildings, better warnings and a 
quicker government response” (“Humans to Blame for Scale of Devas-
tation Caused by Typhoon Haiyan Say Experts!” ). An alliance of de-
veloping nations like the Philippines, the Group of  plus China, are now 
demanding compensation from the worst polluting countries for the dam-
age done to the climate and the plight they fi nd themselves in. Advocates 
hope to see  billion a year pledged to a Green Climate Fund estab-
lished in  with the intention of helping poorer countries reduce their 
emissions and prepare for climate change. While these fund-raising goals 
remain little more than aspirational at present (Myers and Kulish ), the 
sheer destructive power of Typhoon Haiyan “all but assures that the super 
typhoon will become a symbol of climate change for years to come, just as 
Hurricane Katrina and Super Storm Sandy have” (Walsh , ).
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Typhoon Yolanda
If, at an international level, Typhoon Haiyan remains very much a narrative 
of climate change underlain with a sense that the fault, at least partly, was 
self-infl icted, Typhoon Yolanda, on the other hand, has a storyline that is 
rooted in the past and is played out in the arena of national and local pol-
itics where accusations of incompetence are used to castigate electoral 
rivals and gain the advantage for one’s faction or clan (often one and the 
same thing). It is not that climate change is completely absent from the 
debate—it is just that it is not really applicable in the local context. At 
a more popular level, the tale is about a people once confi dent in their 
capacity to manage whatever the storm had to throw at them, as they 
had done so many times before, but subsequently humbled by a divine 
reminder of their vulnerability in the face of natural forces.
Like Typhoon Haiyan, too, Yolanda had its media moment that, even 
though aired in an international setting, had its principal impact on a na-
tional audience. President Aquino’s controversial interview with CNN’s 
Christiane Amanpour on November , , painted a much rosier picture 
of what was taking place in Tacloban than was being reported in both 
the national and international press. In particular, Aquino was attacked 
(especially in the social media) for his downplaying of police projections 
of the number of deaths from Yolanda and for casting blame for the slow 
response on local government. John Nery, a respected local columnist and 
author, argued, however, that it was not only Aquino who made mistakes 
in the interview. Amanpour, by attempting to defi ne the Aquino presi-
dency through his actions, was framing him in largely Western historical 
terms comparable to President George W. Bush and Hurricane Katrina in 
 (Nery ). Nery also argued that the negative social media feed-
back to Aquino’s answers was a manifestation of a lingering colonial men-
tality, a narrative that views Filipinos as still ensnared by the infl uence of 
centuries of foreign, and especially American, culture (Constantino ). 
Nery concluded, “Those of us who agreed with [Amanpour’s] premise 
[of how Aquino’s response to Yolanda could be legacy defi ning] had the 
wrong history in mind” since, in his view, no Philippine president had ever 
been “defi ned by his or her response to a national catastrophe” (Nery 
)
Although the legacy of Typhoon Yolanda on Aquino’s presidency re-
mains uncertain, the narratives surrounding post-Yolanda politics must be 
seen in the context of the promise held by his landslide electoral victory 
in . President Aquino ran under a platform of “Matuwid na Daan” 
(straight path or honest governance), to implement reforms and prose-
cute corrupt offi  cials from the previous Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) 
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administration (Quimpo ). Yet the discourse about the typhoon has 
become mired in political rivalries and claims and counterclaims that have 
much in common with the sleaze of former presidencies about them.
In particular, the physical storm became a political storm when Interior 
Secretary Mar Roxas reportedly warned Mayor Alfred Romualdez of Ta-
cloban City, a day or two after the typhoon, to be “very careful because 
you are a Romualdez and our president is an Aquino” (“Transcript: Ro-
mualdez, Roxas Meet Post-Yolanda” ). Such incidents bring to the 
fore the issue of the role of family dynasties in what has been described 
as the “personalistic” and “dynastic” political culture in the Philippines 
(Aceron , ; Casiple ). Mayor Romualdez is the nephew of for-
mer fi rst lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, widow of President Ferdinand 
Marcos ( – ). President Benigno Aquino III, on the other hand, is 
the son of martyred Marcos archcritic Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino Jr. and 
Corazon “Cory” Aquino, Ninoy’s widow who was catapulted into the pres-
idency in the wake of the  EDSA or People Power Revolution. In the 
Amanpour interview and on several other occasions, President Aquino 
has stressed that local governments are the fi rst responders during disas-
ters. In his defense, Romualdez retorted that his ability to respond had 
been impaired both by the magnitude of the calamity and by a reduction 
in municipal capabilities: many emergency service personnel and police 
offi  cers either went missing or abandoned their posts to look after their 
own families. Under these circumstances, he continued, local government 
needs national intervention (Tindog Tacloban ; “Aquino, Romualdez 
Trade Barbs over Haiyan” ). Despite the serious issues of governance 
at stake here, the episode mainly evoked the long-standing political rivalry 
between the Cojuangco-Aquino and Romualdez-Marcos dynasties and 
how paternalistic narratives continue to shape national and provincial 
politics in the Philippines.
The politicization of Yolanda, however, was also very much a local af-
fair as disputes between national and provincial offi  cials were mirrored 
in barangay (district)-level problems to do with relief distribution. There 
were claims that barangay offi  cials from opposition parties were denied 
relief goods and other forms of aid because of their rival political affi  l-
iation. One such case occurred in the barangay of Guindapunan in the 
municipality of Palo (situated directly south of Tacloban City), where more 
than a thousand people had been killed on November . The mayor of 
Palo, Remedios Petilla, and mother of both the provincial governor and 
a minister in Aquino’s cabinet, decided not to distribute aid through the 
barangay captain of Guindapunan, who happened to be an ally of former 
fi rst lady Imelda Marcos. While the scale and veracity of these kinds of al-
legations are diffi  cult to confi rm, a Reuters report based on more than fi fty 
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interviews across the province concluded, “A picture emerges of an aid 
campaign riven with rivalries and vulnerable to abuse” (Layne and Mogato 
). This funneling of resources has been termed locally “color-coding” 
or “the selective distribution of aid along political lines, or by the colors 
associated with diff erent parties,” eff ectively the selective distribution of 
relief items to friends and supporters of local offi  cials (Layne and Mogato 
; Cruz , ). Perceived critics of barangay offi  cials were simply not 
provided with relief items or were referred to adjacent barangays for aid 
(Abrematea, interview, ; Cayanong, interview, ).
Bickering by government offi  cials is seen as one of the principal rea-
sons for the lack of leadership on the ground in the critical days after 
Yolanda made landfall. Preexisting factional and personal rivalries were 
compounded by problems of logistics and communications, leading inter-
national aid workers to observe, “Offi  cials did not have a full grasp of the 
magnitude of the devastation and could provide no guidance on when 
basic emergency needs could be met” (Esguerra and Ubac ). Such 
impressions were only confi rmed by the presence in devastated areas of 
politicians with known presidential ambitions (e.g., Secretary Mar Roxas 
of the Department of Interior and Local Government, Vice President Je-
jomar Binay, and Senator Bongbong Marcos, among others). Rather than 
overseeing the relief eff orts, their actions were interpreted as early pol-
iticking for the  presidential election as relief goods were allegedly 
repacked into bags featuring the names of the various contenders for high 
offi  ce (Cruz ).
In its  report, Assessment of Disaster Risk Reduction and Manage-
ment at the Local Level, the Commission on Audit blamed patronage pol-
itics for the government’s failure to protect and aid poor Filipinos in the 
country’s high-risk zones despite the enactment of the new Philippine 
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act . “As a result of pa-
tronage,” the report affi  rmed, “decisions are based on electoral consider-
ations rather than on evidence of technical assessments” (Commission on 
Audit , ). Meantime, most Filipinos were glued to their TV screens 
watching the Senate testimony of the detained Janet “Jenny” Lim-Napoles. 
Napoles is accused of being the mastermind behind the Priority Develop-
ment Assistance Fund scam that allegedly allowed members of Congress 
to channel discretionary spending through fake nongovernmental organi-
zations (NGOs) on nonexistent projects and pocket the money for them-
selves (Carvajal ). Some survivors even cited the Senate hearing, aired 
the day before the typhoon struck, as a factor that distracted them from 
making proper preparations for the storm.
Apart from the mutual recriminations and fi nger-pointing among poli-
ticians, blame was also leveled at the most vulnerable: the many informal 
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settlers who live in the most exposed coastal slums. These communities 
often have very tenuous relations with local government administrators, 
and are seen as either sources of votes or as obstacles to development. 
Their inhabitants are often characterized as overly stubborn, people who 
generally resist government advice and ignore offi  cial warnings, and who, 
in the case of Yolanda, failed to evacuate when repeatedly told about the 
dangers (Tindog Tacloban ).
Rather surprisingly, this is a view largely shared by many of the sur-
vivors. A common reason residents cite for the high number of deaths 
among such settlements is their kumpyansa, or overconfi dence, in their 
capacity to withstand what turned out to be the strongest typhoon the 
region had faced in living memory. The people of the eastern Visayas are 
accustomed to typhoons but the collective memory of the storm surges 
that sometimes accompany such events and what they should do has 
largely disappeared from local narratives (Lotilla ; Montalvan ). 
Thus, although people were prepared for fl ooding and expected damage 
to their homes and property, they did not expect the six-meter storm 
surge. It was this wave of water, subsequent reports have confi rmed, 
that caused the greatest number of casualties. It is estimated that “ % 
of the casualties along the coast died from the storm surge” (Neussner 
, ). Many residents also evidently failed to understand exactly what 
a storm surge was and the dangers posed to them and their families. One 
survivor later told an interviewer, “I don’t understand ‘storm surge.’ If 
they said tsunami or tidal wave we should have evacuated” (Neussner 
, ). The aftermath of the storm, too, led others to doubt themselves 
and their worthiness. For many, Yolanda was God’s punishment for their 
shortcomings. “Guin kastigo kita” (we were punished), said one elderly 
woman to a friend. Teenagers sang or played through their cell phones a 
popular Filipino rap song called “Lord, Patawad” (Lord, forgive us), and 
spray-painted the song’s title on the walls of destroyed homes, buildings, 
and ships washed inland. The spread of a scientifi c paradigm that explains 
typhoons in terms of rising sea surface temperatures and climate change 
has not greatly diminished alternative views that explain calamities as the 
work of divine agency or as manifestations of a capricious nature (Bankoff  
).
Whethering the Storm
Whether one calls it Typhoon Haiyan or Typhoon Yolanda matters because 
how societies make sense of disasters contributes to their impact. Peo-
ple’s behavior is shaped not only by their past experience of disaster, but 
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also by “a cultural narrative that creates a set of expectations and sen-
sitizes people to some problems more than others” (Furedi , ). 
These narratives also change over time to refl ect shifts in cultural norms 
and perceptions; what constitutes a disaster and how it is explained also 
has a history. Understanding the changing nature of how disasters are 
visualized is signifi cant because it is related to how people react to such 
phenomena. According to E. L. Quarantelli, how societies think about di-
sasters passes through three phases that are chronological in principle if 
often overlapping in practice.
First, a culture may exhibit a fatalistic acceptance of disasters, histor-
ically ascribing what happens to acts of God, an attribution that is often 
enshrined in a society’s legal system. The implication is that such acts are 
random and that no one can do anything practical to avoid them: disasters 
are simply to be endured. Such fatalistic attitudes to disasters, Quarantelli 
( ) argues, did not encourage the development of innovative social 
arrangements to better prepare for such events. These beliefs gave way 
after the destruction of Lisbon in  to a second perception—at least 
in Western societies: societies are able to adjust and modify the impact 
of disasters to some degree. Russell Dynes points to the development of 
earthquake-resistant architecture around the mid-eighteenth century as 
symptomatic of such a development (Dynes ). The materials used and 
the construction techniques employed reduce the impact on structures: 
while the hazard may be uncontrollable, measures can nevertheless be 
taken to decrease the risk and reduce their consequences.  By the second 
half of the twentieth century, disasters were seen as neither the signs of 
divine retribution nor as random acts of nature, but rather as the inevita-
ble outcome of inappropriate human decisions that put people at risk. As 
such, they can be mitigated if not altogether prevented by forethought 
and planning. Disasters are perceived more as acts of society than as acts 
of God, and can be averted or, at least, moderated by changes to the 
structure of the social systems that gave rise to them (Quarantelli ). 
Increasingly, too, there is a search for a scapegoat on whom the disaster 
can be blamed. Responsibility is alternately attributed to the neglect of 
government offi  cials, the corporate greed of big business, or the careless-
ness of operatives who are held morally as well as legally responsible for 
the consequences (Furedi , ).
Frank Furedi argues that the perceptions of what causes a disaster has 
a cultural script that seeks to endow extreme events with meaning. “For 
most people,” he continues, “the really important question is not how 
but why a disaster occurred” (Furedi , ). To a certain extent, we 
can see evidence of this cultural script in both the international and the 
domestic discourses surrounding Typhoon Haiyan and Typhoon Yolanda. 
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In the case of Typhoon Haiyan, the disaster in the Philippines is embedded 
into a wider debate about global warming as a foretaste of what is likely 
to come. Blame is diff used across all of humanity, even if this is contested 
and there is a vigorous eff ort to shift responsibility onto the energy-hungry, 
carbon-emitting economies of the developed world. This is more a con-
test in political power than an engagement with the real issues inherent 
in climate change and is an attempt to secure compensation on behalf of 
aggrieved parties. The cultural narrative that surrounds Typhoon Haiyan 
also partly fi ts into a familiar trope that renders large parts of the world as 
vulnerable by blaming the poverty and inequitable distribution of material 
goods of the people living in these regions squarely on nature. That this 
nature might be the product of their own lack of resilience becomes dif-
fused amidst declarations to do with the common plight of humanity. The 
opprobrium that might otherwise attach to an economic system created 
by and largely benefi ting the West is largely lost amidst scientifi c and tech-
nical discussions about purely climatic and scientifi c phenomena (Bankoff  
).
Typhoon Yolanda, on the other hand, is another matter. It, too, has a 
political as well as a social dimension. As might be expected, however, both 
these discourses are on a diff erent level of scale, one in which the local 
and national feature prominently and international debates remain in the 
background. In the public arena, debates are personalistic and dynastic, 
refl ecting the political culture of the Philippines and the rivalry that exists 
between elite families from the president down to the local mayor. The 
dominant political clans, particularly the Aquinos and Romualdezes, have 
made Typhoon Yolanda a scapegoat for their ambitions, each accusing 
the other of manipulating aid for their own benefi ts, and blaming their 
opponents for inadequate preparations, bungled relief distribution, and 
favoring their own supporters.  This political fi nger-pointing, however, is 
underscored by a strong sense of self-blame and unworthiness that views 
the typhoon and its aftermath as God’s punishment for people’s kumpy-
ansa, or overconfi dence, and their lack of belief. The cultural narrative to 
do with Typhoon Yolanda does not really engage with Western discourses 
of risk but is more to do with identity, citizenship, power, and divine prov-
enance. Nature has surprisingly little to do with what’s happening and is 
reduced to more of a background context.
Why these diff erent perceptions matter is more than of just academic 
interest because how disasters are framed infl uences the way people re-
spond to them. Typhoon Haiyan, as symptomatic of climate change, is 
linked to variability in climate that no one can halt but whose worst ef-
fects may be minimized though concerted actions by the international 
community. In the short to medium term though, it is generally accepted 
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that little can be done to avert the incidence of extreme weather where 
higher-intensity cyclones and storm surges are likely to become more fre-
quent. At best, improvements to the forecasting services and evacuation 
procedures, and retreat from the most exposed coastal areas are all the 
immediate remedies on off er and these are largely within the competence 
of national not international agencies. The international community can 
debate, commiserate, and, perhaps, provide a certain amount of aid but 
that is where its responsibility ends. Typhoon Yolanda, on the other hand, 
is very much a national aff air and is part of an ongoing political struggle at 
the national, provincial, and local levels for power: disasters are viewed 
more as tests of governance that can be used as so much ammunition to 
strike at one’s political rivals. The typhoon is perceived not so much as an 
environmental phenomenon or even a social construction, but rather as 
a political tool. Accusations of incompetence and corruption mean that 
aid and reconstruction become matters of political expediency providing 
powerful motivation when the spotlight is fi rmly fi xed on them, but los-
ing momentum and dissipating as soon as public interest lapses. There 
is, therefore, little motivation to reduce vulnerability over the long term. 
Nor is this political discourse confi ned to only the electoral process but 
expands to include questions of self-identity and citizenship at the local, 
ethnic, and national levels. Filipino life and culture is ineluctably entwined 
with the experience of hazard, as Miguel Selga so poignantly pointed out 
some eighty years ago.
On a theoretical level, the discourses about Typhoons Haiyan and 
Yolanda are focused less on vulnerability and more on resilience. In an age 
ever more alarmed by the prospect of climate change, the issue of vul-
nerability, it is suggested, should be turned around and approached from 
a more positive viewpoint. Societies are no longer simply viewed as vul-
nerable with all its associated negative connotations but people are seen 
as primarily resilient; they have the capacities to organize, resist, learn, 
change and adapt (Handmer ). The stress in the developed world is 
increasingly on the need for adaptation and necessary adjustment as the 
only really practical measures: what will make societies more resilient. 
For those in the developing world, however, the issue is still much more 
about what renders them vulnerable, more especially as that condition 
is seen as largely imposed by the West on the rest. Moreover, this status 
all but absolves them of any responsibility for climate change and allows 
countries, more especially the BRICs, to continue polluting at a reckless 
pace all in the name of social justice and economic parity. Just as there 
are two discourses about the typhoon, an international and a national, so, 
too, the paradigms evoked to explain global disasters refl ect a theoretical 
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distinction that emphasizes capacity on the one hand and disentitlement 
on the other. Typhoon Haiyan and Typhoon Yolanda might be one and the 
same tropical cyclone, but the storm has a dual nature that represents fun-
damental differences in the way disasters are viewed and acted on from 
the standpoint of the developed and the developing worlds. In this sense, 
tropical cyclones are as much political forces as they are forces of nature.
Greg Bankoff has worked and published extensively on both the histori-
cal dimension of how societies adapt  to  risk and on contemporary civil 
defense and emergency management practices in Asia, Australasia, and, 
more recently, in Europe. His most recent publications include coauthor-
ing The Red Cross’s World Disaster Report 2014: Focus on Culture and Risk 
and a companion coedited volume entitled Cultures and Disasters: Under-
standing Cultural Framings in Disaster Risk Reduction (2015). He is professor 
of modern history at the University of Hull, United Kingdom.




ern North Pacific and South China Sea  region  states  that  compose  the World 
Meteorology Organization’s Typhoon Committee.





and so presumably postdates him.
  4.  There is some controversy as to the extent of the damage caused on this occasion.
  5.  Seismic architecture, however, has a longer pedigree than the pombalino or casa 
baraccata  architecture of Portugal or  southern  Italy  referred  to by Dynes and 






The present mayor of Tacloban is Alfred Romualdez, scion of a family that has 
dominated Leyte’s politics for decades. He is the son of a former mayor of the city 
who is the younger brother of First Lady Imelda Marcos who, in turn, was the wife 
of former president Ferdinand Marcos (1965–1986).
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
 • Greg Bankoff  and George Emmanuel Borrinaga
Interviews
Abrematea, Nestor. , June . Publisher of the Tacloban Star newspaper. In Taclo-
ban City, Philippines.
Cayanong, Cesar. , September . Artist/signboard maker. In Tacloban City, 
Philippines.
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CHAPTER 
“The Tremors Felt Round the World”
Haiti’s Earthquake as Global Imagined Community 
MARK SCHULLER
Benedict Anderson ( ) argued that capitalist print media created for 
the fi rst time a national identity, fi rst, by standardizing language and 
encouraging standard time zones, but most importantly by shaping the 
consciousness of citizens around so-called national events. His histori-
cal analysis was focused on the same time period as Jürgen Habermas’s 
( ) analysis of the rise of the bourgeois public sphere in the Enlighten-
ment, the so-called age of revolution. Haiti’s earthquake became a global 
event that hailed global citizens to act. The multinational response broke 
new ground; it truly became the model for a global disaster. To use the 
phrase of Ralph Waldo Emerson, writing about the battles of Lexington 
and Concord that triggered the Age of Revolution, the January ,  
tremors were felt “round the world.”
The times are very diff erent, but Anderson’s insights help us under-
stand the contemporary era. CNN—which cut its teeth on the  U.S. 
invasion of Iraq—also successfully hailed citizens from around the world 
in its dramatic coverage of an event in a country that has often served 
as a foil to imperialist, white supremacist, capital interests. In total, ac-
cording to the United Nations Offi  ce of the Special Envoy for Haiti ( ), 
private individuals gave .  billion. At a March  UN conference, of-
fi cial donors pledged  billion for reconstruction, .  for the following 
year and a half. The Special Envoy’s offi  ce reported that offi  cial donors 
allocated .  billion to Haiti, having disbursed just under a half of that 
amount— .  billion—as of December .
The response to Haiti’s earthquake was thus one of the most generous 
in recent memory. This is in no small part because of the event’s high 
media profi le. As several analysts have noted (e.g., Benthall ; Brau-
man ), disaster aid feeds off  media coverage. Olsen, Carstensen, and 
Hoyen ( ) demonstrated a correlation in the amount of seconds allo-
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cated on prime time news to a particular disaster and the generosity of the 
response (see, e.g., Brown and Minty ). The Olsen et. article was pub-
lished in , before the mega-disasters of the past decade, including the 
 Indian Ocean tsunami and Hurricane Katrina, in , not to mention 
the massive earthquake in Haiti. While the article did not lay out a formula 
for a precise prediction of private and public donations to a humanitarian 
eff ort, the hypothesis seems validated by the diff erences in donations 
to the Haiti earthquake, the  fl oods in Pakistan, and the results of 
the earthquake and tsunami (aka / ) in Fukushima, Japan. The Pakistan 
fl ood that displaced  million was almost entirely ignored in U.S. media, 
and worldwide donations were only  million, with pledges totaling 
just over a billion. Even though Japan is one of the world’s wealthiest 
countries, the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear threat attracted almost 
 billion (  billion yen) during the fi rst year.
However, the Haiti earthquake’s high media profi le—and the generos-
ity it inspired—came at a price. With stories of devastation, appearing to 
many foreign observers as hell on earth with phrases like “state failure” 
often repeated, foreign media coverage also naturalized foreign control 
of the response. The Haitian Creole word istwa means story in the way 
that people share with one another as well as offi  cial histories (see also 
Bell ). In fact, they are often the same, since political actors are also 
often the ones writing history (Trouillot , ). This chapter explores 
this phenomenon, how what might be called disaster narratives shape 
responses. The transnational nation building, the global imagined com-
munity, thus triggered a chain of events that empowered foreign agencies 
and actors. Foreign agencies assumed de facto control over Haiti’s gover-
nance apparatus, through the Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission 
(CIRH, in the French acronym, or IHRC in the English) and a system of UN 
clusters. Framed by the continued media coverage, this foreign control 
was naturalized through a series of discourses about Haiti being a “failed 
state,” requiring a “republic of NGOs” to step in and take over. This chap-
ter begins with contrasting foreign media coverage and Haitian under-
standings. Following that discussion is an exploration of the connection 
between foreign media coverage and aid delivery, particularly four tropes: 
a weak state, dehumanization, the photo op, and the blame game. The 
chapter ends with a series of refl ections on the disaster narrative.
Haiti’s Earthquake as Media Event
At :  P.M. on January , , an earthquake of .  magnitude struck 
outside the capital of Port-au-Prince, Haiti. The damage was unimaginable: 
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an estimated ,  people dead and an equal number injured. An evalu-
ation (Schwartz, Pierre, and Calpas ) declared over half of the housing 
in the capital was seriously damaged; ,  houses were completely 
destroyed and ,  houses badly damaged, requiring repair (United 
Nations Offi  ce of the Special Envoy for Haiti ). At its peak, the Inter-
national Organization for Migration (IOM) counted .  million people in 
makeshift internally displaced persons (IDP) camps. Certainly the facts 
alone should merit worldwide attention. However, Haiti’s earthquake 
became an international event because of foreign media coverage. As a 
transnational event, global citizens were hailed to act, and international 
agencies responded.
News from within Haiti fi rst trickled out of the country through Twitter, 
because the earthquake damaged other satellite-based Internet and cell 
phone towers. Soon thereafter, CNN reported the earthquake nonstop 
for over a week, capturing the most horrifi c scenes and broadcasting them 
throughout the world. Anchor Anderson Cooper—who had made a name 
for himself after his coverage of Hurricane Katrina sharing some emo-
tional moments with millions of viewers—immediately went to Haiti and 
stayed for over two weeks. He returned at the six-month point, July , 
, to receive an award from President René Préval of Haiti; Bill Clinton 
and Sean Penn accompanied him. Progressive news site Common Dreams 
had for the fi rst time a special banner on the top left related to Haiti’s 
earthquake, which it has since repeated for the BP oil spill, the antigov-
ernment mobilization in Egypt, the Japan earthquake, and the bombing of 
Libya (neither the fl oods in Pakistan nor the earthquakes in Chile or New 
Zealand received a special banner). The banner on Haiti outlasted all the 
others, and fi nally was taken down in mid-March .
World citizens responded to the collective hailing. In the fi rst week, 
private U.S. citizens contributed  million, mostly to large NGOs like 
the Red Cross. By contrast, the donations the fi rst week following Japan’s 
earthquake that triggered a nuclear crisis and killed around ,  totaled 
 million. In their generosity to the Haiti eff ort, U.S. citizens reacted 
more like they did following Hurricane Katrina, with  million. This con-
tribution was sustained, reaching  billion as of March , the deadline for 
claiming donations on citizens’  taxes following a special incentive 
from the Obama administration, peaking at .  billion for the year. Sixty 
percent of U.S. households and over  percent of African American fam-
ilies contributed to the Haiti earthquake response, despite feeling the 
pinch from the global fi nancial crisis. Another technological innovation 
that was to later serve as a blueprint for global citizens’ action was the use 
of text messages to donate. Made popular by international hip-hop star 
and disqualifi ed presidential candidate Wyclef Jean for his Yéle Haiti char-
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ity, texting to the relief eff ort was particularly aimed at younger people. 
The Red Cross adopted this technology, which it continued in the Japan 
earthquake eff ort.
Individual citizens poured into Haiti after it was deemed safe by the U.S. 
military, which had shut down the airport to rebuild the airstrip. The num-
ber of fl ights and destinations to and from Haiti increased. Before , 
when Delta added a nonstop to Haiti several times a week, the only U.S. air 
carriers to Haiti were American Airlines and Spirit. There were fi ve Amer-
ican fl ights from Miami, Fort Lauderdale, and New York, and one with 
Spirit, from Miami. Following the earthquake, to keep up with and capital-
ize on the increased demand, American added a fl ight from its worldwide 
hub Dallas and one from San Juan, Puerto Rico. Delta added one from its 
worldwide hub of Atlanta. Continental, which merged with United soon 
thereafter, added a fl ight from Newark. Before the quake it was not un-
common to see packs of missionaries with matching t-shirts on the fl ights. 
Throughout  foreigners were a majority of people on fl ights. The av-
erage age also decreased: following the earthquake, missionary groups 
included large numbers of high school and even some junior high stu-
dents, and the professional development or nongovernmental organiza-
tion (NGO) staff  increased their numbers, with a plurality if not a majority 
of twenty-somethings to staff  these agencies. When asked, a group of two 
dozen junior high school students wearing “map ede Ayiti” (I am helping 
Haiti) t-shirts reported that they were volunteering at an orphanage. Me-
dia stories abound of reports back from fi rst-time mission trips, almost 
invariably to celebrate the hometown heroes. Narratives about Haiti in-
clude what Heff eran ( ) called the reverse mission, that Haitian people 
were more spiritual and resilient (Panchang ; Ulysse ). Captured 
and mirrored by news coverage, these newly minted experts (Renda ) 
also opined about the virtues of Christianity, of capitalist development, pub-
lic health and hygiene, and limited representative democracy, all markers 
of assumed cultural and racial superiority. As Haitian American anthropol-
ogist Gina Ulysse ( : ) has hammered home, these racist depictions 
are a contemporary refl ection of Haiti’s “image problem” that stretches 
far into its past because of its role in ending slavery with the Haitian Revo-
lution. The collective residue of these stories justify, and naturalize, foreign 
control of the country, an element of what Inderpal Grewal ( ) termed 
“humanitarian citizenship” being the “soft” power of empire.
In the wake of the temblor, televangelist Pat Robertson claimed it was 
God’s punishment for Haiti’s “pact to [sic] the devil.” While this was not 
his fi rst such statement following a disaster—he made similar comments 
following Hurricane Katrina—this discourse gained wide currency. The 
“pact” Robertson referred to was the ceremony at Bois Caiman, on Au-
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gust , , which ignited the Haitian Revolution. This discourse gained 
momentum following the earthquake, including among Haitian evangel-
icals, many of whom traced their conversion from Catholicism to a mis-
sionary group in the United States (McAlister ). Mainstream coverage 
eschewed this brazen attempt to invoke the almighty, but the terms of 
the discussion placed the onus on Haiti for the evident lack of progress. 
New York Times columnist David Brooks argued that Haitian culture was 
resistant to progress. Ulysse ( ) deconstructed the representations of 
Haiti coming out of the mainstream press at the time. She demonstrated 
racialized continuities in discourses stemming from the Haitian Revolu-
tion—from a slave revolt—based on the fear of black self-determination 
and as a warning to other slaves against rising up, which Michel-Rolph 
Trouillot ( ) called unthinkable, given Enlightenment ideas of who 
counted as a person. Familiar language of Haiti being a fragile or failed 
state, and being the poorest country in the hemisphere, served to justify 
the need for foreign intervention and off ered a convenient explanation for 
the limited progress of this intervention. By focusing on “defi cient” local 
cultural practices, social systems, or institutions, the foreign media gaze 
defl ected attention away from the impact of foreign policies toward Haiti 
in amplifying the earthquake’s destructiveness.
Haitian Understandings
As a country with an estimated  million inhabitants, and one deeply di-
vided along a variety of social cleavages, including socioeconomic status, 
religion, and urban/rural, it should not come as a surprise that there are 
many often competing narratives from within Haiti: there is far more than 
one Haitian perspective, just as there is more than one Filipino or Ameri-
can perspective. That said, clusters of Haitian understandings off er import-
ant counterpoints to those promoted in foreign media and policy-making 
agencies. Many commentators in Haiti do not use the word katastwòf 
(catastrophe) or dezas (disaster) to discuss the earthquake. For a long 
while, many did not use the Creole word tranblemanntè (earthquake) to 
discuss the seismic event, out of respect for the dead and also to not relive 
the memories: it was known as various names, including Douz ( ), bagay 
la (the thing), evenman nan (the event), or goudougoudou (an onomato-
poeia mimicking the rumbling sound of the earth moving). Haitian scholar 
Myrtha Gilbert is succinct: the title of her  book is “La catastrophe 
n’était pas naturelle” (the catastrophe wasn’t natural; Gilbert ). Many 
commentators, activists, scholars, or people living in the camps (with 
many identifying with more than one category) pointedly drew the distinc-
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tion between “the catastrophe” and “the event.” This language mirrors 
social science scholarship, which discusses triggering “events” as only one 
part of the disaster. Haitian intellectuals, including what Antonio Gramsci 
( ) termed organic intellectuals, as well as activists, community leaders, 
and aid recipients who lived in the camps, whose experience and refl ec-
tion represent marginalized people’s interests, distinguish the kriz estrik-
tirèl (structural crisis) from the kriz konjonktirèl (conjunctural crisis, of the 
intersection of contemporary issues with the structural).
This kriz estriktirèl is local language refl ecting the concept of vulnerabil-
ity. To many in Haiti, the disaster was not the event itself but the factors 
that increased Haiti’s vulnerability. As scholars have argued elsewhere 
(e.g., Beauvoir-Dominique ; Gilbert ; Oliver-Smith ), this vul-
nerability was produced by a collusion of foreign and local elite popula-
tions. Having lost their “pearl of the Antilles” in , France nonetheless 
demanded a  million francs indemnity in , plunging the country into 
a -year debt. In , President Jean-Bertrand Aristide estimated the 
contemporary value of this debt to be  billion. The United States, which 
did not recognize Haiti until its Civil War, invaded the country twenty-
six times until , when Marines landed and occupied the island for nine-
teen years. This U.S. occupation centralized political and economic power 
in Port-au-Prince (Elie ; Jean-Baptiste ; Lucien ), and neolib-
eral policies imposed on the country since the mid- s triggered a mas-
sive urbanization and slumifi cation (Deshommes ; DeWind and Kinley 
). Alex Dupuy ( ) pointed out that the population quadrupled in 
the two decades since the implantation of neoliberalism. With nowhere 
to go, individually bearing costs of austerity, paying for education, health 
care, water, and sanitation, and with a weakened government with limited 
oversight capacity, people built housing as cheaply as possible in shanty-
towns. These neoliberal policies had a direct impact on the disaster:  
percent of the homes destroyed in the earthquake had been built since 
 (Etienne ).
Haitian people have told other sets of narratives about the earthquake, 
their own shared survival, and everyday heroism. Throughout the earth-
quake-aff ected region—not only Port-au-Prince but also the area to the 
south, including Léogâne, Jacmel, Petit-Goâve, and Grand-Goâve—the fi rst 
emergency response came from people themselves: Complete strangers 
pulling out children or the elderly, half-buried, from under slabs of con-
crete. Neighbors pooling together what scraps of food, utensils, charcoal, 
and water they could fi nd, sleeping next to one another on the ground, 
in the street. Community brigades pulling out material goods along with 
the living and dead bodies from the remains of houses. Makeshift clinics 
being set up under borrowed tarps or bedsheets. Store owners giving out 
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stocks of candles, water, batteries, and medicines to passers-by. Huddled 
meetings assessing the damage, the loss of life, needs, and community as-
sets. Homeowners opening their lakou—the family compound—to family 
members, fellow churchgoers, neighbors, coworkers, and friends. Teams 
of able-bodied young men and women clearing debris from roads and cor-
ridors. Stories like these were not the exception: this was the story of how 
the Haitian people put away their economic and political diff erences and 
worked together, in dignity and solidarity, to collectively survive.
As Rebecca Solnit ( ) reminds us, following a tradition within di-
saster sociology, disasters can also be stages for extraordinary human 
growth and solidarity. Haiti’s earthquake was not by any means an excep-
tion, even though stories of solidarity and Haitian people’s everyday acts 
of survival went largely unnoticed by international press and humanitarian 
agencies. A range of Haitian writers detailed acts of solidarity following 
the earthquake (e.g., Jean-Baptiste ; Lahens ; Montas-Dominique 
; Trouillot ; Victor ). Unfortunately, there is a serious gap in 
research on local communities acting as fi rst responders to disasters. The 
political divisions that six years prior ripped the country apart were at least 
temporarily suspended. Glimpses of another Haiti that fulfi lled its revolu-
tionary slogan emblazoned on its fl ag, l’union fait la force (unity creates 
strength) were visible, as the spirit of youn ede lòt (one helping the other) 
was so poignantly expressed.
Connection between Media Coverage and Aid
It may seem too obvious to mention, but most media outlets are for-
profi t, generating revenue based on advertising. Even so-called new or 
social media rely on the amount of hits a particular story generates: in-
creased traffi  c means greater ad revenue. Reporters are disciplined into 
covering stories that have maximum impact, written in such a way to high-
light drama (Pedelty ). Editors—often far away from the “beat”—are 
responsible for writing headlines, and even more important for online 
media searches, which often obscure nuance and at times can even argue 
against the main ideas. If the story has particularly dramatic photos, so 
much the better. Haiti’s earthquake provided all these elements, inspiring 
a maelstrom of literally tens of thousands of stories. Once put on a Web 
site, images went viral. Haitian photojournalist Daniel Morel successfully 
sued transnational media conglomerates Agence France-Presse and Getty 
Images for .  million in royalties denied from using his images, an indica-
tor of just how profi table covering the earthquake was. Outlets like CNN 
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had direct fi nancial interests in seeking out the most macabre, desperate, 
and devastating.
Haiti was also the fi rst mega-disaster in an era dominated by new or 
social media. From  (the year of Hurricane Katrina) to , new plat-
forms like Twitter came on the scene, Facebook grew from  million reg-
ular users at the beginning of  to  million fi ve years later, and 
entirely online Huffi  ngton Post outpaced even the New York Times. True, 
so-called traditional media still had the resources and infrastructure to 
maintain dominance within online platforms. But the proliferation of me-
dia forms as well as outlets led to a blurring of distinctions between jour-
nalists and aid workers. For example, the vast majority of people covering 
Haiti for Huffi  ngton Post worked for aid agencies. Refl ecting the low mean 
age of foreign aid workers (Seitenfus ) and armies of volunteers, tens 
of thousands of stories were written by amateurs, coming to Haiti for 
the fi rst time as part of an aid mission. These individuals became instant 
experts. These voices also had a direct interest in dramatizing the devasta-
tion of the earthquake. In addition, they had interests in highlighting their 
heroic eff orts. Even if unintended, a direct outcome of both tendencies 
was to frame Haitian people out of the story, or relegate them to silent vic-
tims, props for foreigners’ heroism. The following section of the chapter 
explores the material impacts of these media framings.
Impacts of the Foreign Coverage
Given the many circuits connecting media coverage and disaster response, 
there are many potential outcomes of what might be called the media-
disasters-industrial complex, or the disaster narrative. The following dis-
cussion focuses on four: First, the discourse of a “weak state” served to 
justify foreign control of the process and almost total exclusion of Haitian 
people in the process. Second, this exclusion, also having roots in framing 
Haitian people out of the story and tropes of dehumanization, led to prac-
tices and relationships wherein aid recipients felt they were treated like 
animals. Third, the disaster response was greatly infl uenced by the photo 
op. Finally, a blame game led to increasingly severe responses.
Weak State
The destruction of government buildings was often cited as justifi cation 
for foreign agencies—donors, intergovernmental organizations like the 
Red Cross and IOM, and NGOs—taking charge of the eff ort. This did not 
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sit well with Haitian government employees. A member of the Haitian gov-
ernment retorted, “So we didn’t have a space to meet. That doesn’t mean 
you exclude us from the conversation.” By and large, government agen-
cies made do with what they had. According to a foreign NGO worker, he 
was given the choice to either meet “in the small conference room” or “in 
the large conference room,” indicating two diff erent tables under trees 
on the ministry grounds. While not universally true, and notwithstanding 
the populations’ belief in government capacity, the government itself con-
tinued to function even with buildings collapsed. Many donors, including 
the U.N. (United Nations Offi  ce of the Special Envoy for Haiti ), had 
outlined the need for improved coordination in Haiti. In order to support 
this, only the Spanish government gave direct support to two government 
agencies playing central roles in coordination. Venezuela, a country that 
out-pledged even the United States, gave direct cash support—much in 
the form of loans—to the Haitian government, through the Petro Caribé 
program. However, Spain and Venezuela were exceptions; nearly all other 
donors continued to support NGOs headquartered in their country, or 
gave to a new international body.
Solidifying this tendency, following the March  UN donor confer-
ence, donors asked the Haitian parliament to vote to dissolve itself and 
endorse the creation of the IHRC. The IHRC comprised twenty-six mem-
bers, half of them non-Haitian, and was cochaired by Bill Clinton and Jean-
Max Bellerive, who was then prime minister. In theory, this was a symbol 
of shared governance. The IHRC’s mandate was to review and approve 
projects for reconstruction. Upon IHRC approval, the Haiti Reconstruction 
Fund, managed by the World Bank, had the authority to release the funds. 
In the words of a World Bank offi  cial, “It was the way we could convince 
donors to let go of the money. In eff ect we were holding onto it.” The IHRC 
was structured in such a way that the major donors—the United States, 
Canada, France, and the European Union—had individual seats while the 
entirety of Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM), Haiti’s 
Caribbean neighbors, shared a seat. Commentators across the political 
spectrum in Haiti saw the IHRC as a symbol of Haiti’s sovereignty being vio-
lated (Bélizaire ; Willems ). One international aid worker reported 
that a senior government offi  cial characterized it as comment est-ce qu’on 
va foutre la gueule du peuple haitien, which can be translated as “How can 
we fuck the snout of the Haitian people?” Prime Minister Bellerive, who 
was to be IHRC cochair, responded to senators, “I hope you sense the 
dependency in this document. If you don’t sense it, you should tear it up” 
(Dupuy , ). Several Haitian members of the IHRC denounced the 
fact that they were shut out of the process of meaningful participation, 
publishing a scathing open letter on December , , before a meeting 
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in the Dominican Republic, when borders were closed to Haitian people 
because of the cholera epidemic caused by the UN (Hendriksen, Price, and 
Shupp ; Piarroux et al. ).  At least it was more open, to some, re-
fl ecting the reality of an occupation: UN troops on the ground since  
and an even longer foreign control of fi nances and aid.
Parallel to the IHRC that assumed control of reconstruction, interna-
tional agencies created a foreign-led system of coordinating the human-
itarian response. Taking a cue from one of what agencies referred to as 
“lessons learned” from the Aceh experience, the UN organized what they 
call “clusters” bringing together diff erent agencies that they term “ac-
tors”—the UN system, other donors, international NGOs, and at least 
in theory the Haitian government—from the various sectors of the hu-
manitarian response: water and sanitation, health, protection, agriculture, 
food aid, and so on. Agriculture was a separate cluster from emergency 
food aid. At least for the fi rst two years, housing was split between three 
clusters, for emergency shelter (Camp Coordination and Management); 
temporary shelters, or T-shelters (Shelter), and longer-term housing out-
side the camps (Housing Reconstruction). Gender-Based Violence was a 
subcluster of Protection. There were twelve clusters overall. All but the 
Water and Sanitation and Gender-Based Violence clusters met inside the 
UN Logistics Base, a military base tucked inside the international airport, 
called LogBase for short. LogBase contained large tents and later ship-
ping containers wherein various UN agencies set up temporary offi  ces, a 
grocery store, and a couple of restaurants, serving international fare and 
using the U.S. dollar as the offi  cial currency (Klarreich and Polman ). 
The area was patrolled and secured by UN troops, with a solid wall painted 
with the UN colors (white and baby blue) towering over six meters high, 
topped with barbed wire, keeping Haitian people out. Armed guards 
granted access, checking passports. Once cleared, visitors would be sent 
through X-ray, metal detection, and closed-circuit television. Exiting this, 
a person would fi nd one another guard tower trained down on them. Sev-
eral Haitian nationals reported that they felt excluded from the space. For 
example, a high-ranking government offi  cial was denied access by the UN 
guards. Suspecting a racial and national origin bias, I twice attempted to 
enter without my U.S. passport. Both times I was granted access.
The Haitian government already had coordination structures in place, 
called tables sectorielles (sector tables). Some people expressed the con-
cern that the cluster meetings were on top of their jobs, and so some NGO 
staff , with experience before the earthquake, chose to opt out. Almost ev-
ery foreign agency staff  member I talked to used the word “clusterfuck” 
to describe the chaotic, overwhelming, and ineff ectual nature of the meet-
ings. Several participants noted that cluster meetings were about mes-
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
 • Mark Schuller
saging or sharing information about a particular service contracted by an 
NGO. They were, in other words, ritual or performative spaces rather than 
deliberative spaces. In all but the two clusters noted above, the language 
was English, not even French, one of the two national languages accessi-
ble to Haiti’s NGO class (Miles ). Haitian NGO employee Geralda noted, 
“For a long time, the dominant language of the country was English. In a 
context where English was the dominant language in the decision-making 
process, in a context where all planning was done in English, and con-
sidering cultural aspects were ignored, it was crystal clear that Haitians 
were outside of everything.” Like kach-fò-wòk (cash for work) and chèltè 
(shelter), the word “klòstè,” a Kreyòl pronunciation of “cluster,” was used 
among the NGO class, but fewer than  percent of IDP camp residents 
knew what that meant or had even heard of it. International agency staff  
Antonio said candidly, “We don’t include IDPs in our discussions” (see also 
Panchang ).
“Like Animals”
Given the dehumanizing tendencies within media coverage, it is unfortu-
nately not surprising that many aid recipients reported feeling dehuman-
ized. A discourse that agencies were treating them like animals was quite 
common; at the State University of Haiti students and faculty invoked 
Giorgio Agamben’s ( ) concept of “bare life” to describe how human 
beings were reduced to bare, biological, survival. Living conditions were 
often inhuman: the heat, lack of sanitation, mud, complete lack of pri-
vacy, the smell, and limited opportunities. Skin rashes were a common 
occurrence, as people’s bodies attempted to fend off  pathogens in the 
environment. Yves, who lived in an IDP camp, explained that “We’re here, 
in tents, because of what happened on January . Some people look at us 
like we’re dogs. Actually, dogs in foreign countries are valued more than 
us. The amount of money that’s spent on them in one week would be our 
income for four or fi ve months.” Allande, who lived in another camp, de-
cried the situation: “Just because we’re living in a camp, the way people 
see us, people liken us to delinquents.” Frisline, who lived in the same 
camp, revealed, “Sometimes you get on a bus and you hear people speak-
ing badly about people living in the camps. You can’t speak because you 
are one of them.” These statements and many more like them outline a 
powerful stigma attached to being a deplase (person removed to a camp), 
the identity of being an IDP (Brun ; Duncan ).
Why is this? In no small part, camps remain visual reminders of failures 
within the international aid response, eyesores that get in the way of sell-
ing Haiti as being “now open for business,” as President Michel Martelly 
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boasted in May . This slogan just happened to coincide with Bill Clin-
ton’s.  More fundamentally, the people struggling to survive under the 
heat of the tarps or T-shelters were committing the ultimate indignity: 
they existed. IDPs’ mere existence brought visibility to profound social 
problems, such as extreme poverty and deep class hostility that has al-
ways beset Haiti but had been swept under the rug; they were what Hardt 
and Negri ( , ) called disposable people, or Michel Agier ( ) 
called undesirables. The hypocrisy, misery, and inequality could no longer 
be ignored, now that it was in plain view, especially in the Champs de 
Mars, the national plaza surrounding the crumbled remains of the Palais 
National (National Palace): a visible demand to be seen.
The Photo Op
This demand to be seen is a central trait to humanitarian aid. Humani-
tarian staff , particularly those engaged in public relations or fundraising, 
are acutely aware that their organizations live from media coverage. 
Therefore, decisions about particular courses of action on the ground are 
guided at least in part for the opportunity to stage a photo op. Some staff  
grumbled about their roles as “PR tools,” even when they knew better. 
“Remember how your salaries are being paid,” one person sardonically 
retold when I asked why she did things she knew to be ineff ective, ineffi  -
cient, or inappropriate. She left that agency a month after our interview.
This mantra, directive, or logic of visibility was evident in many sectors 
of the humanitarian response. One such example was the T-shelters. Clus-
ter staff  demonstrated that they were inappropriate, creating pressures 
that swelled the shantytowns in dangerous mountainsides. In addition, 
the Haitian government and the Shelter cluster issued a moratorium in 
. However, in the parlance of humanitarian agencies, they were still 
the “solution” of choice for several NGOs. Explaining why, international 
aid worker Siobhan argued, “It’s also the most visible, providing the photo 
opportunity, to show off  what our structures are.” This logic of visibil-
ity was also behind the choice of which camps were to be closed during 
the controversial /  relocation program, announced by newly elected 
president Martelly in June , closing six highly visible camps and sup-
posedly reconstructing sixteen neighborhoods where the residents of the 
six camps had lived before the earthquake. Andrea, who came to Haiti 
working for an NGO and later joined the IOM, said, “They might not be the 
most vulnerable sites, but they are sites with the most visibility.” Aside 
from the Champs de Mars, the epicenter of the photo op across from the 
crumbled Palais National, which was not part of the program, these loca-
tions were the most highly visible to journalists, including the area around 
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the airport and the main two plazas in the suburb of Pétion-Ville. For his 
part, Andrea’s colleague William, who worked more directly on relocation, 
was unmoved by this critique: “There are humanitarian actors and donors 
who are very upset that the six camps have been chosen quite clearly on 
political grounds. My view on that is you were never going to get them to 
start on any other grounds other than political.”
The need for visibility also encouraged private water trucks instead 
of reinforcing public taps that existed before the earthquake. Geralda, a 
Haitian director of an international NGO, denounced this practice: “Water 
distribution began with the international community bringing their own 
water. Then, they started buying local water trucks, making a few peo-
ple rich, instead of building water systems that could still be useful to us 
today. When you distribute water with trucks only, you are spending mil-
lions, but you have to provide water on a daily basis. When the millions are 
gone, the people don’t have drinking water and are exposed once again 
to water-related diseases.”
One reason why humanitarian agencies chose this decidedly unsustain-
able practice was that people could be seen—and photographed—stand-
ing in long lines in the camps. Benefi ciaries’ performances become cred for 
the humanitarian agency fi lming it; it becomes capital they can leverage, 
in eff ect to sell to donors for more aid, or to justify its receipt. Associated 
Press (AP) journalist Jonathan Katz ( ) came close to suggesting that 
this tendency to play to the international media led many NGOs to force 
people into the camps in order to receive aid.
International aid worker Siobhan noted the tendency for humanitarian 
agencies to look for visible signs of distress and send aid there, so it would 
be expected that NGOs would not even look for the strategic points, lo-
cal providers, or local leaders. This is one reason why the international 
response missed a golden opportunity to decrease the vulnerability that 
neoliberalism engendered when ,  people fl ed the city (Bengtsson 
et al. ).  Agencies have to be seen actually giving aid. This need for 
visibility also explained why camps in peripheral municipalities had fewer 
services than those near the urban core (Schuller and Levey ). Those 
of us in the solidarity movement might have contributed to these tenden-
cies by the lack of clarity of our rhetoric. If the only question (that was 
heard, at least) was, “Where did the money go?” then, understandably, 
NGOs needing to justify their receipt of .  billion in private donations 
and .  billion in offi  cial sources went for the “quick wins” in the words 
of one: the photo op. Said another, “If I can see it, I can sell it.” This sim-
ple statement says a lot: in the fi rst several months of the recovery it 
was enough to show pictures of usually young, usually white, aid workers 
carrying boxes of aid to demonstrate eff ort.  But when the image of the 
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country did not change as a result of foreigners’ good intentions, jour-
nalists began questioning the overall eff ort and its eff ectiveness; in fact, 
some had questioned it all along, a strange mix of Fox News and leftist 
non-mainstream sites. This questioning reached a high point in June , 
when NPR published a scathing exposé of the Red Cross (Elliot and Sulli-
van ).
A Blame Game
In response, some humanitarian actors went on the off ensive, playing a 
blame game. On top of Haiti’s deep-seated social divisions temporarily 
suspended after the earthquake, foreign aid agencies added to this den-
igration of IDPs. In most of my interviews and in informal conversations, 
foreign aid workers were quick to point to a case of an individual trying to 
take advantage of the situation. Usually this was a single individual, and 
always this was the prelude to a general assessment of IDPs. This assess-
ment either justifi ed the agency’s disciplinary, even punitive, approach to 
management of IDPs or explained the failures in the aid system overall. 
These were not just conversations with me: humanitarian agencies at-
tempted to shape the conversation, shifting the blame for the obvious 
lack of progress onto the IDPs themselves. Echoing former fi rst lady Bar-
bara Bush’s comments about Katrina-displaced persons living better in 
the Astrodome than they had before the storm, on May , , Assistant 
Secretary of State Cheryl Mills said, “People seek to remain in the tem-
porary communities because, as surprising as that might seem outside of 
Haiti, life is better for many of them now.”
Mills’ comment highlights a persistent discourse that people were 
only living under tents in order to get free services: How else would living 
“worse than dogs” be possibly considered better? Foreign aid workers 
expended quite a bit of energy to expose this. For example, anthropolo-
gist Tim Schwartz declared there only to be ,  “legitimate” IDPs in a 
report commissioned (and later rejected) by United States Agency for In-
ternational Development (USAID), but leaked to the press and fi nally pub-
lished on May , , by Agence France-Presse (Troutman ). Dozens 
of news stories, including in large-circulation Washington Post, New York 
Times, Newsweek, and Time, repeated this fi nger-wagging, more editorial-
izing than news reporting. Schwartz’s critique of the Haitian government 
was based primarily on its lack of transparency in its research methods, 
however the leaked report was similarly opaque. For its part, USAID dis-
tanced itself from the most controversial claims, citing inconsistencies and 
irregularities within Schwartz’s research methods (Daniel ). Only two 
stories that made it to Google’s daily news alerts reported this critique, 
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despite the dozens that used the leaked report to lodge a critique against 
the Haitian government, many drawing on familiar narratives of Haitian 
incompetence, adding to Haiti’s unending bad press (Lawless ; Ulysse 
; Trouillot ). The debate was primarily focused on the death toll, 
leaving the other unsubstantiated claims about the “legitimate” IDPs and 
incendiary statements such as people living in the camps only for the free 
access to services unaddressed. The total silence, the attention defl ected 
away from this discussion of the “illegitimate” IDPs, was an insidious out-
come. The infl ammatory and controversial allegations about living IDPs, 
whose rights were actively being challenged by a range of actors, became 
tacitly accepted by the lack of scrutiny. This debate about the numbers of 
dead, mapping onto a discussion of who is a “real” victim, dramatizes the 
material consequences of contests over the disaster narrative.
Theorizing the Disaster Narrative
Haiti’s earthquake broke the charts in terms of media coverage. Con-
sequently, the scale of the foreign response has few parallels. Disaster 
scholars have long pointed out the interrelation between media coverage 
and generosity (e.g., Brauman ; Olsen, Carstensen, and Hoyen ). 
However, this chapter has also demonstrated that the disaster narrative 
shapes the imagination, articulation, and implementation of responses, a 
point powerfully argued by Ulysse ( ). Having framed Haitian people 
outside of a person who is deemed an actor, reducing them to objects of 
aid, most stories justifi ed a top-down, militarized, foreign-led response. 
Disaster response institutions such as the IHRC and the clusters excluded 
Haitian authorities and communities from decision-making. In addition, 
short-term, costly, unsustainable interventions that neither matched local 
communities’ priorities nor reinforced public institutions or services were 
consistently chosen by foreign humanitarian agencies. Explaining why, 
several agency representatives pointed to the need to stage a photo op 
to justify their receipt of one of the largest humanitarian responses ever 
given, and to prove that funds had been spent. In addition to begging the 
question, “Where did the money go?” increasingly raised by journalists 
(and solidarity activists), the need for visibility is a general operating logic 
within contemporary disaster responses. While funding for international 
development has declined, certainly after the global recession since , 
funding for humanitarian aid has held steady and even grown. In  the 
industry was worth  billion, up from .  the previous year (Develop-
ment Initiatives ). Noted above, media coverage is widely credited for 
maintaining these levels of generosity.
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Focusing disproportionate attention on the event and not on vulnera-
bility, most media accounts of the earthquake took for granted that Haiti 
was a “failed state” without exploring the foreign policy roots of this 
condition. Some commentators like New York Times’ David Brooks and 
others argued that Haiti’s fatalistic, present-oriented culture (in the singu-
lar) was to blame. Many other accounts had the language of corruption 
or failed state framed within the story, while slavery, colonialism, the U.S. 
occupation, and neoliberalism were usually framed outside, and not dis-
cussed. Aid agencies’ good intentions, Bill Clinton’s cheerful “Build Back 
Better” and “Haiti is open for business” slogans were reported, erasing 
the role played by Clinton and USAID in creating the conditions for Port-
au-Prince’s hyperurbanization and slumifi cation in the fi rst place. With a 
historical analysis thus cut off , a new industrial park outside of the capital 
area wherein the USAID and the Inter-American Development Bank spent 
.  million could even make sense as a solution in the fi rst place. The 
industrial park in the capital, with its low wages and limited public invest-
ment, played a heavy role in producing the country’s largest shantytown, 
Cité Soleil, and associated negative consequences that include violence 
and extreme vulnerability to disasters.
Given the singularity of the media attention and therefore generosity, it 
is tempting to once again exceptionalize Haiti. The post-earthquake case 
is more visible and therefore the contradictions within the humanitarian 
system are easier to notice. But the need for visibility, photo op, project 
mentality, market logic, and turning people’s suff ering into capital are 
unfortunately realities of a humanitarian system that relies on generosity 
of individual donors and states, particularly in a lingering fi nancial crisis 
(e.g., Agier ; Barnett ; Duffi  eld, Macrae, and Curtis ; Fassin 
; Feldman ; Scherz ). Especially people employed in public 
relations or fundraising intimately understand this reality. The Haiti case, 
perhaps, because of its visibility, makes these contradictions—and their 
consequences—diffi  cult to ignore. As many people in Haiti exclaimed, 
“They are making money off  us!”
Related to this point, the post-quake aid response highlights the disas-
ter narrative. While the nonstop barrage of media coverage engendered 
generosity, most stories also normalized foreign control. They did so fi rst 
by portraying the most abject misery, framed in a narrative of a nation 
brought “to its knees,” a quadruple entendre referring to being physically 
jostled, extreme devastation, and a refl ex to pray, not to mention being 
forced to beg. Second, by systematically ignoring the everyday heroism 
and solidarity of tens of thousands of ordinary people, framing them out-
side the story, media accounts painted a picture of terra nullius, if not 
Lord of the Flies. This served to justify a fear-based, militarized response. 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
 • Mark Schuller
Explaining what he called an “expatriate colonization,” Haitian NGO pro-
fessional Sonson theorized, “It seems that they thought that the rubble 
fell on our intelligence too.” If we foreigners were responsible for every-
thing, from security to nation building, because everything was destroyed 
and there was nothing left of the state and no local capacity, then why not 
continue to forge ahead with the war surgeries and cigar cuts, continuing 
to build T-shelters when the government actually did say no? Structur-
ing this expatronizing, Haitian commentators discussed the tendency to 
turn recipients into objects, animals, or children (Louis ). Jackson, a 
director of a Haitian NGO, challenged one of these narratives: “NGOs are 
currently spending money any which way because they say Haitians can’t 
manage. Constructing autonomy begins here as well. We reject in advance 
all attempts to say that Haitians can’t manage.”
Media coverage focused almost entirely on what Paul Farmer ( ) 
called the proximate cause of the suff ering: the hazardous conditions 
(Wisner et al. ). Lost in the majority of discussions in the media are 
the distal, more structural, causes: hyperurbanization triggered by one 
of the most successful implantations of free-market capitalism the world 
has ever seen, following a nineteen-year U.S. military occupation. Conse-
quently, the opportunity to reinforce what Haitian people were actually 
doing was lost (Jean-Baptiste ). Rather than seize this opportunity to 
undo this urbanization and rebuild Haiti’s rural peasant economy, agen-
cies contributed to the centralization, overcrowding, and individualism. 
As foreign aid worker Siobhan noted, supporting rural recipient commu-
nities wouldn’t have even occurred to humanitarian agencies. Using the 
same language, two Haitian directors argued that this is because of their 
need to “plant the fl ag,” to be seen where the journalists were. It was, in 
eff ect, a vicious cycle. Aid attracted journalists to the epicenter and the na-
tional plaza, and to the camps. Meanwhile, quietly, ,  Haitian people 
sought refuge with their rural family members, and even more individuals 
in Port-au-Prince were piecing together their homes, families, and neigh-
borhoods outside the camps.
Beyond Haiti
Insights from understanding these disaster narratives are certainly not 
limited to Haiti. Discussing multiple cases of industrial accidents, from 
Exxon Valdez to the BP Deepwater Horizon spill, Gregory Button ( ) 
demonstrated how hotly contested the disaster narrative can be. Impor-
tantly, accounts that portray spills as “accidents” and without precedent 
actively discourage public recognition of these as systemic, and portray 
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these excesses of corporate greed and lack of accountability as normal. 
And thus the response is usually woefully inadequate, and certainly we 
are no better prepared against future catastrophes. Mahmood Mamdani 
( ) analyzes the disaster narrative coming from Darfur that mapped 
onto global anti-Islamic discourses, turning the “responsibility to protect” 
into a “right to punish” (see also Clarke ).
Why do media anoint some disasters such as the  earthquake in 
Haiti and disregard others such as the coal ash spill covered by Button and 
Eldridge, this volume? Haiti’s earthquake, like the  Indian Ocean tsu-
nami or Hurricane Katrina, became mega-disasters, whose media cover-
age obscures our understanding of disasters overall. Scholars of disasters 
have long pointed out that for an event to become known as a disaster 
requires vulnerability. Scholars and practitioners have correctly focused 
our energies on the factors that contribute to vulnerability, as the factors 
within our control and actually the factors that shape the deadliness of 
a hazard. We often lament the misrecognition of the disaster-as-event, 
often imbedded in media portrayals, as acts of God or their inherent singu-
larity. However, it behooves us to pay attention to these narratives them-
selves. In eff ect, to be anointed as a disaster requires a disaster narrative. 
The diff erence between mega-disasters, slow-moving disasters, or hidden 
or forgotten disasters is the photo op, the ability to move people to an 
emotional response: in short, the story.
The extreme visibility and impact of foreign news coverage on Haiti’s 
earthquake is a powerful example of what Arjun Appadurai ( , ) re-
ferred to as “mediascape,” pervasive and insidious, shaping how people 
perceive the world. Michel Foucault ( ) has drawn scholars’ attention 
to the relationships of power surrounding the messages, media, and indi-
viduals regarding discourse. Building from these insights of mediascapes 
shaping people’s worldview, and how discourses refl ect and reproduce 
inequality, the disaster narrative is the istwa, the story as well as the his-
tory, exposing the ways in which powerful interests defi ne and frame the 
disaster, calling to question what issues are to be discussed—and what 
excluded—how, and by whom, and who is declared to be an actor, and 
who is framed out of the story. In this way the disaster narrative frames 
the responses. Deconstructing the disaster narrative thus exposes the po-
litical economy of knowledge production, dissemination, and action. One 
wonders whether mega-disasters themselves, notably Haiti’s earthquake, 
through the disaster narrative, constitute a global imagined community? 
The circuits of a community of concern overlaid on Haiti suggest that 
mega-disasters might represent the epicenter of a new transnational hu-
manitarian order: a trans-nation.
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Notes
The author would like to thank his colleagues at the Faculté d’Ethnologie, various 
NGOs and social movement organizations, and especially the people living in the IDP 
camps. This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Founda-
tion under Grant No. . Any opinions, fi ndings, and conclusions or recommenda-
tions expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily refl ect 
the views of the National Science Foundation. All translations from the French and 
Haitian Creole are by the author.
 . The full text of the letter is posted online, unnamed. It was published originally in 
Le Matin, with unoffi  cial translation by Isabeau Doucet (“Letter from the Haitian 
Members” ).
 . In Fatal Assistance (Peck ), there was a strong implication that Bill Clinton 
backed Martelly in the elections. The documentary also showed Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton strong-arming President Préval about the election results.
 . There were some individual eff orts, notably a settlement built in the Belladères-Las 
Cahobas border region, and in Papaye.
 . For an example see the cover photo of Frédéric Thomas’s ( ) Haiti: l’Echec 
Humanitaire.
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 CHAPTER 
Contested Narratives
Challenging the State’s Neoliberal Authority 
in the Aftermath of the Chilean Earthquake
NIA PARSON
“I have come to the conclusion that taking your body out to the street 
is the most political act you can perform,” a long-time women’s rights 
activist whose mother had been tortured by Pinochet’s dictatorship said 
to me in August . We had just emerged from the CS tear gas cloud 
that hung around the Baquedano Metro station in downtown Santiago, 
Chile, during one of the widespread student protests there that year. She 
has participated in many protests over the past four decades in Santiago, 
but the police repression that day, she said, was stronger than she had 
seen in a long time. Indeed, many social observers noted that the mano 
dura (heavy hand) of the dictatorship era seemed to be reemerging under 
the fi rst postdictatorship right-wing president, Sebastian Piñera. Potent 
tear gas grenades, manufactured in the United States, were launched 
indiscriminately into the crowds, exploding at the feet of protestors, the 
majority of whom that night seemed to be adolescents. Army cars, nick-
named zorrillos, sprayed tear gas as they patrolled the streets. A helicop-
ter fl ew overhead with a searchlight to spot groups to target for dispersal. 
Large tank-like vehicles, windows covered in wire, sprayed protestors with 
heavy jets of water mixed with CS gas, even as protesters attempted to 
fl ee the chaotic scene. The repressive apparatus of the Chilean state re-
acted in similar fashion to social movements’ protests against the inaction 
of the state in the wake of the earthquake/tsunami of .  Protests and 
social movements have historically been part of the fabric of Chilean so-
ciety, reaching an apex during the waning years of the dictatorship in the 
late s. Many of the current protests refl ect widespread dissatisfaction 
with growing economic inequality and vulnerabilities, more than two de-
cades after the end of Pinochet’s dictatorial regime.
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The  Chilean Earthquake and Tsunami 
in the Context of Neoliberal Reform
Chile occupies a particular history in terms of its relationship to the consol-
idation of global neoliberal regimes. Following the military-backed coup 
in , the Chilean state’s neoliberal economic policies articulated with 
other manifestations of state violence against its citizens, including mur-
der and torture, in addition to more-insidious repressive measures. The 
macroeconomic successes of the so-called Chilean miracle  often serve as 
justifi cation for the seventeen-year dictatorial regime.  Chile’s macroeco-
nomic situation makes it a middle-income country. Chile has the highest 
level of income inequality among the thirty-four member countries of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD; ). 
Nevertheless, Chile is widely touted on the global stage as exemplary of 
the successes of the neoliberal economic model.
February , : .  Magnitude Earthquake
The disaster of February , , occurred in this neoliberal context. On 
that day, various regions of southern and central Chile suff ered an .  
magnitude earthquake, which produced a powerful tsunami in coastal 
areas. Regions outside of the capital city of Santiago suff ered the most, 
though some zones of Santiago saw condemned buildings and severe 
damages as well. The government’s offi  cial death toll was , with  peo-
ple reported missing (Gobierno de Chile ). The events of February , 
, or F/  as they are popularly called in various Chilean media, aff ected 
people diff erentially depending to a large degree on the fault lines of the 
social inequalities that structured vulnerabilities prior to and following 
F/  (Adams, Van Hattum, and English ; Gunewardena and Schuller 
). The regions that were the worst hit by the disaster were also the 
most poverty stricken of Chile. Adding to the precariousness in which 
many in these areas already lived their lives, ,  families lost their 
homes (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
). This situation left many to live semi-permanently in campamentos 
(camps). Two years later, many continued to inhabit these lodgings that 
were intended to be temporary.
Competing Truth Claims about the State and Everyday Life
Claims by the state and by social movements about the events and after-
math of F/  constitute not only narratives about reconstruction, but also 
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more-generalized, and opposing, narratives of the Chilean nation-state 
and the eff ects of neoliberal political economies. As global media attention 
is drawn to disasters, the Chilean state has sought to portray itself as pow-
erful, authoritative, in control, and a bastion of modernity (see also Brown 
and Minty ). Meanwhile, Chilean activist groups protesting their ex-
clusion from the benefi ts of the Chilean miracle, whose exclusion became 
only more apparent and dire on F/ , mobilized to protest the state’s mis-
handling of the disaster and its aftermath, especially in poorer regions. 
These activist groups were oriented to the global as well, joining the glo-
balized protests against economic inequality and neoliberal hegemony—
such as the Global Call of the Indignant in Spain and Occupy Wall Street 
in the United States. Confl icting narratives of disasters, their aftermaths, 
and reconstruction often spring up in the aftermath (Oliver-Smith , 
). States, private enterprise, local communities, and other actors have 
diff erent stakes in the maintenance or contestation of “offi  cial” narratives 
(Button ), and they draw from and create competing forms of knowl-
edge about the disaster as diff erent forms of knowledge that emerge in its 
aftermath (see chap.  by Barrios, this volume; Button a). 
Tierney, Bevc, and Kuligowski ( ) have observed that media pro-
mote disaster myths in the wake of catastrophe that serve to bolster the 
state’s authority and justify its use of repressive tactics on the populace. 
For example, a looting frame is common and Tierney, Bevc, and Kuligowski 
( ) illustrate how this narrative, along with the frame of a war zone, 
were used to justify military intervention and martial law in post-Katrina 
New Orleans, and to show the necessity of the state for national security. 
This frame was also used in Chile, as media emphasized the lawless and dan-
gerous nature of those who were stealing food from supermarkets in the 
wake of the disaster. However, Tierney, Bevc, and Kuligowski ( ) point 
out that often people are desperate and stealing food is not simply violent 
mob mentality but is largely a mode of survival under dire circumstances. 
It is important to note that similar to stealing food in the aftermath, post 
disaster social movements are produced largely out of desperation, not 
necessarily long-standing political activism against the state. However, new 
social media and the ubiquity of smart phone technologies in many places, 
as in Chile, make it possible for people in these crisis situations to talk back 
to the looting frame and purvey their own narratives of post-disaster real-
ities on the ground, for consumption by national and crucially, for global 
audiences. They make counter claims about the post-disaster authority of 
the state, pointing to gaps in the state’s provision of care prior to and in the 
aftermath of the disaster and therefore to the state’s weaknesses.
This chapter builds on these rich theoretical frameworks about media, 
narrative, and power to show how the state’s hegemony is at stake in its 
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deployment of narratives of authority and mastery in the post-disaster 
period, in part because of the state’s need to assert itself as sovereign in 
the global context. It shows fi rst how the Chilean state produces narra-
tives that align the nation-state with modernity and “Empire,” and asserts 
its authority through donation of humanitarian aid to Haiti in the wake of 
their  earthquake, which occurred about a month before F/ . Then 
it examines the Chilean state’s narrative of recovery, transmitted to the 
global stage in the wake of F/  and the chronic disaster that has ensued 
(Adams, Van Hattum, and English ). The state used its spectacular 
rescue of the thirty-three miners in front of global media to bolster its 
narrative of Chile’s technological modernity and mastery and therefore its 
belonging to the “fi rst world” or “Empire” (Donini ), its belonging to 
the global North. Social movements have emerged in the wake of F/  to 
assert their claims of the state’s failures to act on their behalf following 
the disaster and their demands for inclusion in the state’s reconstruction 
plans. In opposition to the state, these social movements proclaim the 
value of their members’ lives and highlight to local and global communi-
ties that the state lacks authority and moral conscience. They assert that 
they are citizens who matter, and they assert this on a global media stage. 
They refuse to be what Agamben ( ) calls “bare life”—that is, persons 
with no political rights. Similar to the biological citizenship that Petryna 
described in the post-Chernobyl landscape (Petryna ), they assert 
their belonging to the state based on damages they have incurred. They 
make claims to and about the state’s neoliberal successes in the process.
Resistance can be seen as an index for power (Abu-Lughod ). The 
greater the power, the greater the resistance it produces and the greater 
the power of the resistance, the greater the repressive response. The 
various social movements that have emerged since  in Chile, including 
movements around reconstruction, are based broadly on claims to citizen-
ship and a critique of the power of the state’s implementation of el modelo 
(the neoliberal model), a set of policies and practices that people deem 
to negatively aff ect their lives, similar to contemporaneous social move-
ments globally. These reconstruction-based social movements emerged 
within a wider ethos of social unrest on the registers of the local, the 
nation-state, and the global during . Within Chile, people are increas-
ingly disillusioned by the state’s promises of democracy, citizenship, and 
prosperity, which many feel have not been fulfi lled following the offi  cial 
end of the dictatorship. Various Chilean movements, including the student 
movement for quality education and the movement for fair reconstruc-
tion, have banded together and also consciously linked their agenda to 
social movements for democracy that occurred throughout the world 
during . As social movements seek to show the failures of the Chilean 
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state to both national and global communities, through protests at times 
peaceful and at times violent that become media spectacles, the state in 
turn represses this expression through military force. Activists’ counter-
narratives of the aftermath of the disaster threaten the narrative of the 
Chilean nation as exemplar of neoliberal success on the world stage.  But 
activists and protestors have new tools to get their messages out to one 
another, to wage their campaigns, and to project their narratives to na-
tional and global audiences. The use of new Internet media such as You-
Tube, Facebook, and groups like Anonymous have shifted the balance and 
allowed for local political battles between citizens and the state to articu-
late with the global in novel ways. New possibilities for linkages among so-
cial movements throughout the world continue to emerge. As realities of 
inequalities and poverty emerge within Chile and are projected through-
out the world under the spotlight of disaster, the state’s narratives of 
mastery and authority act as a mask for the state’s lack of authority and 
power. As Tierney, Bevc, and Kuligowski ( , ) note, “Ways of telling 
are also ways of not telling.” Social movements in the wake of disaster 
make this reality more visible to global actors and challenge the power of 
the state. This chapter argues that part of the fair reconstruction move-
ment’s aim is to show the weakness of the Chilean state on the global 
stage in order to pressure the state to act on its citizens’ behalf.
State Narratives of Empire and Technological Sophistication
A common refrain throughout the global media in the wake of the Chilean 
earthquake was unveiled astonishment that “Chile is not Haiti” (Kurczy, 
Montgomery, and Ryan ), even though Haitian and Chilean histories 
are widely divergent. The surprise expressed in global media about how 
much better Chile fared refl ects confl ation of Chile and Haiti in the global 
imagination. And this is exactly what the Chilean state aims to dispel—the 
idea that it is but one of many “underdeveloped” Latin American coun-
tries. Both within Chile and as projected outward to the world, the Chilean 
government’s master narrative of the recovery works against this confl a-
tion to portray and emphasize the stability and modernity of the Chilean 
miracle, exemplary of the promise of the neoliberal political economic 
model.
Following the January  earthquake in Haiti, Chile off ered humani-
tarian aid in the form of basic supplies, food, water, and tents, and pro-
vided trained dogs to search for people buried under the rubble (Agencia 
EFE [EFE] b). The Chilean state asserted that it is not Haiti by mo-
bilizing the moralizing, dominant discourse (Donini : ) of its hu-
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manitarian aid to Haiti. By using the global discourses and mechanisms 
of humanitarian aid, a major force of globalization (Rabinow et al. ), 
to refute its image on the global stage as “underdeveloped” and “third 
world,” it claims its place at the table of “developed” nations, the table of 
Empire (Donini ). In so doing Chile eschews an image of the Chilean 
nation-state as Other (Etheridge ). Haiti, on the other hand, is Other. 
In the wake of Haiti’s disaster, Chilean president Michelle Bachelet empha-
sized that Haitians are “a people who have made enormous eff orts to re-
construct their democracy, to move forward, to fi ght against hunger and 
poverty, and because of that, Chile will give support and a friendly hand 
of solidarity that is required in this moment” (EFE a). By highlighting 
Chile’s support for Haiti’s moves toward democracy, the Chilean state 
can also signal that it is a nation that promotes democracy and is there-
fore democratic itself, a notion contested by social movements of various 
kinds within Chile in .
In another instance of Chile’s construction of its national narrative on 
the global stage, in opposition to the Haitian disaster, in August  Chil-
ean president Piñera hosted Haiti’s president Martelly to show him the 
“exemplary” relief housing and reconstruction in Chile following F/ . Both 
presidents marveled at Chile’s successes in dealing with the aftermath of 
the earthquake/tsunami (La Nación ). Meanwhile, social movements 
continued their protests of the Chilean state’s lack of reconstruction after 
F/ , demanding the failures of the state be made visible. Once again, the 
Chilean nation asserted on the global media stage that it was not Haiti, 
this time because of what Chile had to teach Haiti about the great strides 
the Chilean state had taken in the aftermath of F/ . Chile claimed techno-
logical knowledge and mastery by using Haitian technological failures as a 
foil in order to demonstrate Chilean belonging to the “us” of Empire and 
not to the “them” of underdevelopment. Various global media streams 
broadcast this message.
The Technological Embrace and Chilean Modernity on the Global Stage
About six months after F/ , another catastrophe struck in Chile that drew 
the world’s attention—perhaps even more so: the rescue of thirty-three 
Chilean miners (a Google search on October ,  for “Chile earthquake 
” yielded .  million hits and for “Chile miners ” .  million hits). 
The rescue of these miners, known as los , from the mine redirected 
attention from the ongoing suff ering of those aff ected by the disaster(s) 
back to Chile’s modern version of the enlightenment narrative of techno-
logical mastery in the face of danger to human life. This time the disaster 
was induced by the failure of technologies that put men under the earth to 
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mine valuable metals and minerals for the global economic system. During 
the decade of the s, on average thirty-four miners died in Chilean 
copper mines each year and received no global fanfare or lament (Long 
b). The global media spectacle of los  who were valiantly rescued 
in , seemingly by President Sebastian Piñera himself, is emblematic 
of Chile’s national narrative of technological embrace and its appearance 
not only as a modern nation, but as a hypermodern nation. The Chilean 
nation was invested in that moment in the technological embrace, the 
channeling of hope for the future, hope for humanity, into technologi-
cal solutions. In this case, the technological solution was a metaphor in 
the global media for Chile as a nation, one that indicated, according to 
a CBS news headline, that “With Mine Rescue, Chile Sets Sights on st 
World: President Sebastian Piñera Could Change Landscape of Chile and 
Bring Nation Closer to Developed Status” (Associated Press [AP] b). 
The “miracle” rescue of the miners eff ectively mirrored the desired image 
of the Chilean economic “miracle” that the state leveraged to reassert 
Chile’s exemplary and even exceptional status on the global media stage. 
As Olsen, Carstensen, and Hoyen ( ) have demonstrated, media focus 
draws attention and money.
The technological feat was further heralded by an exhibit entitled 
“Against All Odds: Rescue at the Chilean Mine” at the Smithsonian Na-
tional Museum of Natural History (n.d.) in Washington, DC. However, a 
year after the miners’ dramatic rescue, as the world watched, global me-
dia reported that many of them now struggled fi nancially and psycho-
logically, and, according to a New York Times report, “Many now get by 
on a steady regimen of sedatives and antidepressants.” One miner told 
the Times reporter, “‘They made us feel like heroes. … In the end, we are 
selling peanuts. It’s ironic, isn’t it? … We feel a little abandoned here” (Bar-
rionuevo ). Apparently many of the miners, too, have been abandoned 
by the Chilean state, even after President Piñera carefully used the miners’ 
rescue to promote Chile’s image nationally and globally. The technological 
embrace had served its purpose for the image of the nation on a global 
stage but had failed for many of the Chilean miners, who were Chilean 
citizens.
The State’s Technological Failure
In stark contrast to the miraculous rescue of los , the Chilean govern-
ment lacked the technological knowledge to accurately predict the tsu-
nami that followed the earthquake on F/ . Also in stark contrast to the 
spectacle of the rescue of los , the government’s glaring failure to warn 
of the imminent tsunami has been notably muted in global media reports. 
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Directly following the earthquake, many residents of coastal areas drew 
from their historical, experiential knowledge about the risk of a tsunami 
following an earthquake and fl ed for higher ground. However, based on 
information gathered by the state’s technological instruments, President 
Bachelet and the Ofi cina Nacional de Emergencia del Ministerio del Inte-
rior (Chile’s offi  ce of emergency management, or ONEMI) were uncon-
vinced that a tsunami would occur and gave the order for local authorities 
to tell people in coastal areas to return to their homes (Venegas ). The 
residents’ knowledge turned out to be more sophisticated than the tech-
nological approximations of risk, but the state has authority, and scientifi c 
instruments represent authoritative knowledge, meanwhile experiential 
knowledge is fi gured as less reliable in modern systems (see chapter , 
Barrios, this volume). The Chilean state relied on a narrative of technolog-
ical embrace that sees technological, scientifi c knowledge as the solution 
over and above other responses.  The technological embrace failed. On 
the two-year anniversary of F/  the government had only begun to ad-
dress its error publicly.
Neoliberal Inequalities within the Frame of 
the State’s Discourses of Compassion
Only six months after F/ , President Piñera, along with the International 
Monetary Fund, declared that recovery had been successful; meanwhile, 
the BBC reported that economic indicators suggested that “the percent-
age of Chileans living in poverty—a fi gure that has been declining for de-
cades—rose to . % in mid-  from . % in . It is widely accepted 
that the earthquake was to blame” (Long a). In  Piñera celebrated 
the fi rst anniversary of the earthquake/tsunami, insisting that, “recon-
struction is advancing fi rmly” (El Mercurio – ). The government’s Bal-
ance reconstruccón  a un año del terremoto (reconstruction account), 
an offi  cial report on the recovery eff orts a year after the disaster, boasted 
that  percent of housing subsidies to build new homes had been issued, 
and  percent of the public infrastructure had been restored or almost 
restored (Gobierno de Chile , ). The offi  cial government document is 
nine pages long and provides glossy before and after pictures of damaged 
and repaired infrastructure, but no pictures of the supposedly temporary 
camps where running water and electricity are often scarce, and no pic-
tures or mention of rural, largely indigenous, Mapuche communities like 
Tirúa, which were also aff ected by the earthquake/tsunami (Rojas Bravo 
). In response to critiques of the slow nature of the government’s 
eff orts, especially in the poorer areas, Chilean government offi  cials have 
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asked that its citizens have patience, as rebuilding takes time, especially 
since the government claims to be rebuilding with better quality in mind, 
according to President Piñera (El Mercurio – ). The state’s narrative 
of overcoming the damages of the earthquake/tsunami of  serves to 
brand Chile on the world stage, again, in a way that emphasizes its com-
petence as a neoliberal state; along with its modernity, development, and 
technological sophistication. Meanwhile, it minimizes the harsh realities 
of the structural inequalities that persist even as Chile’s GDP has grown.
In another move that elides the structural inequalities underlying vul-
nerabilities to earthquake and tsunami in zones most heavily aff ected, 
the Chilean state has focused its recovery programs on a discourse of 
compassion about the emotional distress and post-disaster trauma in af-
fected, marginalized communities.  I posit that this is because emotional 
distress can be fi gured as natural—that is, not politically charged, part of 
any disaster and therefore channeled away from the uncomfortable real-
ity of poverty that was exposed by the disaster. The Servicio Nacional de 
la Mujer (national women’s service, or SERNAM) launched a campaign in 
the aff ected zones called Levántate Mujer (get up, woman) and off ered 
psychological interventions for women through their regional women’s 
centers. Psychologist Pilar Sordo gave motivational speeches to address 
what she called the earthquake of the soul that followed the disaster, 
promoting the state’s discourse of compassion, which masked the state’s 
failure to provide adequate material resources for those suff ering. On the 
other hand, as of August  SERNAM’s documentation center and its 
Santiago regional offi  ce told me that they had not done any research to 
ascertain how women in particular had been aff ected by the earthquake/
tsunami (personal communication). SERNAM’s interventions, aimed at 
getting women to “just feel better” and continue executing their wom-
anly gender roles to fulfi ll their “duties” as pillars of the Chilean family and 
nation (see Parson ), have been criticized by those working in non-
governmental and academic settings in Chile. These interventions did not 
increase the visibility of social inequalities and social suff ering—the roots 
of the unnatural disaster’s production of ongoing suff ering. They called 
attention to the collective trauma of bare, “natural” disaster, one that 
could ostensibly be overcome through collective therapy, motivational 
speeches, and self-improvement. Similarly, Fassin and Rechtman ( ) 
have theorized how, globally, discourses of trauma and posttraumatic 
stress disorder have become the technical focus of humanitarian eff orts 
in post-disaster scenarios. Attention is diverted to psychological trauma 
instead of to the underlying social contexts structured by inequalities that 
remain unquestioned. This allows the state to reinforce its authority, more 
legitimately and project an ethic of care for its citizens on the global stage, 
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meanwhile failing to provide needed material support. This is coherent 
with moves under neoliberal governance toward therapy as internalized 
social control (Merry , ).
The state attempts to claim its authority from its discourses of compas-
sion on the local and global registers and not from real accountability to 
its citizens. The state thereby asserts that it is not the role of the state to 
provide materially for its most vulnerable in times of need. The role of the 
state is to off er compassionate discourses, but the citizens themselves 
and global humanitarian organizations must provide the real care. The 
state’s authority is therefore fragile once the reality of its provision of 
material resources is brought to light, and it is this weakness that social 
movements are able to unveil to global media, when they have a power-
ful enough voice to speak back to the state, via the global media stage. 
Also highlighting neoliberal values of self-suffi  ciency, many nongovern-
mental organization (NGO) programs emerged in Chile to fi ll the gaps 
in the state’s provision of care. One such program, Chile Ayuda a Chile 
(Chile helps Chile) proclaimed, “Chileans, sisters and brothers, all compa-
triots, it doesn’t matter how many times we fall, ONE HUNDRED AND A 
THOUSAND TIMES ALWAYS we pick ourselves up, because we are children 
of challenge and to this we always stand up” (“Fuerza Chile: Terremoto 
” ). Indeed, such fund raisers generate funding from within disas-
ter aff ected countries and from outside. Brown and Minty ( , ) found 
that after the widespread and devastating tsunami of , for every min-
ute of nightly news coverage or newspaper stories about the disaster, 
donations increased by –  percent. By putting the responsibility on 
the populace to generate funds for those in need, the state is once again 
excused from accountability. International NGOs also have provided care 
where the state has not, thereby bolstering the global in the local.
Recoveries in the Margins of the State
One such place where the state has failed to care and international or-
ganizations have tried to “mind the gap” is Tirúa, a community popu-
lated mostly by indigenous Mapuche, a group that generally lives at the 
margins of the state (see Das and Poole ), and where poverty ex-
ceeds the generalized high levels of poverty in the southern regions most 
aff ected by the disaster (Rojas Bravo , ). In Tirúa, residents have 
criticized the state’s failure to act after the disaster and people there, as 
elsewhere in Chile, have had to rely instead on mechanisms of global gov-
ernance (see Ferguson and Gupta ; Ticktin ), which have taken 
the state’s place. Ximena Rojas Bravo explained to me in July  that she 
had been hired by the global NGO Non-profi t Enterprise and Self-sustain-
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ability Team (NESsT) to work in Tirúa on its campaign Levantando Chile 
(Uplifting Chile), based on her previous work on women’s development 
and violence against women. Rojas Bravo conducted workshops and a sur-
vey of women’s necessities in Tirúa in the wake of the devastation of the 
earthquake/tsunami there, something that the Chilean government had 
not done (Rojas Bravo ). Women in Tirúa reported to her that prior 
to, as following, the earthquake/tsunami their lives were lived in grave 
poverty and isolation from the state. From their descriptions, they lived 
almost in an abandoned state-less state. They felt isolated and marginal-
ized, largely because of the lack of public transportation and the lack of 
telephone lines. “Here the mistreatment of the poor is very hard,” noted 
one woman in an interview with Rojas Bravo. She continued, “It doesn’t 
matter to them what happens to you. When we go to the Municipality for 
something, they see us enter and they put on a bad face. They look at us 
badly. They attend to us poorly and they criticize us a lot” (Rojas Bravo 
, ). All of the women reported that the authorities (municipality and 
national) did not give them help in the wake of the disaster and had not 
asked them what their necessities are, although  percent said that their 
houses suff ered damages. No housing was off ered for those who lost 
their homes (Rojas Bravo , ). In Tirúa the invisibility appears to be 
magnifi ed by the abject poverty, isolation, and racism in which people live 
their lives. This example of global governance to fi ll the gaps in the state’s 
attention to its citizens provides a dramatic counterpoint to the state’s 
narratives of technological mastery, modernity, and economic success. 
But also, extremely poor, indigenous populations in rural areas of Chile, 
such as Tirúa, lack a powerful voice on the global stage. They are unable 
to protest their subjection on that level, and they lack the power to attract 
the state’s attention. Global humanitarian organizations fi ll in the gaps left 
by the state, exposing weakness on the part of the state, and furthering 
the development of forms of humanitarian global governance.
Recovering Equality? Social Movements’ Counter-Narratives
“‘Mayor, there are still temporary houses without electricity. Thirty-three 
are okay and the rest are fucked,’ declared graffi  ti on what was once an in-
terior wall presumably destroyed by the earthquake/tsunami on February 
, ” (Senador Navarro, ).
Chilean social movements have taken note of the state’s selective atten-
tion. An ethos of distrust of the state has emerged strongly in a range of 
Chilean social movements during : against a hydroelectric plant in Pata-
gonia, for reform of educational systems, and for fair reconstruction after 
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the earthquake/tsunami. I posit that these social movements grow in part 
out of an ontological insecurity shaped by lingering memories of the state’s 
repression during the dictatorial era and the lack of equality produced af-
ter twenty years of offi  cial democracy under the Concertación, the left/
center-left coalition. In stark contrast to the state’s narratives of develop-
ment, prosperity, neoliberal modernity, and technological sophistication, 
many people feel left out of the Chilean miracle so touted globally. They 
see their nation represented globally as a success, but they themselves do 
not feel this success. In the wake of the F/  social movements and most 
notably the student movement of , the Chilean state has used great 
force to repress social movement protests, reviving memories of the dic-
tatorship government. These local social movements also link with global 
movements as a tool to further their local agendas. Just as economies and 
humanitarian discourses are globalizing, so are social movements.
National Movement for Fair Reconstruction
Around the fi rst anniversary of F/ , a number of social organizations who 
had come together under the umbrella Movimiento por una Reconstruc-
ción Justa (national movement for fair reconstruction; MNRJ) presented a 
petition to the Chilean government with their demands. The petition, pre-
sented in a protest march in downtown Santiago, demanded that recon-
struction not be driven by “privatization and profi t” (biobioproyecta.org 
) and demanded, “a housing solution for all of the refugees,” includ-
ing dignifi ed housing, constructed with citizens’ participation, within two 
years. With community development in mind, they urged the government 
to make eff orts to avoid, “ghettos of poverty [and] social exclusion in the 
[reconstructed] city.” They also demanded that crucial infrastructure such 
as schools and clinics be reconstructed, without privatization and profi t, 
and that the coastline as well as water remain free from privatization in 
the process of reconstruction. In short, they argued against disaster cap-
italism. All of these measures, MNRJ argued, must be undertaken by the 
government within an environment of transparency. This critique of the 
privatization that has been at the heart of the neoliberal reforms in Chile 
that began under Pinochet resonates throughout the movement that has 
taken root around reconstruction. Romina Aros, the spokeswoman for 
Red Construyamos (we construct network) noted in an interview in , 
“Defi nitely the issue of reconstruction is not a priority, nor education, nor 
health in Chile. The priority today is privatization. What the government is 
for today is to privatize all sectors, including reconstruction” (Observato-
rio de Género y Equidad ).
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Dichato Resists
A Chilean police water cannon tank and CS tear gas-spraying jeep was 
shown in a photograph of the temporary housing that is now the village 
of Dichato during a July , , protest. The headline of the article associ-
ated with the photo says, “Police deny that police tanks entered the small 
village (aldea) of Dichato” (Terra ).
One of the most vocal towns in the struggle for fair reconstruction has 
been the small, coastal town of Dichato, which was completely wiped out 
by the tsunami. Dichato was one of the hardest-hit communities, with 
around  percent of inhabitants there losing their homes. One year after 
the disaster three thousand people were still living in temporary housing, 
some in El Molino camp in -square meter wooden shacks constructed 
for them after they lost their homes (“Terremoto: Campamentos, la emer-
gencia que no termina” ). An article in La Nación, a widely read national 
newspaper, noted that these structures “lack insulation and they fl ood 
when it rains” (La Nación ). Furthermore, a citizens’ group report in 
February  stated, “The sanitary situation of the families in temporary 
housing [mediaguas] is worrisome. They have diffi  culty accessing drinking 
water. … When there is electricity, it is from illegal installations that pose 
fi re hazards. If there is a bathroom, many families have to use it” (Valen-
zeula , ).
A camp leader noted, “Life in the countryside is bad, it’s bitter, it’s ugly. 
For me, this is like a concentration camp. At  P.M. people lock themselves 
into their houses and that is it. Before it wasn’t like this. We went out. We 
went for a stroll” Valenzuela , ). They will be there for two to three 
more years, awaiting permanent housing, which is supposedly in process. 
One El Molino community leader referred to these living conditions and 
lack of governmental response as a “moral earthquake” that paralleled 
the seismic event (Toledo ), referring to the government’s unfulfi lled 
promises of aid and challenging the state’s moral authority and its dis-
course of compassion.
Later in the year, on July , , Dichato residents took to the streets 
to protest the continued lack of running water, lack of plumbing and in-
sulation, lack of electricity, and the government’s failure to come through 
on its promises of reconstruction after eighteen months. And onlook-
ers digitally recorded the events and then posted them on YouTube, for 
other Chileans and for the world to access. One YouTube video shows the 
bonfi re of small trees that burned slowly in the middle of the highway, 
the protest banners, protestors talking to the press, and chanting, “El 
pueblo unido jamas sera vencido” (“The people united will never be de-
feated”). Lorena Arce, a leader of the movement in Dichato, asserted to 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
 • Nia Parson
the press, “If the government won’t respond to us and provide the rights 
we deserve, we will fi ght for them” (Sepulveda Arteaga ). Global me-
dia allowed the protestors’ voices to be heard far beyond the local and the 
national. The state is accountable to its citizens in new ways via new global 
media linkages.
The governmental authorities engaged the police’s force to defuse the 
situation. In a video report of the event it appears that the police calmly 
tried to talk with the protestors to ask them to disperse from the road-
way. The protesters responded with their complaints to the government. 
For example, one man said that his wife was old and ill and it was very dif-
fi cult for her to make it to the bathroom, which is outside (Sepulveda Ar-
teaga ). Indeed, residents had to share one portable bathroom among 
several families and these were located outside of their homes, a problem 
that has been documented in particular for women and girls, as well (Sab-
orido ).
The police remained calm and quiet, but did not respond to this man’s 
and others’ complaints, returning without words to their vehicles. They 
soon returned to the crowd, dressed in full riot gear, army green helmets, 
shields, and bullet-proof vests; they walked almost in lock step to form a 
wall of bodies. They easily worked their way into the disgruntled crowd 
to clear the roadway of the burning debris and then physically pushed 
the crowd out of the way, using their shields to protect themselves. A 
protestor hit one of the shields with a stick in a futile rage, for the state 
had spoken. In this visual image of the state’s relationship to its citizens, 
the state’s ultimate power, with physical gear and tools of repression 
represent a force that is overbearing and is no physical match for the pro-
testors. But the movements fi nd other ways to broadcast their messages.
Indeed, as in the so-called Arab Spring movements, new forms of social 
media provide novel platforms for social movements’ narratives, present-
ing new possibilities for alternative versions of reality to emerge and for 
the state’s authority to be challenged. In addition to the facility with which 
the above scene has circulated via YouTube, social movements’ Web sites, 
like “Dichatohoy,” run by the Movimiento Ciudadanos Asamblea de Di-
chato (Dichato citizens’ movement assembly) promotes their goals. For 
instance, in a post by Legua York, a popular Chilean hip-hop group, they 
shared their Rimas para Dichato (Rhymes for Dichato): “First came the 
earthquake, then the tsunami. Then came this shitty government. Two 
winters without reconstruction. Two winters with a lot of repression. Di-
chato Resists: The People Should Rule” (Legua York ). Social move-
ments around reconstruction emerged in many other post-disaster sites 
in , including in Villa Olímpica (Olympic Village) in Santiago, to which 
this chapter now turns.
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Although the socioeconomic fault lines that show through the cracks 
that the earthquake left behind in Villa Olímpica are diff erent from those 
in Dichato, there are important similarities that tie them together. Like 
poverty-stricken populations living in camps in Dichato who have strug-
gled to make their lack of running water, plumbing, and insulation visible 
after the disaster itself struck, the residents of Villa Olímpica also fail to 
embody the state’s narrative of the “miracle” of Chilean modernity and 
prosperity.
Villa Olímpica was built by the Chilean government for the Soccer World 
Cup in  and houses around ten thousand people. In its prime, Villa 
Olímpica was associated with the strengthening Chilean middle class as 
a desirable place to live. In recent years, however, it has been associated 
with the increasingly vulnerable lower-middle-class; after the earthquake’s 
damage many there are clinging to their lower-middle-class status by a 
dwindling thread. Many of the blocks of apartments were damaged so 
badly during the  earthquake that residents were displaced, forced 
to move in with relatives or live temporarily in tents. Many owned their 
apartments but had little fi nancial solvency to confront homelessness that 
the quake produced. The day following the earthquake, in response to 
the dire situation in which residents of Villa Olímpica found themselves, 
these residents formed the Asamblea de Vecinos de la Villa Olímpica (Villa 
Olímpica neighbors’ association). Soon after, the municipality government 
declared fourteen blocks of Villa Olímpica apartments condemned. Inap-
propriate and utter lack of government action has been a common com-
plaint of the Asamblea de Vecinos. The residents have been disillusioned 
and frustrated at what they perceive to be the abandonment and corrup-
tion of their local and national governmental responses in the post-disas-
ter. For instance, on May , , the mayor of their municipality said in a 
television interview that reconstruction funds would be used to repair the 
leaky roofs in the Villa, and that within twenty days of that appearance 
they would start the work and from there it would be two months to fi nish 
the roof repairs (TVN ). However, by February , one year after the 
quake, the roofs had yet to be repaired. This and other complaints led to 
a series of protests by Villa Olímpica residents. In an interview around the 
fi rst anniversary of the quake in February , a resident told the media 
the following:
One year after the earthquake we have thousands of families [in Chile] in camps in 
undignifi ed conditions, where they have not even started to construct the houses 
that ended up in the dirt. Today, from the Villa Olímpica we send them support and 
strength, since we as a people should work together against adversities, fi ghting all 
together so that the government of this country realizes that we are a population 
that is conscious, critical, and that does not permit them to pretend to be blind 
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to all of the pain of the families. Mr. President, Ministers, Senators and Business 
People, we will remain standing, fi ghting for our homes to be repaired, organizing 
ourselves every day and reminding you that the state is for all Chileans. (Anony-
mous )
By August  when I visited, little reconstruction to speak of had be-
gun, in spite of residents’ struggles to make their voices heard to their mu-
nicipality. Residents pointed out that the municipality’s May  promise 
to fi x their roofs still had not been fulfi lled, and the roofs had not been 
fi xed. Problems of rain water dripping into apartments persisted; the signs 
were easily visible on ceilings and walls.
In spite of these conditions many residents have returned to their 
condemned apartments to wait for the government’s promises of help, 
at least for the roofs and other common areas of the blocks, to come 
through. These peoples’ resources are largely tied up in the apartments 
themselves. Many of Villa Olímpica’s residents are particularly vulnera-
ble to the devastation of disaster—not because they have nothing, but 
because they have something, but not enough to fulfi ll the neoliberal ex-
pectation to pull themselves up of their own will and work. In neoliberal 
systems Harvey ( , ) has noted, “Individual success or failure are in-
terpreted in terms of entrepreneurial virtues or personal failings … rather 
than being attributed to any systemic property.” These people, then, do 
not fulfi ll the neoliberal ethic of (presumed) self-suffi  ciency. They reveal 
the cracks in the neoliberal regime, wherein hard work, a job, and a home 
are not enough in the face of disaster. Without the state’s safety net, they 
live in utter vulnerability, and this is what they protest—their vulnerability 
to the neoliberal economic system and the marriage of the state and pri-
vate enterprise. For in a seismic and volcanic country like Chile, disasters 
are a question of when, not if the next earthquake, tsunami, or volcano 
will strike.
The Global Call of the Indignant: 
The Local Struggle Is the Global Struggle
The movements in Dichato and Villa Olímpica are two nodes of the wider 
social movements related to reconstruction after F/ , and these various 
movements to protest the state’s lack of care for those aff ected by the 
disaster are symptomatic of a generalized dissatisfaction with the state’s 
lack of attention to its citizens’ needs. The reconstruction movements 
have now joined with other large social movements in Chile and global 
social movements for social justice. In a statement on October , , 
the reconstruction movement in Chile joined its voice to the Global Call of 
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the Indignant. In doing so, the group Movimientos Ciudadanos (citizens’ 
movements) made itself visible to the world. Movimientos Ciudadanos is 
a conglomerate social movement comprising Chilean movements against 
( ) HidroAysén, the thermoelectric project in Patagonia, ( ) ineff ectual 
reconstruction, ( ) profi t in public housing, and ( ) “Piñera’s Damned/
Cursed Law” (Ley Maldita; Ley de Defensa Permanente de la Democracia, 
that was imposed during the Cold War to outlaw the Communist Party 
and curtail individual freedoms), which the government has proposed to 
revive and social movements see as an attempt to criminalize their eff orts. 
Finally, the Movimientos Ciudadanos’ demands include free and quality 
education for all, the central demand of the Chilean student movement 
that has been strongly repressed by the state, meanwhile gaining wide 
international attention, for example in a recent article on student move-
ment leader Camila Vallejo, in the New York Times (Wilson ). In  
the Movimientos Ciudadanos gathered in front of the Chilean presidential 
palace, La Moneda, to proclaim with a unifi ed voice, “Chile needs a real 
democracy,” and demanded citizen participation in constructing a new 
constitution to replace the  Constitution put in place by decree of 
Augusto Pinochet’s violent military dictatorship (Movimientos Ciudadanos 
). “Our demands add to the global call of the indignant all over the 
world,” they proclaimed, using the word “indignado/as” (indignant) as 
protestors had done in Spain to protest their disenfranchisement in the 
global neoliberal economic system (Poggioli ). As the movement for 
fair reconstruction has developed, it has increasingly formed connections 
with other social movements in Chile and globally, which have the same 
basic complaints at their base—social inequality caused by corrupt politi-
cal economic systems, which are both global and local.
Conclusions: Power Struggles on a Global Stage
This chapter has shown that it is crucial to attend to the multilayered as-
pects of any disaster and its chronicity—including the media broadcast of 
forms of state actions and citizens’ actions in the wake of disaster. As the 
state asserts the value-lessness of its citizens in its attempts to abandon 
them through inattention to their needs and through global narratives of 
its authority and modernity, social movements also create and purvey nar-
rative claims to personhood, value, and rights on behalf of their members. 
In Chile, neoliberal economic policies are entrenched, but also entrenched 
in the Chilean social body are the tactics of resistance and protest fi nely 
honed by the population in their historical interactions with the state. 
These movements are largely cognizant of the need to broadcast their 
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voices of dissent on global stages, in the face of the state’s assertions of 
its hegemony via global media pronouncements.
Resistance to the state’s inactions in the wake of disaster is far from 
limited to the Chilean context, though it manifests in particular ways in 
Chile. At the same time, people most directly aff ected by disasters have 
found ways to attempt to talk back to the state and to make the state ac-
countable to its citizens’ needs by using media outlets, specifi cally widely 
viewed and available Internet sites like YouTube and Facebook. Protests 
and citizen unrest in the aftermath of disaster have become a widespread 
reaction to the immensity of both the visible and the invisible impacts of 
disaster, and this is a worldwide phenomenon. Protests in Japan over 
the nuclear fallout of Fukushima and the government’s failure to provide 
accurate knowledge of the severity of the nuclear disaster have emerged 
(Button b; Rose Johnston ; Tabuchi ). In Haiti protestors have 
rallied in response to allegations of government hoarding of aid (Vega 
) and in the wake of widespread death due to the rampant spread of 
cholera in the camps (AP a). In the aftermath of the BP Gulf oil spill 
in the United States, groups protested the handling of that environmen-
tal, health, and economic disaster (Jonsson ). Although states value 
lives diff erentially through their creation and enforcement of the rules 
of reconstruction and through the broadcast of global media narratives 
that attempt to consolidate its power and authority, social movements’ 
power to assert a diff erent narrative of the reality of these policies on the 
ground and to shift power relations and distribution of resources cannot 
be overlooked. Social movements protest and resist the devaluing of 
their lives, and their linkages with global media and globally dispersed 
social movements are crucial. These movements are part of new socio-
political landscapes that emerge when the more insidious vulnerabili-
ties that preceded the disaster suddenly become critical (see Kleinman 
).
In disaster capitalism, national and international capitalist interests take 
advantage of post-disaster vulnerabilities in order to make profi ts (see 
Adams, Van Hattum, and English ; Klein ; Schuller ). The 
analysis in this chapter suggests that vulnerable people themselves and 
their social movements also leverage the visibility and the desperation of 
the disaster’s aftermath to make claims on the state, claims that are about 
the aftermath of the disaster itself but are also claims to democracy, cit-
izenship, and belonging to the state in an era of intensive globalization 
of economies, media, and inequalities. The disaster provides those who 
are disenfranchised subjects of the state the “conditions of possibility for 
forms of subjectivity” (Fischer , ) that hinge on protest of their sub-
mission to local and global orders. They use new Internet media to mobi-
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lize attention to their experiences and protests—thereby to some extent 
engaging in attempts at “reshaping the public sphere by changing power 
relations” (Fischer , ). The question of how social movements will 
continue to aff ect and shape global political economies, and the ways 
these movements articulate with post-disaster landscapes in particular, is 
an open one.
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Notes
Author did all translations throughout this chapter.
 . In May  citizens from various sectors of the society came out strongly in 
protest against HidroAys, a hydroelectric company to be built in Patagonia in 
southern Chile.
 . It is important to note that Hale has argued that neoliberal economic regimes in 
Latin America were actually “consummated in tandem with a region-wide return 
to democracy” (Hale ).
 . In , Salvador Allende, a socialist, was democratically elected president. Al-
lende nationalized the lucrative copper mining industry, redistributed land, pro-
moted free education, health for all, and other public policies directed at social 
justice. These policies, in concert with his friendship with Cuba during the Cold 
War represented threats to the United States’ political and economic interests 
in Chile. The U.S. government under the direction of Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger backed the imposition of economic policies that drove scarcity of basic 
goods in Chile under Allende and then underwrote the violent overthrow of Al-
lende during a bloody coup, led by General Augusto Pinochet, on September , 
. Neoliberal economic policies were instituted under Pinochet’s dictatorial 
rule, led by los Chicago Boys, Chilean economists trained at the University of Chi-
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cago under Milton Friedman, who led the charge to privatize agriculture, health 
care, education, and social security; to make trade unions of most types illegal; 
and to maximize trade profi ts.
 . See Button ( ) on counter-narratives in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 
New Orleans.
 . Building on Del Vecchio Good’s ( ) concept of the biotechnical embrace, which 
includes the aff ective dimensions that lead people to trust technological interven-
tion in biomedicine and bioscience over and above other forms of knowledge and 
experience.
 . Fassin and Rechtman ( ) have explicated the phenomenon in global human-
itarian aid whereby trauma, and not the underlying structural inequalities that 
shape vulnerability, has become the focal point of interventions.
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CHAPTER 
Decentralizing Disasters
Civic Engagement and Stalled Reconstruction 
after Japan’s /
BRIDGET LOVE
What is this earthquake trying to teach us? If there is nothing it is 
trying to teach us, then what can we possibly have left to believe?
Wagō Ryōichi 
After threading through miles of ruins, a mini-bus deposited our group in 
the parking lot of an incongruously named bōsai sentā (disaster preven-
tion center). It stood in front of us, a battered and windowless two-story 
building. A lone bulldozer toiled in the rubble behind it. There were few 
other orienting points in sight. The remains of concrete foundations left 
by Japan’s March , , tsunami poked up jaggedly from the ground for 
miles in every direction. As we waited for a local guide to arrive and give 
us a tour of the center, members of our group wandered the parking lot 
snapping pictures of tiled bathrooms open to the sky, hardy clover fl ower-
ing in piles of debris, and other curiosities in the ruins.
We were volunteers returning from a day spent building a community 
garden for tsunami survivors from this district of Kamaishi City. In  
they were still living in temporary housing enclaves wedged between 
nearby mountains. Rebuilding had yet to begin in Kamaishi, as in dozens 
of coastal municipalities along Japan’s northeastern Pacifi c coast, even 
though fukkō (reconstruction) was a constant topic of discussion in the 
national news. This contradiction invariably surprised volunteers visiting 
the disaster site for the fi rst time. Refl ecting on our outing at a debriefi ng 
meeting later that evening, a young man from Tokyo marveled, “It’s been 
two years, but nothing has changed.”
Of course, this was not entirely true. According to Japan’s Reconstruc-
tion Agency, over  million tons of debris were collected, sorted, and 
removed from the coast in the fi rst year after the disaster (Fukkō chō , 
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).  Yet rubble is just one of massive challenges caused by the magnitude 
.  earthquake that struck off  the eastern coast of Tōhoku, the six-prefec-
ture region comprising the northeast of Japan’s main island. Triggered by 
the quake, mega-tsunami rising to heights of forty meters inundated three 
hundred miles of coastline. They killed nearly twenty thousand people be-
fore triggering a nuclear meltdown at the Fukushima Dai-ichi power plant 
in southern Tōhoku. This chain of disasters, referred to as /  in Japan, 
produced vast and far-reaching eff ects. Five hundred thousand coastal 
residents were displaced from their homes. Radiation permeated Japan’s 
domestic food system and has streamed into the Pacifi c in unknown quan-
tity. Even as government teams work to decontaminate municipalities 
in the fallout plume of the Fukushima plant, advocacy groups have mea-
sured radiation hotspots in playgrounds one hundred and fi fty miles south 
in Tokyo. Equidistant from the plant to the north, survivors in Kamaishi 
still waited two years later as plans to rebuild their communities lagged in 
deliberations.
During this time, Japanese politicians, pundits, and academics have 
been quick to glean crisp lessons from the sprawling tragedies. Just days 
after the earthquake, Tokyo’s governor, Ishihara Shintaro, called the tsu-
nami “a divine punishment” meant to “wash away the selfi sh-egoism” and 
“materialism” that has come to infuse Japan’s national identity (“Daishin-
sai wa tenbatsu” ). Critics quickly condemned his comments as absurd 
and insensitive. However, his was just one of many voices seeking to distill 
the vast disasters into pointed commentary on the legacies of Japan’s 
high-speed economic growth. Tourism policy expert Inoue Kenji observed 
that the tsunami abruptly destroyed the illusion that Japan’s relative af-
fl uence can ensure the security and well-being of its population. He ex-
plained, “We realized that a society premised on constant growth through 
the pursuit of material wealth and mass consumption can’t be permanent. 
What is real prosperity? What is happiness? We need to rebuild, but fi rst 
re-imagine our values and way of living” (Inoue , ).  
Domestically, the triple disasters prompted many Japanese to recog-
nize the unequally shared costs of Japan’s affl  uence. In their wake, Tōhoku 
came into view as an aged and economically vulnerable region that had 
been exploited to support the priorities of Japan’s center. Having provided 
natural resources to support the nation’s industrialization and military 
expansion, then labor to fuel Japan’s postwar economic growth, Tōhoku 
became an ideal site for generating nuclear power to serve Tokyo’s con-
sumer needs. Highlighting this extractive relationship, /  spurred a mood 
of critical refl ection in Tokyo. Much of it has been directed toward the 
failings of the highly centralized system of governance that structured 
Japan’s postwar economic recovery and high-speed growth. After two 
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“lost decades” of persisting recession, many argue that this centralized 
system has outlived its effi  cacy in an increasingly fast-paced and volatile 
global economy. In this self-refl exive climate, reconstruction has assumed 
signifi cance as an opportunity to usher in changes that will forge a more 
resilient nation and reset Japan’s global standing.
Such realizations have bolstered an ongoing shift toward decentral-
ization, implemented in the early s through a series of structural re-
forms by Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichiro to update the nation’s political 
economy. Part of a concerted neoliberal agenda, decentralization aims to 
streamline Japan’s central government by demanding greater fi scal and 
administrative autonomy of its rural regions. Proponents of such reforms 
have seized on the disasters as evidence of the vulnerabilities inherent 
in Japan’s centralized energy industry, food systems, and public works 
juggernaut. In turn, they envision reconstruction as an opportunity to pur-
sue more intensive structural reforms, under which Tōhoku would be-
come one of several autonomous but competitive regional blocks within 
a decentered nation. Economist Fujita Masahisa ( ) thus refers to the 
disasters as a “creative destruction” that will spark the building of a more 
resilient and innovative Japan. Yet his logic diff ers from that motivating 
more virulent strains of “disaster capitalism” (Klein ) that exploit the 
chaotic aftermath of catastrophe as cover for implementing aggressive 
neoliberal reforms. Many post-disaster decentralization supporters argue 
that the catastrophes revealed latent civic energies, cultural resources, 
and environmental vulnerabilities suppressed within Japan’s highly cen-
tralized political economy. They frame their visions of post- /  reconstruc-
tion in terms of progressive goals of national inclusion, cultural diversity, 
and ecological resilience.
In this chapter I critically examine hopeful expectations that recon-
struction might spark needed social and political change in Japan. As-
sessing the stagnant progress of coastal reconstruction, I argue that the 
revelatory insights sparked by the /  disasters have failed to clarify the 
mechanisms through which decentralization might produce a more resil-
ient nation. Two years later, Kamaishi’s survivors still waited for the out-
lines of a rebuilding plan to take shape. Even as they were appropriated as 
national symbols of community self-reliance, they increasingly feared the 
possibility of their own municipal recovery slipping beyond their grasp. 
Attempting to bypass this stalemate, relief volunteers, who continue to 
trek to Kamaishi and other sites in Tōhoku, concentrated on microrenewal 
initiatives to help build morale and relationships among survivors. This 
chapter draws on fi eldwork with volunteer groups in Kamaishi in  and 
, and builds on a decade of prior research in Tōhoku. It shows that 
the decentered model of reconstruction following /  promotes ad hoc 
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and small-scale relief and rebuilding eff orts that reproduce, rather than 
resolve, regional inequalities.
The prolonged recovery period endured by Kamaishi’s residents is a 
common outcome of catastrophes. Vincanne Adams is among medical 
anthropologists (Adams et al. , ) who characterize disasters as 
“chronic in nature.” In their study of the long-term health impacts of Hur-
ricane Katrina, Adams and her colleagues contend that as “disasters them-
selves ‘age,’” they often produce lasting political inaction and “relentless 
long-term debility” ( , ). Their work builds on anthropological schol-
arship that considers disasters “from the perspective of a long-term con-
tinuum” (Button , ; see also Oliver-Smith , ). For disaster 
anthropologists, this corrects a popular misconception of disasters as iso-
lated events—which in turn contributes to shortsighted visions of recov-
ery. Here, I assess the debility and inaction emerging in the wake of /  as 
an unexpected outcome in Japan, given collective hopes that the disasters 
would unleash change. Consistent with a shift toward decentralization, I 
show that the burden of these unrealized hopes has been transferred over 
time onto victims of the disasters in Japan’s northeast. As decentraliza-
tion becomes a global trend of governance, this chapter raises important 
questions about the growing vulnerability of communities in a global era 
marked by intensifying natural catastrophes and economic volatility, but 
devolving risks and responsibilities.
Reconstruction Doldrums
News coverage of post-disaster Tōhoku has frequently attributed delays 
in coastal recovery to local disagreements over how to rebuild devas-
tated communities. When our guide Tanaka-san arrived at Kamaishi’s di-
saster prevention center, he explained to us that the battered building 
was at the center of one such confl ict. Nearly two hundred nearby resi-
dents took refuge inside the center on March , , only to drown when 
tsunami waters inundated the two-story building. While some local sur-
vivors wanted the structure retained as a memorial, others dreaded the 
prospect of encountering a graphic reminder of their tragedy on a daily 
basis. An energetic elderly farmer, Tanaka-san parsed this debate for us 
before detailing the prefecture’s plans to rebuild the district atop a secure 
ten-meter elevation. As we surveyed the ruins, it was diffi  cult to imagine 
such a feat—even more so since Tanaka-san was not optimistic about its 
execution. He warned of enormous shortages in the expertise and labor 
needed to initiate such massive earthworks projects simultaneously in 
dozens of municipalities up and down Tōhoku’s coast. The cause of the 
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expected delays was not fi scal. When Prime Minister Abe took power in 
 after a rapid succession of leaders from the center-left Democratic 
Party of Japan (DPJ), his conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) com-
mitted to increase reconstruction funding to  billion over the next fi ve 
years (Oguma ). Even so, during the fi rst year money allocated for 
reconstruction was returned unspent to government coff ers because mu-
nicipalities were unable to mobilize needed workers or materials (Borov 
and Tsubuku ).
As he lamented this deadlock in a thick northeastern dialect, Tanaka-san 
was prone to cheerful digressions—including a story about his pumpkins. 
It illustrated how, in the midst of systemic stalemates, many survivors 
took solace in projects symbolic of proactive, local forms of intervention. 
On his upland farm, Tanaka-san was cultivating heirloom pumpkins with 
seeds evacuated from Iitate, a city in the fallout plume of the Fukushima 
plant. Forced from their contaminated land, Iitate’s farmers called on col-
leagues in other prefectures to maintain their distinctive local pumpkin va-
riety. In rescuing the seeds to grow in Kamaishi and telling the story to our 
group while standing in a vast scene of tsunami wreckage, Tanaka-san was 
making a small but optimistic gesture in the midst of a situation mired in 
a massive structural quagmire. Nearby, local tsunami survivors remained 
housed indefi nitely in rows of prefab housing units crowded onto narrow 
terraces of land. When they were moved into temporary housing months 
after the disaster, all Tōhoku evacuees were given a deadline of two years 
to relocate into permanent homes. Two years later in Kamaishi, basic plans 
about how to safeguard the city against future tsunami still had to be fi -
nalized and approved before rebuilding could start. The situation was the 
same up and down the coast. On the eve of the second anniversary of the 
disaster, the national newspaper Asahi shimbun reported that only  per-
cent of Japan’s ,  evacuees had permanently relocated. Summing 
up the dilemma of Kamaishi’s displaced families, Tanaka-san explained, 
“They can’t see a way forward.”
Indeed, there was increasing concern among offi  cials about the psy-
chological toll of such prolonged uncertainty on evacuees. Many predict 
that suicide rates will rise as the situation drags on without resolution. 
A study by the National Institute for Research Advancement (Sōgō ken-
kyū kaihatsu kikō ) highlighted hardships endured by survivors during 
their second year of displacement in temporary housing. Hardships were 
especially pronounced in Iwate Prefecture, the northernmost of the hard-
est-hit prefectures, where progress toward reconstruction particularly 
lagged in municipalities like Kamaishi. The study found that women remain 
socially isolated without adequate child care or job options. It noted that 
elderly living alone in temporary housing are under signifi cant emotional 
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stress. They have been left behind in disproportionately high numbers as 
young families, eager to settle into new jobs and schools, begin relocating 
to start their lives elsewhere. Several relief volunteers that I spoke with 
commented that many elderly expect to live out the remainder of their 
days in temporary housing. Indeed, fi gures released by Japan’s Recon-
struction Agency suggest that delays have begun to endanger prospects 
for municipal rebuilding. In Kamaishi alone, there has been a  percent 
drop in the number of displaced families intending to rebuild their homes 
in the city. Commenting on these falling numbers, Iwate University agricul-
tural scientist Hirota Jun’ichi urged offi  cials to speed up the reconstruction 
process. He noted, “The longer decisions about relocation sites and land 
reclamation are delayed, more and more disaster victims will give up on 
rebuilding their homes” (“Hisaisha: jitaku saiken kōtai” ). 
At the same time, such dismal predictions have not dampened the 
futuristic infl ection of national rhetoric surrounding the rebuilding of 
Tōhoku’s devastated regions. On the third anniversary of the disaster, 
Prime Minister Abe (Sōri kantei ) acknowledged the sluggish pace of 
post-disaster recovery, even as he reassured the nation: “I am determined 
that this coming year will be one in which the people of the devastated 
regions actually perceive reconstruction.” Befi tting this promise, the term 
“fukkō” (reconstruction) evokes the active and materially tangible work 
of rebuilding. Yet in the context of Abe’s larger comments, its purpose is 
not just the restoration of well-being to aff ected communities. Rather, as 
he continued, “We must make [the  Tokyo Olympics] an opportunity 
to demonstrate to the world that Tōhoku has achieved reconstruction.” 
On an international stage, Japan’s handling of the disaster has been seized 
upon as an opportunity for its government to model the kind of national 
resolve needed to restore a global status dimmed by decades of economic 
malaise. Likewise, the disaster has been appropriated in other forums as 
an occasion to translate Japan’s downturns into global leadership in the 
arena of sustainable development. At the  United Nations Confer-
ence on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro, Japan presented its 
Future City Initiative, a set of urban design models showcasing principles 
of low-carbon building, recycling, health care, and disaster preparedness 
(United Nations ). Kamaishi was selected as one of several model 
cities in this initiative, since its reconstruction off ered an opportunity to 
highlight innovative urban planning that promotes disaster resilience, el-
der-friendly communities, and environmentally sound construction.
Plans to promote the city as a global model of sustainability overlook 
the extent to which predisaster Kamaishi grappled with concerns about its 
future. During Japan’s nineteenth-century industrialization and twentieth-
century colonial expansion in Asia, the city prospered as a center of steel 
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mining and metal works. Though its postwar population peaked at around 
,  residents, falling global metal prices meant the downsizing of the 
city’s iron works and the closing of its mines. For the past half-century, the 
city has experienced steady demographic and economic decline. By the 
time of the  disasters, the city’s population had fallen to just under 
,  residents, nearly one-third of whom were over sixty-fi ve years of 
age.  Pre- /  Kamaishi was like many cities and towns in Tōhoku—in the 
throes of radical decline, and without expectations of future growth. The 
city is one apt example of why offi  cials have adopted reconstruction as 
their post-disaster benchmark, rather than the related goal of fukkyū (re-
covery), which connotes the return to a previous state.
Indeed, Kamaishi’s vulnerability prior to the disaster was intensifi ed 
by a decade of neoliberal reforms. Designed to promote greater munici-
pal autonomy by streamlining Japan’s centralized government, neoliberal 
decentralization policies have largely entailed measures to reduce state 
funding to the nation’s rural regions. In doing so, they have reversed a 
redistributive tax system that for decades transferred taxes collected in 
Japan’s populous urban centers to shore up the municipal budgets of its 
fl agging countryside. Proponents of such reforms assume that funding 
withdrawals will force Japan’s municipalities to more eff ectively and re-
sponsibly manage their existing assets. In fact, many frame decentraliza-
tion as a return to grassroots forms of local democratic governance—a 
way, according to DPJ politician Katayama Yoshihiro, “for residents to 
decide regional matters themselves” (Takenaka ). Despite such ideals, 
many rural localities, economically depleted and with large aging popu-
lations dependent on social welfare services, struggle to manage their 
needs on less and less government support.
It is in this context that that fascination with the idea of community 
self-suffi  ciency in Tōhoku blossomed after the /  disasters. Mainstream 
media outlets quickly honed in on themes of communal resilience in their 
coverage of the tsunami aftermath. Stories of the collective strength 
and self-control of tsunami survivors—as they organized themselves in 
makeshift evacuation centers and peaceably shared scant resources—
became staples of disaster reporting. The international press seized on 
such stories as examples of how traditional Japanese values of restraint 
and gaman (perseverance) patterned an orderly civic response to the di-
saster. In contrast, within Japan such traits are strongly associated with 
Tōhoku’s rural communities, long viewed as repositories of traditions that 
have faded in prosperous, urban Japan. According to this logic, the history 
of famine and deprivation endured by Tōhoku’s communities, within their 
rugged terrain and harsh winter climate, has produced a collective spirit 
of perseverance. As Jennifer Robertson ( , ) has critically noted, in 
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the wake of /  celebrations of Tōhoku’s culture displaced anger over an 
inadequate governmental response that abandoned vulnerable disaster 
victims to their own devices.
Indeed, the most common expressions of solidarity with tsunami sur-
vivors consist of calls for Tōhoku’s victims to continue to persevere. As 
one example, Japan’s Ministry of the Interior sought to drum up emo-
tional support for the devastated communities by encouraging groups to 
endorse the slogan “Gambaru Tōhoku” [you can do it, Tōhoku]. A March 
 Ministry memo explained, “As time passes after the earthquake and 
tsunami, a forward-looking energy is starting to return to victims of the 
disaster. In support, we’ve begun an initiative to send to the Tōhoku re-
gion the message ‘You can do it Tōhoku.’ … It’s meant to deliver hope 
to the hearts of Tōhoku’s people who met with suff ering in the disas-
ter” (Kokudokōtsu sho ). The announcement contained a roster of 
academic, governmental, and business groups endorsing the initiative, 
as well as links to download “Gambaru Tōhoku” banners in various sizes 
for printing onto fl iers and stickers. In the months after the disaster, such 
signage became ubiquitous throughout Japan. It was indicative of the 
tone of cheerful encouragement that has also permeated policy and aca-
demic responses to the disaster from within Tokyo.  Rooted in earnest op-
timism that the disaster-stricken regions will overcome their devastation, 
these responses from the center lack specifi c recommendations about 
how Tōhoku might translate its indigenous character into a vital regional 
future. Instead, Gambaru Tōhoku—in conjunction with the post-disaster 
slogan Gambaru Nippon (we can do it, Japan)—transformed the devas-
tated region into a beacon of inspiration for Japan to rally strength and 
solidarity after two lost decades of stagnant economic growth and dimin-
ished global standing.
Disaster and Decentralization
In Japan as elsewhere, decentralization displaces administrative functions 
and fi scal responsibilities of the state onto local government or civic and 
private entities. Because it is often driven by an impulse to free up markets 
from excessive oversight, geographers Rodriguez-Pose and Nicholas Gill 
( , ) refer to decentralization as a devolutionary trend sweeping the 
world in relation to aggressive forms of neoliberal capitalism. It requires 
self-responsible citizens and self-suffi  cient communities that can main-
tain themselves with limited state support. The events of /  revealed 
ambivalent public perceptions of these devolutions in Japan. On the one 
hand, the disasters proved an opportunity to recognize new sources of 
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agency and energy in Japanese society. For many social commentators, 
volunteer relief workers represented the potentials latent in Japan’s civic 
sphere. On the other hand, the disasters highlighted the limits of commu-
nity self-suffi  ciency. Volunteers have been among those most critical of 
calls encouraging disaster victims and their communities to persevere in 
the aftermath of the tsunami. The nonprofi t organization that facilitated 
my visit to Kamaishi’s disaster prevention center addressed this problem 
in a lengthy fl ier outlining its guidelines for new volunteers. It included the 
following advice: “When we don’t know what to say, we automatically use 
words like ‘gambatte’ (you can do it) and ‘gambarō’ (let’s keep trying). But 
try to use them as little as possible. There are times when people have no 
idea how to ‘keep trying.’”
To illustrate the scope of losses experienced by victims, the organiza-
tion took volunteers on mini-tours through the disaster zones. It was on 
one such trip that we followed Tanaka-san through the Disaster Preven-
tion Center, where a makeshift shrine spanned one wall of the center’s 
fi rst fl oor. It was laden with Buddhist statuary and off erings of incense, 
canned drinks, fl owers, and toys to comfort the spirits of the deceased. Al-
most two hundred residents, including children from a nearby preschool, 
took refuge in a cavernous room on the second fl oor following the /  
earthquake. They were following the protocol of a recent neighborhood 
drill during which residents had practiced assembling at the center. In a 
tragic oversight, the drill’s organizers failed to clarify that the building 
was not intended for tsunami evacuation.  Residents seeking refuge there 
were caught unaware when water inundated both fl oors of the building. 
Of those inside who survived this deluge, a few clung to speakers and 
curtains mounted on the ceiling of the second fl oor. The rest were drawn 
out to sea as the water receded in the late afternoon. As we made our way 
through the center, Tanaka-san advised us not to linger around stairwells, 
closets, or other dark, enclosed spaces where bodies had been trapped. 
He explained that they were likely to be occupied by unsettled spirits that 
can infl uence and even possess the living who encounter them.  The en-
during presence of such spirits within tsunami-devastated communities 
remains a highly localized eff ect of the tsunami, long lasting and diffi  cult 
to resolve through proactive initiative.
In public forums, politicians and activists have worked to derive tidier 
and more-transportable lessons from the disaster. These often center on 
themes of collective resilience and personal agency, both highly suited 
to mandates of decentralized governance. In Kamaishi, the roof of the 
disaster prevention center overlooks the site of two former junior high 
and elementary schools. In contrast to the tragic losses at the center, all 
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six hundred students from these schools survived the tsunami by fl ee-
ing upland after the earthquake. As the story goes, older students took 
younger students by the hand as they ascended the road to the schools’ 
designated evacuation site. They then decided to climb higher, a decision 
that ultimately saved both students and the residents who followed their 
example. Dubbed Kamaishi no kiseki (the miracle of Kamaishi) in the me-
dia, the students’ actions have garnered nationwide publicity. The Web 
site of Japan’s Public Relations Offi  ce features their story under its post-
/  banner “Made in the New Japan” as an example of the spirit that 
Japan needs to forge a comprehensive recovery—both from the disasters 
and the nation’s sustained downturns (Japan Public Relations Offi  ce ). 
According to the article, the students prefer to call the event Kamaishi no 
jisseki (the achievement of Kamaishi) to emphasize the role that prepara-
tion and self-responsibility played in their survival.
Among the many contexts in which it has been invoked, Iwate’s for-
mer governor Masuda Hiroya cited the “miracle of Kamaishi” in a  
keynote speech at a conference on regional decentralization. For him, the 
students’ actions reinforced the importance of self-motivated agency in 
twenty-fi rst century Japan. They have been widely praised for their im-
promptu decision not to sacrifi ce their own lives by stopping to help the 
elderly they encountered along their route. His speech juxtaposed the 
students’ agility and self-motivated resolve with the bulky system of cen-
tralized governance that worsened the impacts of the disaster. It included 
a costly centralized engineering and public works juggernaut of seawalls 
that failed to protect coastal citizens from the tsunami, as well as national 
supply chains and energy systems instantly disrupted by the disasters (Ma-
suda ). In contrast to these, he evoked Kamaishi’s “miracle” as a heart-
ening parable about the effi  cacy of local initiative and fl exibility.
Motivated and mobile volunteers have also played a visible role in post-
/  relief and recovery. Figures collected by coastal volunteer centers 
show that nearly  million volunteers poured into Tōhoku’s tsunami-devas-
tated regions to provide relief to victims in the fi rst year after the disaster.  
Most worked on the coasts of Miyagai and Iwate Prefectures north of 
Fukushima Prefecture, where fear of radiation exposure inhibited volun-
teering. Volunteers cleared rubble, shoveled mud, washed photographs, 
distributed donations, and otherwise busied themselves with tasks that 
could be accomplished in the midst of the immense devastation. In turn, 
the outpouring of volunteers took many Japanese by surprise. The term 
“muen shakai” (disconnected society) has become a buzzword in reces-
sionary Japan, summing up concerns that eroding familial support, job 
instability, and social isolation have come to pervade the character of 
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national life (Allison ). In contrast, the outpouring of volunteers was 
widely interpreted as an expression of latent forms of social connected-
ness that many feared had eroded in pre- /  Japan.
Yet it is important to note that Japan’s volunteer movement was not a 
purely spontaneous emergence, but also the outcome of over a decade of 
political reform. It was shaped by policy initiatives to foster greater civic 
engagement from Japan’s citizens so that its central government might 
retreat from so-called soft arenas of governance, including community 
building, social welfare, and environmental issues. The potential of volun-
teers was recognized as a resource to this end after the  Kobe earth-
quake, a magnitude  trembler that killed over six thousand of the city’s 
residents. Amid a sluggish offi  cial response, volunteers mobilized to res-
cue trapped victims, coordinate relief services, and clear debris in Kobe. 
Acknowledging the potential of volunteer activity, Japan’s government 
quickly issued legislation to promote the expansion of its nonprofi t sector 
in .  Such moves parallel similar eff orts in other national contexts to 
cultivate active volunteer and nonprofi t arenas as states externalize their 
welfare functions (see Muhlenberg ; Paley ). In fact, Japan’s disas-
ter volunteer movement was interpreted by some as evidence of the gov-
ernment’s reticence to provide timely aid to its most vulnerable margins. 
In a newspaper profi le two months after the tsunami, an American-born 
resident of Ishinomaki City in Miyagi Prefecture equated the presence of 
volunteers with the abandonment of the region. He reasoned, “People 
in Tōhoku can persevere. But, to me, it’s manifesting in a negative way. 
More people need to be angry with the government, and ask ‘Why do you 
prioritize [Japan’s] cities? Why aren’t you acting?’” (Yamaguchi ). He is 
among many who suspect that Tōhoku’s peripheral status played a role in 
the state’s slow response to the tsunami. In this sense, he observed, the 
disaster has revealed the politically signifi cant slippage between gaman 
(perseverance) and “enduring problems forced on you.”
Still others have considered the proactive civic response to the Tōhoku’s 
disaster a vital step in building a more inclusive nation and self-actualized 
citizenry. Commenting on the volunteer relief eff ort, social welfare expert 
Yamasaki Mikiko asserted, “If we don’t do this, there is no hope. Every sin-
gle citizen who participates is weaving hope” (Yamasaki , ). Rather 
than a sign of regional abandonment, she envisions that /  volunteerism 
has boosted awareness of the value of Japan’s regions in Tokyo-centric 
Japan. She continued, “It’s always said that the regions are important. … 
Each region has its own lifestyle and culture. But [through volunteering] 
everyone experiences this personally. So the experience of volunteer-
ing becomes reality within each person. It doesn’t just pass away, but 
becomes an inspiration in the way they live, something that cultivates 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
Decentralizing Disasters • 
them as citizens” (Yamasaki , ). She argues that in allowing many 
Japanese to experience Tōhoku for the fi rst time under the auspices of 
providing relief, volunteering has helped them form a sense of their own 
agency as citizens within a diverse and inclusive nation.
In a broader sense, the disasters sparked the recognition of what so-
ciologist Yamashita Yūsuke ( , ) calls “a gap in awareness between 
Tokyo and Tōhoku.” This gap is a product of the structural inequalities that 
displaced the costs of Tokyo’s rapacious energy needs onto Tōhoku. The 
nature of this relationship is a concern of intellectual historian Akasaka 
Norio, who has long advocated for the recognition of Tōhoku’s distinctive 
cultural identity and historical role within Japan. In a high-profi le editorial 
published in Asahi shimbun on the second anniversary of / , Akasaka, a 
governmental adviser on reconstruction, posed the provocative question, 
“Is Tōhoku still a colony?” His question drew attention to an extractive 
history during which Tōhoku’s population, resources, and economic vital-
ity were drained to fuel the priorities of Japan’s center. In the wake of the 
disaster, Akasaka asserted that the region still remains bound to Tokyo 
in a “periphery to core” relationship that “completely conceals Tōhoku.” 
To end this subordination, he and many commentators have proposed 
that Tōhoku transform its abundant natural resources of wind, forests, 
and waves into a self-suffi  cient, renewable energy system (Akasaka and 
Oguma , ). They contend that such plans would foster regional 
autonomy and self-direction, allowing Tōhoku to devise its own future 
development priorities.
The logistics of this transformation remain unclear, especially in the 
wake of the disasters, though an array of popular commentary celebrates 
the capacity of Tōhoku’s devastated communities to rally. Economist and 
public intellectual Genda Yuji recalls that when he visited Kamaishi after 
the disaster, he was shocked both at the level of devastation, and at how 
“bright and forward-looking” the residents he encountered were in their 
resolve to “defi nitely rebuild” ( , ). Interviewed as an offi  cial adviser 
on Tōhoku’s reconstruction, he cited the city’s history—its experience 
overcoming “hardship and setbacks” ( , )—as an explanation for this 
resolve and as a resource for residents to draw from. Genda has invested a 
great deal in understanding Kamaishi’s municipal disposition. As part of a 
kibōgaku (Hopology) initiative spearheaded by Japan’s prestigious Tokyo 
University in the early s, he was among an interdisciplinary group of 
scholars who adopted Kamaishi as a case study for exploring the existence 
of hope in recessionary Japan. In their three-volume set of fi ndings, Genda 
suggested that the group selected the city as a fi eld site because it is an 
unlikely place to look for hope. He noted that Japan’s center-driven quest 
for economic growth and effi  ciency have destroyed Kamaishi’s economy 
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and propelled radical outmigration. For these reasons, Genda explained, 
“You’d think that this would be a region that’s lost its hope” ( , ). 
Yet he and his colleagues ( , ) found that, despite being “in cir-
cumstances in which it’s diffi  cult to believe that [hope] can be realized,” 
Kamaishi’s residents do have hope for the future.
Their fi ndings that hope can exist even in bleak circumstances were 
well received in recessionary Japan, mired in stagnant economic growth, 
falling birthrates, and an aging population. More so, because the hope 
that Genda and his colleagues discovered in pre- /  Kamaishi was not a 
vague inclination of better times ahead, but an actionable impulse—“a 
wish for something to come true through action.” As Genda clarifi es, 
“hope without any possibility of realization does not produce well-being. 
It’s the same as not having hope” ( , ).  Equally important was 
their fi nding that it is within social relationships that hope fl ourishes as a 
productive force. In Kamaishi they concluded that while isolation and lone-
liness dull people’s capacity for hope, residents’ sense of attachment to 
their homes and community compel them to take action toward realizing 
a better future (Genda , ). In post-disaster Japan, Tōhoku’s commu-
nities have been celebrated for the durability of their ancestral culture and 
social bonds—qualities that activists, academics, and politicians expect 
will propel coastal reconstruction and rejuvenate Japan.
Recovery Work
Offi  cial visions of reconstruction assert a cheerful certainty about the fu-
ture of Japan’s tsunami-devastated margins. A report by Japan’s Recon-
struction Agency promised, “Reconstruction will not just restore [Tōhoku] 
to its original condition. It is an opportunity to solve problems that grip 
Japan as a nation, including population decline, aging, and the hollowing 
out of industries. In building a ‘New Tōhoku,’ we will model for the na-
tion and world ‘a future society with creativity and potential’” (Fukkō chō 
). In framing the disaster as an opportunity for bold action, the agency 
channels the assertive vision of Prime Minister Abe. An LDP neo-conserva-
tive, Abe has cast the  Tokyo Olympics as an event that will showcase 
the success of Abenomics, a stimulus and spending package launched in 
 to jolt Japan out of its recessionary malaise. Internationally, Abe has 
created waves by advocating for the revision of Article Nine of Japan’s 
constitution, which prevents its military from engaging in nondefensive 
operations. This move, along with offi  cial statements downplaying Japan’s 
historical responsibility for the sexual abuse of so-called comfort women 
by its wartime Imperial forces, has raised concern in Asia and beyond. In-
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deed, Abe’s unapologetic stance has extended to eff orts—supported by 
neo-nationalists, but opposed by a coalition of anti-nuclear activists—not 
only to restart domestic reactors following the Fukushima meltdown, but 
also to export Japan’s nuclear know-how to Central and South Asia.  The 
disaster has been appropriated within an aggressive program to marshal 
domestic strength and relaunch Japan’s global status.
Domestically, the mechanisms through which this bold agenda might 
restore well-being to the tsunami-ravaged coast remain unclear. The suc-
cess of Japan’s bid to host the upcoming Olympics was greeted with joy-
ous fanfare in many sectors. However, critics quickly raised concerns that 
the building of Olympic infrastructure in Tokyo will draw needed resources 
away from Tōhoku’s rebuilding. It will also defl ect attention from ongo-
ing struggles to contain the meltdown of the still-precarious Fukushima 
power plant. In fact, it is citizens who assumed new risks and responsibili-
ties in post- /  Japan. An opaque government response to the Fukushima 
meltdown left everyday people, armed with scant information, to cal-
culate the dangers they might face from nuclear exposure. Likewise, as 
Japan’s bureaucracy struggled to respond to the disasters, a groundswell 
of volunteers fl ocked to Tōhoku’s coast to assist victims in the weeks and 
months after / . Their eff orts have been celebrated as evidence of latent 
civic energies that will speed the nation’s recovery from / .
They also refl ect an ad hoc response to the disasters that—addressing 
wide-scale destruction through small-scale and local engagements—mir-
rors the devolutionary framework of decentralization. When I fi rst trav-
eled to Iwate’s post-tsunami coast in June , I did so on a plush, private 
tour bus deployed by the prefectural government from Iwate’s capital of 
Morioka. It carried a group of volunteers from all over Japan who signed 
up by following links on Iwate’s prefectural Web site to a travel agency 
donating its resources for relief eff orts. Our group emerged from the bus 
two hours later in a rubble-strewn rice paddy, where we spent the day 
cleaning out irrigation channels clogged with oily sludge and debris. Such 
work—dirty, strenuous, and focused on righting small patches within a 
vast scene of devastation—comprised much of what volunteers did on 
the coast during the fi rst half-year following the tsunami. Japan’s media 
coverage of their work emphasized buzzwords like kibō (hope) and kizuna 
(bonds) to reframe tragedy on the nation’s margins as an experience that 
reconnects Japanese in bonds of shared resolve.
Still, ambiguities persist about the long-term roles of the state and civil 
society in coastal reconstruction. As volunteer with the nonprofi t orga-
nization Magokoro Netto in , I joined clean-up crews removing mud 
and debris from districts of Kamaishi. Two years later, when I returned to 
volunteer again, the organization had redefi ned their mission to that of 
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providing pasoneru sapotto (personal support) to survivors in the midst 
of stalled rebuilding. This time, I joined fellow volunteers creating rec-
reational sites for evacuees in temporary housing. These sites included 
a community garden just north of Kamaishi where elderly women from 
nearby housing units tended small plots of vegetables. In the early sum-
mer of  I worked on a crew cutting grasses and weeding the perimeter 
of the garden plots. We turned over an adjacent fi eld with pick-axes to 
plant sweet potatoes in long raised furrows; students from a preschool 
across the road would harvest them during the fall harvest festival.
During a break one day, our supervisor and driver Yamaguchi-san ges-
tured toward a nearby settlement of temporary housing units as he ex-
plained the need for the gardens: “People are anxious and aren’t leaving 
their temporary housing; they’re shutting themselves in. We want to make 
a place they can come when they want to leave, to relax and talk.” A single 
man in his late thirties, Yamaguchi-san had come to Tōhoku as a volunteer 
soon after the tsunami and stayed on to work for Magokoro Netto. He 
oversaw an herb and wildfl ower garden adjacent to another temporary 
housing enclave in Kamaishi. The organization hoped that elderly evacu-
ees would eventually assume greater responsibility for the gardens, roles 
that staff  contended would boost their morale and outlook on the future. 
In the meantime, volunteers weeded and watered them, hauling buckets 
from nearby irrigation channels to keep them alive.
Volunteers embraced such strenuous work as a temporary alternative 
to conventional career and life paths that are increasingly scarce and in-
secure in recessionary Japan. Many were long-term visitors at Magokoro 
Netto who boarded at the center in communal dorm rooms equipped 
with donated bedding for as long as they could aff ord to feed and clothe 
themselves. One young man was on a gap year before starting university. 
A woman in her thirties had a lucrative job as a nurse in Indonesia at the 
time of the disaster, but felt compelled to return and contribute to the 
relief eff ort. Another young woman working as a cook in Tokyo during /  
explained, “At the time of the earthquake … there was a sense that we 
needed to keep working precisely because of the disaster. But I had such 
a strange feeling watching things up here. I was on a three-year contract 
then, but it ended. Even among free people, I am especially free.” Another 
prominent category of volunteers free from the demands of conventional 
work consisted of retired men with families in central Japan. I volunteered 
with two retirees from Tokyo, who both spent one week each month at 
the center. One described his work there to me as a kind of asobi (play), an 
absorbing occupation that he found pleasurably satisfying after a career 
as a white-collar, salaried worker. Though his characterization of volun-
teering as play was designed to communicate modesty about his contri-
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bution, it also aptly summed up the personal satisfaction that long-term 
volunteers derived from the engrossing physical labor of digging, clean-
ing, and building.
Short-term volunteers took overnight buses from Tokyo to spend one 
or two days at the center, before returning home or traveling on to sight-
see elsewhere in Tōhoku. Every workday at the center ended with a group 
meeting during which the organization’s staff  made announcements and 
volunteers commented on their experiences or the communal living sit-
uation. At the end of each meeting, departing volunteers stood to off er 
some refl ections on their stay. Most observed that their perspective of 
the disaster had changed. They echoed that “to stand on the actual site” 
and “see with their own eyes” the aftermath of the tsunami helped them 
understand what they could not via their television in Tokyo. In fact, volun-
teer coordinators argued that the continued traffi  c of visitors from central 
to northeastern Japan was valuable because it communicated to victims 
that they had not been forgotten. One NPO staff  member explained, “In 
coming to the disaster area, you give strength to the victims [hisaisha]. 
They see that volunteers are still coming, from Japan and all over the 
world, to support us.” Likewise, he encouraged us “to greet the victims 
with spirited ‘good mornings’ and ‘hellos,’ and talk to them.” Following 
his advice, we greeted the elderly grandmothers tending their garden 
plots and made purchases from shopkeepers who had restarted their busi-
nesses in prefab shops set up to serve evacuees and recovery workers. Yet 
there was little chance for most volunteers to have substantive exchanges 
with local residents. As our small groups traveled through the quiet disas-
ter zone to and from our worksites, evacuees moved around us in their 
daily routines of school, shopping, and work.
One notable exception was a gregarious elderly man who visited the 
community garden site nearly every day and chatted with us during our 
breaks. During one conversation about the costs of reconstruction, he 
remarked in an inexplicably cheerful tone, “They’re waiting for us to die.” 
After two years of inaction, he suspected that government did not intend 
to rebuild the area. Rather, he explained, they would continue to delay 
until the young families had left the region and the remaining elderly died 
off . His comments are expressive of the frustration felt by many survi-
vors, their sense of abandonment and alienation from the reconstruction 
process. In municipalities up and down Tōhoku’s coast, residents have 
expressed concerns not just about the pace of rebuilding, but also about 
their exclusion from its planning. One particularly thorny issue has been 
the costly replacement of seawalls and breakwaters that instilled a sense 
of security in coastal residents, but failed to protect them on / . Kamai-
shi was a particularly egregious example: the sixty-foot-deep breakwa-
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ter, which took thirty years and .  billion of public funding to complete, 
crumpled under the fi rst tsunami.  Evaluating such failures, planners and 
policy-makers initially emphasized reconstruction as a chance to abandon 
the hubris of centralized development and consolidate the coast into di-
saster-resilient smart communities. Along with many residents of Kamai-
shi, they were dismayed when the central government quickly and quietly 
approved plans to rebuild the breakwater. It has proven easier for munici-
pal planners to secure government funding for such construction projects 
than for more-innovative but less-construction-intensive plans. Thus, the 
city’s reconstruction plans—released on their municipal Web site (Kamai-
shi shi a)—detail massive engineering and earthworks projects that 
will consolidate districts that are most vulnerable to future tsunami and 
rebuild them atop elevated plains.
In contrast to the immensity of such plans, NPOs such as Magokoro 
Netto envisioned their purpose as that of easing the tension and isolation 
experienced by evacuees. The small recreational spaces they maintained 
through volunteer eff ort were designed to provide evacuees with tempo-
rary respite. Many volunteers were motivated by the idea that their eff orts 
to attend to the feelings of evacuees also served as an intervention amid 
the larger structural deadlock that gripped the coast. This was the case 
with one young group of volunteers who visited Magokoro Netto: newly 
hired central government employees sent by their respective ministries 
from Tokyo in small groups to experience the disaster aftermath. I over-
lapped for several days with one such group during my time at the center. 
On the night before they departed, they shared their earnest personal 
refl ections on what they’d seen. Nearly all noted that their visit had made 
them aware that Japan’s government must better understand what life is 
like in the tsunami-devastated regions. What is needed, several observed, 
is not just large-scale construction projects, but small human gestures 
to improve the circumstances and spirits of evacuees. Likewise, many 
volunteers and organizers saw their work as a direct form of human-to-
human engagement that can break through the debility miring Kamaishi 
and other coastal localities.
Representing an engaged and self-motivated civic sphere, volunteers 
and nonprofi t relief organization comprise one element of a decentralizing 
Japan. They are not the risk-embracing, competitive individuals normally 
associated with neoliberal ideals. Rather they refl ect what Illana Gershon 
( , ) characterizes as a ubiquitous form of neoliberal agency that 
envisions people as repositories of talents to be mobilized and directed. 
In what she calls “a misrecognition of scale” ( , ), a similar logic 
extends to communities, that, according to the mandates of decentraliza-
tion in Japan, can mobilize their energies and resources to support their 
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own autonomy and self-suffi  ciency. Prior to Tōhoku’s disaster, questions 
about the future of aging and depopulating regions unable to survive the 
competitive climate of decentralization abounded. Such questions are 
even more critical in the context of post-disaster reconstruction. As the 
group of young government offi  cials said their farewells at Magokoro 
Netto, one young man enthused, “Instead of just doing what we can, 
we need to do things we can’t yet imagine.” This earnest statement, ex-
pressive of a sincere desire to see the coast reconstructed, also hinted 
that this outcome was a possibility so diffi  cult to envision that it required 
a fl ight of imagination. Such hopeful optimism that tsunami-devastated 
communities can sustain themselves on their own resolve and the support 
of volunteers soothe anxieties in Japan’s center, but does little to ensure 
a viable future for Tōhoku’s coast.
Conclusion
In the aftermath of / , academics, pundits, politicians, and activists ex-
pressed widely shared expectations that the disasters in all their scale 
and fury would spark needed political and social change in Japan. Such 
expectations derive from seeing the catastrophes as revelatory events 
that exposed the troubled legacies of Japan’s centralized high-speed 
growth era—including entrenched regional inequalities and energy inse-
curities long masked by Japan’s prosperity. The idea that catastrophes are 
“revealing crises” that lay bare features of social and political order has 
become a cornerstone concept among disaster scholars (Garcia-Acosta 
, ; Oliver-Smith , ). In Japan, /  sparked a mood of critical 
refl ection on the costs of centralization. It prompted continued support 
for decentralization as a strategy for producing resilient local economies, 
self-suffi  cient regions, and a stronger and more sustainable nation. In fact, 
the Tōhoku disasters have highlighted unlikely consensus between neolib-
eral market enthusiasts eager to streamline the bulky apparatus of Japan’s 
central government, and advocates of a more inclusive and more diverse 
national model in which Japan’s regions set their own autonomous prio-
ries of sustainable development.
Given the sluggish pace of recovery on Tōhoku’s coast, I have argued 
here that the revelations associated with the /  disasters remain de-
tached from the logistics of reconstruction. Two years after Kamaishi 
City’s tsunami, groundbreaking had yet to begin on the massive engineer-
ing and construction projects that will be the fi rst stages of a long-term 
rebuilding process. As residents, including a growing ratio of elderly sur-
vivors, endure extended delays, volunteers continue to visit the city to 
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work on small-scale relief projects that aim to boost the spirits of evacu-
ees and provide them with kokoro no kea (heart-mind care). Meanwhile, 
reconstruction has been appropriated in diverse spheres as a rubric for 
discussing visions of Japan’s future. Economist Fujita Masahisa ( ) ar-
gues that reconstruction provides an opportunity to create an updated 
“socio-economic system which values the knowledge of each individual, 
and which has more rich diversity and autonomy than the present.” Like 
many commentators, he envisions Tōhoku’s recovery from /  as an im-
portant step in building a more resilient, fl exible, and innovative nation. 
As I have shown here, Japan’s disaster will also provide long-term insight 
into how a decentralizing state functions in the aftermath of catastrophe. 
This chapter suggests that as it devolves risks and responsibilities, decen-
tralization will create new constellations of vulnerability in an era marked 
both by intensifying disasters and global economic precarity.
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Notes
Awards from The Japan Foundation and The Northeast Asia Council of the Associ-
ation for Asian Studies funded the research for this chapter. Many thanks to Shiho 
Satsuka, Sam Temple, and Tomomi Yamaguchi, as well as editors Gregory Button and 
Mark Schuller, for providing helpful feedback on this chapter’s arguments and de-
tails. My writing was energized by conversations about Japan’s triple-disasters with 
participants in the  lecture series “Japan in Disaster” at the University of Okla-
homa—including Gregory Button, Fuyubi Nakamura, Jennifer Robertson, and Tomomi 
Yamaguchi. I remain grateful for the opportunity to work alongside fellow volunteers 
and devoted staff  members of the nonprofi t organization Magokoro Netto within 
Kamaishi and other devastated towns on Iwate’s coast. All translations from Japanese 
are by the author. 
 . The Reconstruction Agency was created nearly a year after the disaster in Febru-
ary  to replace a temporary Reconstruction Headquarters established in June 
. Despite the frequency of earthquakes, tsunami, typhoons, volcanoes, and 
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other natural catastrophes in Japan, there is no permanent agency to manage 
disasters. The Reconstruction Agency has a ten-year mandate.
 . Here I follow Japanese practice by listing the names of Japanese authors with 
surname fi rst, followed by given name.
 . The Tōhoku disasters will serve as important case studies for understanding the 
relationship between aging and catastrophe. Preliminary reports suggest that 
over half of all tsunami fatalities were elderly, and that large numbers of elderly 
survivors presented enormous challenges for those providing relief. At the same 
time, the social resources of the elderly served as strengths in the wake of the 
disaster.
 . As one rare counter-example, sociologist Oguma Eiji ( ) has broached sensi-
tive questions about the prospects of Tōhoku’s future.
 . After an investigation into deaths at the disaster prevention center, located in Ka-
maishi’s Unosumai District, the city released a formal report (Kamaishi shi b), 
and held information meetings for families of those who perished in the center.
 . In addition to washing away thousands of bodies, the tsunami destroyed family 
graves, Buddhist household altars, and local crematoriums. These sites are con-
sidered vital to the ritual care needed to help the deceased attain a comfortable 
afterlife.
 . These fi gures are compiled in a report by Zenkoku shakai fukushi kyōgikai ( , 
). The report also notes the diffi  culty of gathering accurate statistics on volun-
teers, given that some reported to diff erent centers or made multiple trips to the 
disaster site.
 . See Avenell ( ) for further analysis both of the  volunteer response to 
Kobe and the Japanese government’s active facilitation of post- /  volunteering.
 . In Genda’s formulation, hope produces action that might lead toward a better fu-
ture. This future orientation gives hope utility as a force productive of deliberate 
social change, but distinguishes it from other scholarly visions of hope. For exam-
ple, North American cultural theorist Brian Massumi situates hope fi rmly in the 
present, “separated from concepts of optimism and pessimism, from a wishful 
projection of success” (Massumi , ).
. Soble ( ) and Kingston ( ) critically assess this nuclear agenda.
. For further details on this engineering debacle, see Onishi .
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CHAPTER 
Expert Knowledge and the 
Ethnography of Disaster Reconstruction
ROBERTO E. BARRIOS
For social scientists, disasters are not natural, unavoidable, or discrete 
events (Bankoff  and Hilhorst ; Oliver-Smith and Hoff man ). Di-
sasters, instead, are processes that (a) extend in space and time beyond 
the perceived boundaries of an aff ected community, (b) are engendered 
through policies and everyday practices that enhance the destructive and 
socially disruptive capacities of geophysical phenomena, and (c) have ef-
fects that are inequitably distributed along socially produced race, class, 
and gender diff erentiations. In today’s world, most disasters occur within 
the boundaries of nation-states and contemporary ideals of modern gov-
ernance (Foucault ) uphold state governments as partly responsible 
for assisting disaster-aff ected populations recover from catastrophic 
events. In this context, people who live through disasters routinely fi nd 
themselves interacting with representatives of state agencies that are 
charged with the task of implementing and monitoring reconstruction 
programs.
State organizations, however, are not the only agencies involved in 
post-disaster recovery. Disasters, by defi nition, overwhelm the capacity 
of a given community, population, or nation to respond to a catastrophe’s 
conditions of social disruption, resulting in a situation where aff ected com-
munity members, civil society leaders, and elected offi  cials request or wel-
come assistance from international relief agencies and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs). Whether it is the staff  of governmental institutions, 
international aid agencies, or NGOs, disaster-aff ected communities often 
fi nd themselves interacting with a number of institutional actors who 
claim expertise in disaster recovery (e.g., aid program managers, archi-
tects, urban planners, emergency managers). While the majority of these 
latter actors usually approach disaster-aff ected communities with the best 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
Expert Knowledge and the Ethnography of Disaster Reconstruction • 
of intentions, the ways they defi ne and operationalize best practices and 
recovery can articulate a number of inherent assumptions about the na-
tures of people, communities, and well-being that are not shared by di-
saster survivors. Furthermore, the rigid imposition of these assumptions 
on the part of recovery experts can actually perpetuate a disaster’s social 
eff ects, leading to a disaster after the disaster.
Over the course of sixteen years of ethnographic research on disaster 
reconstruction, I have documented how the assumptions about the na-
tures of people and communities on the part of disaster recovery experts 
are products of unique cultural histories and therefore culturally subjec-
tive; on the other hand, recovery experts often uphold these assumptions 
as matters of fact, applicable and relevant anywhere regardless of cultural 
context. In this chapter I review a number of anthropological insights con-
cerning the application and production of expert knowledge in disaster 
reconstruction. These insights are the result of two ethnographic studies I 
conducted in Honduras after Hurricane Mitch in  and in New Orleans 
following Hurricane Katrina in .
A number of anthropological studies of disaster have recognized that 
policies and practices associated with neoliberalism  on the part of govern-
ment agencies and non-NGOs can contribute to environmental degrada-
tion and the creation of stark socioeconomic disparities, two key factors in 
the political-ecological production of disasters (Gunewardena and Schuller 
). Other studies have also focused on the way expert knowledge and 
knowledge-making practices can function as means of exercising power 
over disaster-aff ected populations and the production of social inequities 
in post-disaster contexts (Barrios ; Button ; Fortun ). Gregory 
Button, for example, has shown how the work of scientists working for ei-
ther liable corporations or government agencies sometimes mobilize the 
knowledge they produce to undermine demands on the part of disaster 
survivors for reparations and accountability. Button’s work demonstrates 
how scientists, executives, and government offi  cials mobilize scientifi c 
expertise to produce uncertainty in terms of toxic exposure, duration of 
impact, and spatial extension of aff ected areas.
In this chapter I will explore other ways in which the relationship be-
tween expert knowledge and governance (i.e., reconstruction policies, 
state-sanctioned planning) plays out in disaster reconstruction contexts. 
I will do this by summarizing two ethnographic studies I conducted in 
southern Honduras after Hurricane Mitch from  to , and in New 
Orleans after Hurricane Katrina from  to . These two studies 
show how disaster reconstruction is a moment when aff ected popula-
tions interact with government offi  cials and aid program managers who 
attempt to assist them through techniques of governance such as bud-
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gets, fi scal cost-benefi t analysis, and modernist and neoliberal principles 
of urban planning. These studies also illustrate how policies on the part of 
governments, expert planners, and aid organizations that rigidly uphold 
technoscientifi c knowledge as a nonnegotiable foundation of reconstruc-
tion practice can actually perpetuate and enhance the deleterious social 
impacts of disasters. Finally, these cases also shed light on the kinds of 
practices among disaster-aff ected populations, aid program managers, 
and government offi  cials that can help adapt reconstruction programs to 
the social and environmental particularities of disaster-aff ected localities. 
These practices include
.  Recognizing acts of resistance and political insubordination on the 
part of disaster-aff ected populations as critical elements in the adap-
tation of reconstruction aid to the social and environmental specifi c-
ities of disaster-aff ected sites, and
.  The importance of fl exibility on the part of aid program managers, 
government offi  cials, and expert planners charged with the task of 
assisting disaster-aff ected populations, especially when using the 
techniques of governance listed above (i.e., budgets, modernist and 
neoliberal principles of disaster recovery, fi scal cost-benefi t analysis) 
to devise or apply reconstruction policy. 
The chapter concludes by emphasizing the importance of acts of re-
sistance on the part of disaster survivors to policies and arrangements of 
disaster aid they fi nd undesirable as critical actions that can help inform 
NGO program managers and government offi  cials on how to adapt re-
covery aid to the cultural particularities of disaster-aff ected sites. As the 
case studies featured in this chapter will demonstrate, the negotiation of 
disaster aid and recovery policies in Honduras and New Orleans was rou-
tinely cut short by expert planners, NGO program managers, and govern-
ment offi  cials when they invoked fi scal cost-benefi t analysis, principles of 
modernist and neoliberal urban planning, and budgets as nonnegotiable 
and self-evidently relevant mechanisms of disaster reconstruction gover-
nance. The case studies also demonstrate that, on occasions when NGO 
program managers were willing to demonstrate fl exibility in their use of 
expert techniques of disaster governance, they were able to successfully 
negotiate reconstruction projects that were meaningful and useful to 
disaster-aff ected communities. Consequently, I argue that such fl exibility 
does not threaten disaster reconstruction with chaos and ineffi  cacy but is 
an important element of negotiating reconstruction assistance with those 
who are most aff ected by catastrophes and in greatest need of assistance 
following a devastating event.
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Case : Honduras after Hurricane Mitch: Modern Urbanism 
and the Budget as Technologies of Governance
Two Communities, Two Outcomes
Hurricane Mitch struck Honduras in late October , causing the deaths 
of at least six thousand people and the disappearance of eight thousand 
others, destroying more than ,  homes, and claiming  percent of 
the country’s GDP. The disaster was the result of more than fi ve hundred 
years of mining, logging, agricultural, and national development practices 
that resulted in the mismanaged growth of urban areas, widespread de-
forestation, and the alteration of the region’s hydrology.
My research in Honduras focused on the construction of two housing 
resettlement sites: Limón de la Cerca and Marcelino Champagnat, which 
were located seven kilometers away from the city of Choluteca. What 
interested me about these two sites was that, despite the common ori-
gins and livelihoods of their residents before Mitch, the two resettlement 
communities demonstrated dramatic diff erences in their reconstruction 
outcomes three years after the storm. Limón (which was the largest hous-
ing reconstruction site in the country’s southern region) was plagued with 
violence and social fragmentation. Over the course of its brief history, the 
site had become renown as a place of street-gang activity, where transna-
tional gangs known as maras operated with impunity and victimized other 
residents. Limón also featured the construction of ,  homes whose spa-
tial design and structural qualities did not suit the social and environmen-
tal particularities of the region. Homes featured a single -square-meter 
room design with no internal divisions. Displaced Cholutecans living in this 
site had a median household size of seven residents, and the small houses 
proved to be unsuitable for families with such numerous members. The 
structures were located on diminutive land parcels (  square meters), 
which limited the possibility for future expansions. Houses lacked struc-
tural reinforcements like concrete columns on their corners or supporting 
cross-beams. The structures also featured haphazardly attached tin roofs 
that were repeatedly blown off  during heavy thunderstorms. Over the 
course of ethnographic interviews, residents reported the severe inju-
ries or deaths of family members and neighbors because of the housing 
structures’ inadequate construction. Finally, Limón was plagued by the 
incompletion of important infrastructural projects including community 
electrifi cation.
In Marcelino, in contrast, street-gang activity was curtailed by a robust 
network of grassroots community organizers. These community organiz-
ers also eff ectively negotiated housing and infrastructural reconstruction 
programs with donor organizations and representatives of foreign gov-
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ernments. Two years after the storm, Marcelino featured the construction 
of  housing structures whose spatial and structural design residents 
found suitable to their daily habits and local environment. Homes had 
larger fl oor plans (  square meters) with internal partitions separating 
sleeping, dining, and cooking areas; homes also had concrete columns 
and cross beams, which made the structures more resilient to environ-
mental hazards like heavy thunderstorms and earthquakes. Homes were 
located on land parcels that were more than twice the size those of those 
in Limón, allowing for the planting of house gardens and fruit trees, and 
allowing for small-animal husbandry (pigs and chickens), which were com-
mon activities among working-class Cholutecans. The community also 
counted with the timely completion of infrastructural projects such as 
electrifi cation, which residents boasted as being the best public lighting 
project in southern Honduras.
My ethnographic research revealed that the majority of residents who 
came to live in Limón and Marcelino lived in twenty-two diff erent bar-
rios de clase obrera (working-class neighborhoods) of Choluteca prior to 
the disaster. In the storm’s immediate aftermath, these disaster survivors 
sought refuge in the city’s schools and churches and remained living there 
for three months. Due to continued delays on the part of local offi  cials, in 
January  disaster survivors who had a history of participation in civil 
society organizations decided to take a proactive role in the recovery pro-
cess and began an independent search for a resettlement site. This group 
of residents picked the locality of Limón de la Cerca due to the site’s low 
land value, which would allow for the distribution of  square-meter 
land parcels, a size they considered adequate for the daily practices of 
displaced clase obrera Cholutecans. The city’s mayor, however, perceived 
the proactive role of these disaster survivors as a political threat, and he 
proceeded to use reconstruction aid (houses, land parcels) as political 
gifts to secure the alliance of some grassroots organizers and alienate the 
most proactive leaders. The politicization of reconstruction aid led to a 
schism among disaster survivor organizers, with those who accepted the 
mayor’s gifts remaining in Limón, and those who were ousted founding a 
new resettlement community, Marcelino Champagnat. From this point on, 
the two resettlement sites followed dramatically diff erent paths, with one 
leading toward mitigation of the disaster’s eff ects (Marcelino) and one 
leading toward prolonged vulnerability (Limón).
In Limón the cooptation of disaster survivor leadership created a rela-
tively docile population whereas, in Marcelino, proactive grassroots orga-
nizers became renown for resisting or rejecting reconstruction projects 
they found unsuitable to their social and environmental needs. As we will 
see below, Limón’s docile leadership translated into a social landscape 
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where recovery experts could implement reconstruction projects and 
project assessment instruments irrespective of the voices of disaster sur-
vivors who clamored for diff erent arrangements of reconstruction aid. In 
Marcelino, in contrast, acts of insubordination and resistance on the part 
of disaster survivors became a key element in the negotiation of recon-
struction projects into arrangements they found meaningful and useful.
Land Parcel Distribution: 
The Implicit Individualism of Modernist Planning
In Limón, land parcel distribution was organized by a municipality-ap-
pointed land committee. This committee invoked principles of modern 
governance such as equity and transparency in its distribution of land 
parcels among disaster survivors, and used a raffl  e as the mechanism for 
ensuring these principles. Numbers were assigned to each land parcel, 
and disaster survivors were given the right to purchase the land parcel 
whose number they drew. Through this distribution of reconstruction re-
sources (land), the municipality land committee made a number of as-
sumptions about the nature of people, communities, and social well-being 
that did not apply to Choluteca’s displaced. Residents of Cholutecan work-
ing-class neighborhoods relied on each other for assistance with child 
care and household security. Working mothers were accustomed to leav-
ing children to the care of trusted neighbors for periods as long as eight 
hours, and residents were known to keep an eye on each other’s houses 
to prevent burglaries. What is more, knowledge of one’s neighbors and 
one’s neighborhood residents was a key strategy against delinquency 
and violence. As trusted interlocutors taught me, the most eff ective strat-
egy against becoming a victim was to know the identities of gang mem-
bers, who were less willing to assault someone who knew them. The land 
parcel raffl  e (which was selected as a means space distribution by the 
municipality-appointed land committee under the justifi cation that it 
would ensure transparency), in contrast, ignored the importance of these 
relationships among disaster survivors in the creation of a sense of place, 
community, and recovery. The random land distribution spatially sepa-
rated long-time neighbors and created conditions of anonymity among 
Choluteca’s displaced. These conditions became a fertile ground for the 
proliferation of street-gang activity.
The municipality-appointed land committee also relied on a national 
engineering fi rm to devise a master plan for Limón de la Cerca. The mas-
ter plan articulated a common convention of modern urbanism, the idea 
that the homogenous and standardized regimentation of space can pro-
duce socially normalized people (although the anthropological litera-
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ture demonstrates that such attempts at normalization are never fully 
accomplished). The master plan for Limón regulated the reconstruction 
site’s space through the meticulous division of land parcels along neat 
rows, which collectively created a diamond shape. At the center of the 
diamond-shaped community was a health center and an elementary 
school. Two years after the storm, municipality annual reports heralded 
photographs of neat rows of houses as defi nitive proof that Limón was 
following a predictable linear path toward development and mitigation. 
My ethnographic research, however, suggested the experiences of disas-
ter survivors diff ered signifi cantly from the municipality’s representation 
of the reconstruction, and that the social and material conditions taking 
shape in Limón made it exceedingly diffi  cult for the site’s residents to ex-
perience a sense of recovery.
Housing Construction Programs in Limón and Marcelino
Once Limón residents were randomly assigned land parcels, they were 
assisted in home construction by one of several NGOs working at the site. 
In Limón, one of the primary aid organizations involved in housing re-
construction was Samaritan’s Purse, a United States-based evangelical 
NGO that operated with funds partially provided by the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID). Architects contracted by 
Samaritan’s Purse proposed the construction of the structurally unsound, 
single-room, -square-meter structures described above. The minimal 
houses were justifi ed under the logic that smaller houses would benefi t 
a larger number of disaster survivors. What was interesting about the 
case of Limón was that construction work was the most frequently re-
ported occupation among adult male residents ( . %), meaning that a 
signifi cant proportion of disaster survivors were familiar with construction 
techniques. These residents were quick to notice the design fl aws of the 
proposed houses, and requested Samaritan’s Purse architects to redraft 
their design to include concrete columns and cross-beams. Samaritan’s 
Purse architects denied these requests, citing reasons of cost-benefi t and 
claiming that such construction techniques were too costly to be accom-
modated within the project budget. Still, Limón residents insisted that the 
construction of columns and cross beams would not increase the costs in 
terms of materials, but would do so in terms of required labor, which was 
provided by the disaster survivors themselves. Nevertheless, the invoca-
tion of cost-benefi t analysis by professional architects as a nonnegotiable 
technique of reconstruction governance prevailed and the requests on 
the part of disaster survivors for alternative construction techniques were 
denied. Hence, the negotiation of recovery resources into an arrange-
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ment that made sense to disaster survivors was impeded, leading to the 
construction of housing conditions that prolonged the vulnerability of 
Limón’s residents.
In Marcelino, in contrast, relationships between NGO project managers, 
architects, and disaster survivors took a dramatically diff erent form. When 
presented with similar minimalist housing designs by the NGO CARE, pro-
active community organizers were quick to reject the plans, stating that 
they would rather remain living in tents than accept an aid package unsuit-
able to their living habits. In this instance, CARE project managers initially 
cited reasons of cost-benefi t for proposing minimalist designs similar to 
those of Limón. The assertive stance of Marcelino residents, however, 
urged CARE program managers to reevaluate their project budget. In this 
case, the budget was not treated by project managers as a nonnegotiable 
element of disaster reconstruction, but rather as a tentative plan that 
could be modifi ed to fi t disaster survivor requests. CARE project managers 
decided to cut some of their costs by doing away with what they consid-
ered to be redundant expenses on highly paid personnel like architects 
and construction supervisors. Instead, CARE project managers borrowed 
a plan for larger houses with internal partitions and supporting columns 
that had already been drafted for the nearby community of Renacer Mar-
covia, and relied on qualifi ed disaster survivors to fi ll in the construction 
supervisor positions. In this case, CARE project managers demonstrated 
fl exibility in their use of disaster reconstruction management techniques 
(the willingness to redraft the budget and make accommodations to di-
saster survivor demands); their fl exibility was key to achieving long-term 
disaster mitigation.
The Budget as an Instrument of Disaster Reconstruction Governance
Beyond these two reconstruction sites, budgets were also used by US-
AID as an expert means of tracking and evaluating reconstruction proj-
ects. In this case, reconstruction programs were said to be successful if 
the allocated funds were spent on their designated purposes at specifi c 
points in time. This emphasis on the use of the budget as an instrument 
of assessment, however, marginalized other concerns, such as ensuring 
that housing reconstruction projects be relevant in cultural and environ-
mental terms. According to USAID project evaluators, Limón de la Cerca 
was a shining example of successful reconstruction: Project funds were 
spent on time on those services and materials they were allocated for. 
Still, the voices and experiences of Limón residents argued otherwise. 
Unfortunately, this emphasis on fi scal accounting obscured rather than 
documented the politicized relationships between disaster survivors, local 
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government, and NGO program managers that shaped Limón de la Cerca 
and Marcelino Champagnat as dramatically diff erent reconstruction com-
munities. As Emel Ganapati and Sukumar Ganapati have shown ( ), 
this is not an isolated case of the use of budgets and fi nancial cost benefi t 
as a means of assessing development programs, but rather is an example 
of a more pervasive expert practice of disaster reconstruction.
Case Study : New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina
In  the city of New Orleans suff ered the fl ooding of  percent of 
its area. This fl ooding was caused by the failure of fl ood protection sys-
tems that were inadequately constructed or maintained by the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers and its subcontractors (Andersen et al. ). As an 
ethnographer of post-disaster reconstruction, my research has focused 
on the diff erent ways government offi  cials, expert planners, developers, 
and disaster survivors of various socioeconomic backgrounds defi ned and 
envisioned community, social well-being, and recovery; the ways these 
diff erent social actors negotiated (or did not negotiate) these diff erent 
positions; and the stakes of these diff erences for the city’s long-term 
reconstruction.
When Hurricane Katrina struck the U.S. Gulf Coast, New Orleans was 
already facing a number of social challenges. During the four decades 
preceding the disaster, the city had experienced the loss of more than 
,  residents, taking the population from nearly ,  residents 
in  to ,  in  (Campanella ). This demographic con-
traction began in the s following the desegregation of public schools 
and public housing. Many residents who self-identifi ed as white left New 
Orleans Parish for the suburban cities of Chalmette and Metairie to avoid 
living in contiguity with working-class African Americans. The racial moti-
vations behind New Orleans’ urban-suburban fl ight were also nuanced by 
the meanings of life in suburbia (the imagined escape from inner-city prob-
lems, the association of modernity with suburban life) and federal subsidy 
programs meant to encourage home ownership, which drew city resi-
dents to outlying suburban areas (Schuller and Thomas Houston ). At 
the same time, many college-educated middle-class African Americans left 
southeastern Louisiana in search of employment opportunities, as many 
still faced discrimination by would-be employers (Jackson ). In the 
mid- s the city also faced economic hardship as major oil companies 
moved their operations to nearby Texas, leaving tourism as one of the 
city’s major sources of revenue and employment. The tourism economy, in 
turn, relied on low-wage labor, systematic underemployment, and public 
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services like housing subsidized by federal or city government to capitalize 
on its investments (Sorant et al. ).
Together, these economic and demographic trends had a number of 
impacts on the city. The diminished population translated into a lowered 
tax revenue. Louisiana is a state renowned for its high tax breaks and tax 
credits, meaning less money from industry is reinvested in essential public 
services like education, public health, and housing. The city of New Orle-
ans also featured low property taxes. Additionally, the post-desegregation 
suburban fl ight meant many jobs and services were lost in the inner city 
while they increased in the suburbs. Finally, the exodus from the city left 
a high number of blighted and abandoned properties throughout central 
neighborhoods.
The result of these trends was the creation of a large underemployed 
and underpaid working -class population, a signifi cant proportion of which 
self-identifi ed as African American. These conditions of social and eco-
nomic marginalization led to the growth of the informal drug economy 
in New Orleans. At the same time, city and federal housing agencies sys-
tematically neglected large public housing facilities, with the intention of 
letting these structures deteriorate to the point where demolition and 
redevelopment became necessary. In New Orleans and its suburbs, res-
idents who remained ignorant of the structural impacts of racism and 
the capitalist tourism economy on working-class African Americans relied 
on racist explanations for making sense of the large underclass that had 
formed over the course of the city’s history. When Katrina struck, many 
residents saw public housing projects as dens of violence and criminality, 
although others insisted on the importance of these structures as housing 
for the city’s indispensable, yet historically exploited, African American 
working class.
Despite their socioeconomically marginalized status, working-class Af-
rican Americans developed a number of rich practices for reshaping the 
city’s urban space from a landscape of racialized diff erence into a land-
scape of identity-making. These practices included the African American 
carnivals of Uptown and Downtown Super Sunday and Second Line Pa-
rades that run from August to May (Breunlin and Regis ; Lewis and 
Breunlin ; Regis ). As George Lipsitz ( ) has noted, in the 
face of limited spatial and social mobility, working-class African Americans 
developed profound attachments to place, and produced the places they 
lived in through the cultivation of social relations with friends, relatives, 
and neighbors.
The mandatory evacuation of the city during Katrina’s aftermath cre-
ated a context in which local government offi  cials, federal agencies, and 
gentrifying resident constituencies imagined New Orleans as a space 
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wiped clean of its pre-disaster social challenges and open for new imag-
inings of the city’s future. Many of these visions of urban recovery, how-
ever, did not foreground the fundamental contradictions of the capitalist 
tourism economy, the state’s tax-break system, or the racial dimensions of 
the city’s urban-suburban fl ight as the root causes of New Orleans’ social 
challenges. Instead, many of the recovery plans, policies, and practices on 
the part of city government proposed the conceptualization of the city’s 
urban space as a mechanism for the investment, circulation, and repro-
duction of capital: a technoscientifi c solution for what was ultimately a so-
ciopolitical problem. As we will see below, these visions of urban recovery 
articulated a number of implicit assumptions about the natures of people, 
community, and social well-being that clashed with the ways many New 
Orleanians envisioned recovery. Additionally, these assumptions were 
characterized by a number of contradictions that inhibited the addressing 
of New Orleans’s principal social challenges before and after Katrina.
Spaces of Neoliberalism in Disaster Reconstruction
In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, Mayor C. Ray Nagin organized 
a panel of developers, planning experts, and local government offi  cials 
and charged them with the task of devising a recovery plan for the city. 
This plan was eventually titled Bring New Orleans Back. As part of this 
initiative, local real estate developer Joe Canizaro and the Urban Land 
Institute, based in Washington, DC, were assigned the task of drawing a 
new land use plan for the city. The Urban Land Institute proposed that 
New Orleans should have a smaller footprint in its future and that there 
should be a moratorium on the reconstruction of the most heavily fl ooded 
areas (which should be allowed to revert into green space). This proposal 
met with widespread opposition on the part of residents from devastated 
neighborhoods like the Lower th Ward and Broadmoor and the greater 
New Orleans community at large because it ignored the importance to 
city residents of neighborhood identity and glossed over the fact that cat-
astrophic damages were caused by the technological failure of the levee 
system and not because of residents’ settlement patterns.
At the same time, the Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO) and 
the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
took advantage of the city’s mandatory evacuation to expedite their plans 
for the demolition and redevelopment of major public housing projects 
(Breunlin and Regis ). In the immediate aftermath of Katrina, HANO 
and HUD ordered the closing of major public housing projects and planned 
for the demolition and redevelopment of  percent of these units, the 
majority of which had not been made uninhabitable by the storm’s fl ood-
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ing. The city and federal housing agencies assured the public that these 
redevelopments would feature a one-to-one unit replacement, but this 
replacement was also accompanied by privatization as individually owned 
mixed income housing. Only a fraction of total units were to remain as 
public housing, while the rest would be sold through various programs 
as mixed income housing. Residents of New Orleans had mixed opinions 
about the redevelopment of public housing. Some public housing resi-
dents and nonresidents saw this as a welcome change, while others wor-
ried that the redevelopment would lengthen the time many working-class 
New Orleanians remained displaced and that few pre-Katrina residents 
would be able to successfully navigate the bureaucracy of home owner-
ship programs. These latter residents insisted on the immediate reopening 
of undamaged units and the facilitated return of public housing residents.
The debate over the future of the city’s public housing would carry 
on to two recovery planning processes that superseded Mayor Nagin’s 
Bring New Orleans Back plan: the Lambert-City Council and Unifi ed New 
Orleans Planning initiatives. Critiques of the Bring New Orleans Back plan 
for lacking broad-based citizen participation resulted in the organiza-
tion of these two planning processes, which were required to include a 
participatory element by the U.S. Congress prior to the disbursement of 
recovery funds. These planning initiatives were offi  cially represented by 
local government offi  cials and organizers from major philanthropic orga-
nizations as bottom-up processes in which all city residents, regardless of 
their socioeconomic backgrounds, could be the collective authors of the 
city’s reconstruction directive. These planning processes, however, did 
not function in this way in practice.
Although many residents continued to insist on the importance of the 
expedited return of public housing residents, who they saw as an integral 
part of the city’ human landscape, professional architects hired as expert 
planners defended HANO and HUD’s decision as a fait accompli. Most 
importantly, professional planners beckoned residents to think about the 
city as a space of capital and energy investment, and not as a landscape of 
social relations among people who were shaped as unique persons over 
their histories of life experiences in New Orleans neighborhoods. During 
one of the Lambert-City Council planning meetings, for example, architect 
Bernard Zyscovich rejected residents’ requests for the immediate reopen-
ing of undamaged public housing, saying, “Recovery plans need to be sold 
in terms of their investment potential, the federal government is much 
more willing to invest  dollars when it is going to get  dollars in return, 
than  dollars in mere social services.” In this statement, Zyscovich articu-
lated the implicit assumption that all elements of urban plans must uphold 
a logic of capital investment and reproduction (neoliberalism). In this in-
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stance, Zyscovich mobilized a neoliberal principle of disaster recovery as 
a nonnegotiable tenet of disaster recovery and, in doing so, shut down an 
important negotiation of reconstruction policy with New Orleans’s most 
aff ected population, eff ectively enhancing and prolonging their vulnerabil-
ity through the continued closure of public housing.
It is also noteworthy that Bernard Zyscovich represented public hous-
ing as a “mere social service” that allegedly did not multiply capital and 
was therefore an unreasonable request on the part of city residents. Still, 
it could be argued that public housing was an integral part of the capitalist 
tourism economy of New Orleans, as the residents of public housing com-
posed a signifi cant proportion of the low-wage service sector from whose 
labor the entertainment and hotel industry derived its profi ts, and whose 
consumption of food, clothing, and basic commodities also supported 
local retail businesses.
Beyond public housing, New Orleans witnessed other disinvestments 
on the part of federal and city governments from the provision of public 
services that were so critical to the survival of low-income households. 
Charity Hospital, the city’s single public hospital, has remained closed 
since the storm. While there are plans for a new Louisiana State University 
Veteran’s Administration medical research complex, the new teaching 
hospital will not be a public facility open to all economically disadvantaged 
New Orleanians, as Charity was.
This pattern of disinvestment from public services was also followed 
by the staff  of the Offi  ce of Recovery and Development Administration 
(ORDA), an offi  ce created during the administration of Mayor Nagin, 
initially directed by Ed Blakely, and charged with the implementation of 
recovery plans. Over the course of ethnographic interviews, ORDA staff  
insisted that the optimal way to help a city recover from a disaster was 
to use public funds to encourage out-of-state investment with the hopes 
of using generated tax revenue to one day provide the public services 
(e.g., schools, fi rehouses, hospitals) needed by the city’s residents. This 
trickle-down economics/business-fi rst approach, however, is limited in its 
effi  cacy to provide New Orleanians with much needed services due to the 
high tax-break system that encourages out-of-state investors to extract 
their fi nancial gains from the state, the unwillingness of out-of-state inves-
tors to invest in New Orleans due to the quality of life limitations already 
present in the city, and the diffi  culties that offi  ces like ORDA have found in 
identifying suitable investors.
To summarize, in the context of post-Katrina New Orleans, city plan-
ners and local government offi  cials have prioritized the conceptualiza-
tion of the city as a space of capital investment as a means of recovery. 
These conceptualizations have deprioritized the expedited provision of 
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much-needed publicly funded social services. Ten years after Katrina, this 
approach toward urban recovery seems to have taken a toll on the most 
socioeconomically vulnerable sector of the city’s population. After the 
hurricane, the city has witnessed a substantial increase in the cost of hous-
ing ( %, Sayre ), a loss of more than ,  residents, and increased 
socioeconomic disparities between race and ethnic groups. The city also 
continues to see signifi cant disparities in the provision of public services to 
highly devastated neighborhoods like the Lower th ward, which remains 
critically underserved in terms of public education, fi re houses, and police 
presence. What is more, the demographic profi le of a signifi cant number 
of returning residents does not match that of pre-Katrina New Orleans, 
suggesting that many of Katrina’s survivors have either decided not to 
return or have not been able to do so (Mack and Ortiz ). The decrease 
in the city’s total population has put further strain on what was an already 
decimated tax base, leading to a rise in the cost of energy and property 
taxes. As one resident commented recently, “In New Orleans, you pay 
more for less.”
Discussion and Conclusions
Although the cases of Choluteca and New Orleans feature signifi cant dif-
ferences, there are a number of common themes that must be noted. 
In both cases, disasters precipitated by relationships between policy, 
technologies, cultural values, and the agency of geophysical phenomena 
created contexts in which government offi  cials and recovery experts (plan-
ners, architects, NGO project managers) saw disaster-devastated localities 
as spaces opened for social transformation. Recovery experts engaged 
these transformative processes from vantage points that were, in one 
way or another, infl uenced by neoliberal and modernist principles of disas-
ter reconstruction management and governance. In southern Honduras, 
for example, the municipality-appointed land committee and professional 
architects envisioned recovery as being contingent on the random distri-
bution of minimal land parcels, parcels that were themselves distributed 
on a grid that regularized spatial relations between disaster survivors. 
The random distribution of land parcels articulated an assumption about 
the nature of people and communities that is characteristic of modernist 
urban planning: the idea that people are entities unto themselves who 
can be predictably shaped through the regimentation of space. The case 
of Limón, in contrast, demonstrates that people in Choluteca were not 
such individualized entities, but were, instead, persons embedded within 
rich social relations with friends, relatives, and neighbors, and that it was 
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these relations that comprised the communities of Choluteca’s barrios 
de clase obrera. As Henri Lefebvre ( ) once noted, cities are places 
of social production, and it is social relations among people that make a 
city. Limón’s master plan, however, reiterated a fundamental principle of 
modernist planning: the idea that the regularization of space (the placing 
of disaster survivors in a meticulously organized grid of minimal land par-
cels) can produce social norms: the neat rows of houses were used in local 
government reports to demonstrate the restoration of normalcy after the 
disaster. In reality, however, the removal of disaster survivors from their 
social networks and their placement in the minimal land parcels of this 
grid did not produce conditions of predictable development. Instead, the 
conditions of social fragmentation created by the plan and the land parcel 
raffl  e emboldened street gangs who could then act with impunity under 
conditions of anonymity.
In addition to the modernist assumptions of Limón’s master plan and 
land distribution, the emphasis on the part of assisting NGOs on the use 
of budgets as a mechanism of reconstruction project assessment both 
enabled the articulation of power by professional architects on disaster 
survivors (i.e., their ability to reject disaster survivor requests for alter-
native house construction practices) and hid the politicized relationships 
between disaster survivors and local government that shaped Limón and 
Marcelino as dramatically diff erent resettlement sites.
In the case of post-Katrina New Orleans, we also see how the disas-
ter was perceived by local government offi  cials and urban planners as a 
space-clearing moment when the city could be transformed through the 
application of expert plans, policies, and practices conceived on the prem-
ises of neoliberal governance. Professional planners upheld the idea that 
urban spaces were, fi rst and foremost, localities of capital investment, and 
that such investment logics were a self-evidently rational and fundamental 
practice for the production of social well-being. But some residents—spe-
cifi cally, displaced New Orleanians—diff ered in opinion, emphasizing that, 
to them, recovery meant the reinstatement of the city’s human landscape. 
Once again, the voices of disaster survivors echoed Lefebvre’s theoriza-
tion of urban space as something made by and made up of social relations. 
Rather than emphasizing the immediate provision of those social services 
that could once again support New Orleans’ pre-Katrina population, local 
government offi  cials and the staff  of the city’s ORDA emphasized the use 
of public funds to encourage capital investment, upholding the logic that 
tax revenue would one day provide those much-needed services. The im-
plications of this perspective on disaster recovery are becoming clear ten 
years after the storm. The emphasis on capital investment over the provi-
sion of public services has failed to address pre-Katrina social inequities, 
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which have actually grown after the storm, thus enhancing, rather than 
mitigating, social vulnerability.
In both the cases of southern Honduras and of New Orleans, we see 
how local government offi  cials, architects, and expert planners engage in 
practices that reference assumptions about the natures of people, society, 
and social well-being that are associated with neoliberal and modernist ur-
ban planning and governance. In both cases, we also see how these social 
actors appeal to a sense of self-evident rationality when engaging in these 
practices (the unquestionable necessity of narratives of cost benefi t and 
budgets as fundamental elements of reconstruction practice), especially 
when confronted with requests on the part of disaster survivors to con-
sider alternative arrangements of reconstruction resources (the construc-
tion of homes with columns and cross beams, the use of reconstruction 
resources to expedite the reopening of public housing and hospitals and 
the expedited return of public housing residents). Inherent in these ap-
peals to the self-evident rationality of budgets and neoliberal or modernist 
master plans is the idea that the knowledge of experts is readily applicable 
across space and time, anywhere, anytime. Both of these case studies, 
however, bring into question the relevance of these policies and practices 
to the social and environmental particularities of disaster-aff ected sites. 
In the case of Limón, we see master plans and land distribution practices 
that ignore the social relations of Hurricane fl ooded neighborhoods of 
Choluteca and the construction of housing structures whose roofs are 
repeatedly damaged during heavy thunderstorms. In New Orleans we 
see neoliberal urban plans and policies that ignore the ways many city 
residents prioritized the return of the city’s pre-Katrina population and 
how these policies and plans have failed to address (and may have exac-
erbated) the social, political, and economic challenges confronted by the 
city before the storm.
At the same time, these two case studies also provide us with a num-
ber of recommendations for practice. These ethnographies of disaster 
reconstruction demonstrate that the practices (the use of budgets as an 
instrument of project assessment, and participatory recovery planning 
as a means of defi ning recovery) and policies of recovery experts need 
to be negotiated with disaster-aff ected populations. To engage in these 
negotiations, recovery experts must be able to recognize the variable, 
historically confi gured, and locality-contingent ways people meaningfully 
engage their environments and both defi ne and experience well-being 
and reconstruction. Recovery experts must also recognize the cultural his-
tories of those rubrics of disaster reconstruction they uphold as matters 
of fact (the self-evident and unquestionable logic of cost-benefi t analysis, 
the conceptualization of urban space in terms of capitalist investment). 
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But what does such an approach to disaster reconstruction look like in 
practice? How do we apply this?
What is interesting about the case of southern Honduras is that the case 
of Marcelino Champagnat shows us exactly how some disaster survivors 
and NGO program managers engage in the dialectical acts of “epistemo-
logical fl exibility”—a term I use to defi ne the act of negotiating reconstruc-
tion policy and practice between recovery experts and disaster-aff ected 
populations—that are absolutely necessary to make reconstruction aid so-
cially and environmentally relevant. While professional architects in Limón 
and New Orleans rigidly upheld narratives of cost-benefi t analysis and 
capitalist investment as nonnegotiable elements of disaster reconstruc-
tion, CARE program managers in Marcelino saw their budget as having a 
greater degree of plasticity. CARE program managers had the fl exibility 
to modify the individual items of their budget without exceeding total 
project costs, and were therefore able to provide Marcelino residents with 
the kinds of housing structures they preferred. In this case, the budget did 
not operate as an unquestionable mechanism of power/knowledge at the 
disposition of recovery experts, as it did in Limón. Instead, CARE program 
managers saw the budget as a malleable and adaptable institutional re-
quirement that could be tailored to fi t disaster survivor self-defi ned needs. 
Recovery experts, then, must begin to problematize fi nancial cost-benefi t 
analysis and neoliberal/modernist principles of urban planning as a fun-
damental and nonnegotiable tenet of disaster reconstruction, and must 
learn to listen to the variety of ways disaster-aff ected populations clamor 
for reconstruction assistance that suits their socioenvironmental circum-
stances. Finally, governmental offi  cials, expert planners, and NGO pro-
gram managers must learn to appreciate acts of resistance on the part of 
disaster survivors and to see these acts not as undesired deviation from 
their expected role as passive and grateful recipients of minimal and in-
eff ective aid. Instead acts of resistance like the rejection of inadequate 
housing or neoliberal logics of urban planning must be seen as critically 
important moments for the negotiation of recovery aid and plans, mo-
ments that allow for an equitable conversation about what community, 
well-being, and recovery are to those most aff ected by disasters, and not 
an imposition by those who purport to help them.
Roberto Barrios is associate professor of applied anthropology at 
Southern Illinois University Carbondale. Since  he has conducted 
ethnographic research on confl ict- and disaster-induced community dis-
placement and resettlement in a number of localities including southeast-
ern Mexico, southern Honduras, New Orleans, and southern Illinois. His 
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in such high-profi le venues as Human Organization, Disasters, Anthropology 
News, and Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power. His current book 
project is titled Governing Aff ect: Modernities and Neoliberalisms of Disaster 
Reconstruction (in press by the University of Nebraska Press). Barrios is a 
founding member of the Disasters Topical Interest Group of the Society 
for Applied Anthropology and has served as a specialist on the anthropol-
ogy of disasters for the National Science Foundation Doctoral Dissertation 
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Note
 . Micaela di Leonardo ( ) defi nes neoliberalism as the idea that market de-
regulation is conducive to optimal social ends, while Elizabeth Povinelli ( ) 
understands neoliberalism as the expansion of capitalist logic of financial 
cost-benefi t analysis to all facets of human life are best thought of in terms of 
fi nancial cost-benefi t.
References
Andersen, Christine F., Jurjen A. Battjes, David E. Daniel, Billy Edge, William Epsey, 
Robert B. Gilbert, Thomas L. Jackson, David Kennedy, Dennis S. Mileti, James K. 
Mitchell, Peter Nicholson, Cliff ord A. Pugh, George Tamaro, and Robert Traver. 
. The New Orleans Hurricane Protection System: What Went Wrong and Why. 
Reston, VA: American Society of Civil Engineers.
Bankoff , Greg, and Dorothea Hilhorst. . “Introduction: Mapping Vunerability.” In 
Mapping Vulnerability: Disasters, Development, and People, edited by Greg Bankoff , 
Georg Frerks, and Dorothea Hilhorst, – . London: Earthscan Press. 
Barrios, Roberto E. . “Budgets, Plans, and Politics: Questioning the Role of Expert 
Knowledge in Disaster Reconstruction.” Anthropology News ( ): – . 
Breunlin, Rachel, and Helen Regis. . “Putting the Ninth Ward on the Map: Race, 
Place, and Transformation in Desire, New Orleans.” American Anthropologist  
( ): – .
Button, Gregory. . Disaster Culture: Knowledge and Uncertainty in the Wake of Hu-
man and Environmental Catastrophe. Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press.
Campanella, Richard. . Geographies of New Orleans: Urban Fabrics Before the 
Storm. Lafayette, LA: Center for Louisiana Studies.
di Leonardo, Micaela. . “Introduction: New Global and American Landscapes of In-
equality.” In New Landscapes of Inequality: Neoliberalism and the Erosion of Democ-
racy in America, edited by Jane L. Collins, Micaela di Leonardo, and Brett Williams, 
– . Santa Fe, NM: School for Advanced Research Press.
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
 • Roberto E. Barrios
Fortun, Kim. . Advocacy After Bhopal: Environmentalism, Disaster, New Global Or-
ders. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Foucault, Michel. . “Governmentality.” In The Foucault Eff ect: Studies in Govern-
mentality, edited by Graham Burchell and Colin Gordon, – . Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press.
Ganapati, N. Emel, and Sukumar Ganapati. . “Enabling Participatory Planning after 
Disasters: A Case Study of the World Bank’s Housing Reconstruction in Turkey.” 
Journal of the American Planning Association  ( ): – .
Gunewardena, Nandini, and Mark Schuller, eds. . Capitalizing on Catastrophe: Neo-
liberal Strategies in Disaster Reconstruction. Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press.
Jackson, Antoinette. . “Diversifying the Dialogue post-Katrina—Race, Place, and 
Displacement in New Orleans, U.S.A.” Transforming Anthropology  ( ): – .
Lefebvre, Henri. . “The Right to the City.” In Writings on Cities, translated and ed-
ited by Eleanore Kofman and Elizabeth Lebas, – . Oxford: Blackwell.
Lewis, Ronald W., and Rachel Breunlin. . The House of Dance and Feathers: A Mu-
seum by Ronald W. Lewis. New Orleans, LA: UNO Press.
Lipsitz, George. . “Learning from New Orleans: The Social Warrant of Hostile 
Privatism and Competitive Consumer Citizenship.” Cultural Anthropology  ( ): 
– .
Mack, Vicky, and Elaine Ortiz. . Who Lives in New Orleans and the Metro Area Now? 
Based on  U.S. Census Bureau data. New Orleans, LA: Greater New Orleans 
Community Data Center.
Oliver-Smith, Anthony, and Susanna Hoff man. . “Anthropology and the Angry 
Earth: An Overview.” In The Angry Earth: Disaster in Anthropological Perspective, 
edited by Anthony Oliver-Smith and Susanna Hoff man, – . New York: Routledge.
Povinelli, Elizabeth. . “Shapes of Freedom. An Interview with Elzabeth A. Povi-
nelli.” Alterites  ( ): – .
Regis, Helen. . “Second Lines, Minstresly, and the Contested Landscapes of New 
Orleans Afro-Festivals.” Cultural Anthropology  ( ): – .
Sayre, Katherine.  “New Orleans Home prices up % since Hurricane Katrina; 
suburbs more modest.” The Times Picayune, August . Accessed October , . 
http://www.nola.com/business/index.ssf/ / /new_orleans_home_prices_
up_ .html 
Schuller, Mark, and Marilyn M. Thomas Houston. . “Introduction: No place like 
Home, no Time Like the Present.” In Homing Devices: The Poor as Targets of Pub-
lic Housing Policy and Practice, edited by Marilyn M. Thomas Houston and Mark 
Schuller, – . Lanham: Lexington Books Publisher. 
Sorant, Peter, Robert Whelan, and Alma Young. . “City profi le: New Orleans.” 
Cities May: – .
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
CHAPTER 
“We Are Always Getting Ready”
How Diverse Notions of Time and Flexibility Build 
Adaptive Capacity in Alaska and Tuvalu
ELIZABETH MARINO and HEATHER LAZRUS
Community-held notions of time, fl exibility, and uncertainty, which un-
derpin disaster preparedness planning, are important organizing prin-
ciples for climate adaptation eff orts. However, communities currently 
facing climate change impacts may simultaneously be on the margins 
of climate change and disaster planning centers and discourses. Subse-
quently, notions of time and preparedness may not translate smoothly 
between boardrooms and community settings. Flexibility in the face of 
uncertainty—for instance, about how and when global climate change 
will manifest locally—is critically linked to these personal and community 
interactions with time. That is, cultural relationships with time imbue how 
people cope with, and make plans to cope with, risk and uncertainty. In 
some cases, the ability to preserve fl exibility is a critical contribution to 
building adaptive capacity in response to disasters precipitated by climate 
change. We explore the intersections of time, fl exibility, uncertainty, and 
adaptation planning in two case studies from communities in very diff er-
ent settings—the village of Shishmaref in Alaska and the country of Tuvalu 
in the southwest Pacifi c Ocean—both of which are already negotiating 
the eff ects of a changing climate and of planning eff orts designed to miti-
gate climate change impacts.
Consider an afternoon in May, , when Fred Eningowuk, a resident 
of Shishmaref, Alaska, asked the Immediate Action Working Group (Work-
ing Group)—a network of State of Alaska and federal agency workers 
tasked with responding to communities for whom the risk of extensive 
fl ooding had become critical—for help moving a bulk fuel container. 
Shishmaref is not eligible for new fuel containers, along with much in the 
way of state-sponsored infrastructure development, since the community 
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voted to relocate in  because of fl ooding pressures, but eroding fuel 
containers are a big problem in the small community. In order to help, a 
neighboring village donated its retired—but still working—fuel container, 
but moving the large piece of equipment was beyond the capacity of the 
small village’s transportation capabilities, leading to Eningowuk’s request 
to the Working Group.
The Working Group, located in Anchorage, was silent in response to this 
request. Fuel tanks are not part of their mission statement. On this partic-
ular day, the Working Group was meeting remotely with several Alaskan 
villages to identify assessment strategies for adding new communities to 
the classifi cation of “most at risk,” and carrying out projects such as new 
fl ooding and hazard maps. The agenda for the meeting dictated that the 
topics of discussion should concentrate on these tasks for four hours and 
twenty minutes, with the last ten minutes were opened for public discus-
sion and unplanned input from community leaders and representatives 
listening in over the phone. 
There is nothing unusual about this interaction, but we see that there 
can exist divergent understandings of what constitutes preparation be-
tween diff erent actors in bureaucratic meetings aimed at building adap-
tive capacity to deal with disasters and climate change. Because of this, 
government planning meetings between local communities experiencing 
or preparing for disaster and the government representatives charged 
to assess and off er assistance, aid, and in some cases relief from acute 
risk, are rich ethnographic moments. In the above example, the Work-
ing Group’s discussion centers largely on drawing categories of risk and 
measuring risk in the future, while Eningowuk’s discussion brings up an 
unexpected (by the participants in Anchorage), immediate need in the 
present. These diff erences indicate unique and situated experiences of 
risk as a construct that exists, for example, in the evolving present (fuel 
tanks) or something that is located and predictable in a not-yet-upon-us 
future (where is it likely to fl ood next?). Notice also how that unique and 
powerful cultural artifact of the agenda dictates time allotted to appro-
priate topics of risks and adaptation. These diff erences in what constitute 
appropriate topics indicate power dynamics during adaptation-planning 
interactions and help point to what are acceptable time frames for—and 
of—engagement within bureaucratic settings.
Interactions such as these are cultural performances of the kinds of 
risk mitigation and management strategies that are acceptable within 
and across social and cultural actors and institutions. Disaster planning 
becomes an ethnographic hot spot for understanding divergent expe-
riences of risk, climate change adaptation, and disaster preparedness 
among stakeholders. Ethnographies of communication (Hymes ) help 
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to make visible the suite of experiences and conceptual frameworks that 
various stakeholders bring to the locations and events where disaster 
mitigation and climate change adaptation are discussed; through these 
ethnographies anthropologists gain a better insight into the spectrum of 
meanings and experiences of disaster planning, and which meanings and 
experiences have value within centers of decision making.
In the following chapter we discuss how culturally appropriate and 
locally derived notions of fl exibility and relationships with time and un-
certainty in Shishmaref and Tuvalu off er remarkable and well-situated 
frameworks for thinking about adaptive capacity in their respective lo-
cales, and yet how these notions of fl exibility can be overlooked by agency 
workers and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). We hypothesize 
that these concepts of fl exibility can be diffi  cult to incorporate into bu-
reaucratic institutions, in part because they confound the limited notions 
of time and task that become habit within bureaucratic cultures and pro-
tocol. By highlighting some situated experiences of time and task in Shish-
maref and Tuvalu, we hope to demonstrate that fl exibility, constructed in 
relationship to time- and task-orientation, can be expanded on to support 
adaptive capacity in these island communities, as well as potentially to 
support adaptive capacity in other communities and locales around the 
globe.
Our insights are ethnographically grounded in fi eldwork conducted 
in Alaska and Tuvalu and ongoing conversations with residents of these 
places, and are supplemented through discourse analysis of texts and 
fi lms produced in media and policy contexts. Our close observations of 
community engagement and climate change adaptation processes over 
the past decade allow us to explore the evolving ways that people inter-
act with their shifting physical and policy environments. From this van-
tage point, we compare and contrast the experiences and situations in 
the Arctic (the community of Shishmaref, Alaska) and in the tropics (the 
low-lying island communities of Tuvalu). This comparative perspective, 
between places in very diff erent geographic settings, allows us to com-
ment on some broader patterns that emerge from the specifi c details of 
each case. 
Climate Change and Vulnerability: 
Unfolding Disasters in Shishmaref and Tuvalu
Anthropogenic climate change is causing shifts and reverberations 
throughout the earth system, which in turn create both known and un-
known eff ects in ecological and social systems (Maslin and Austin ). 
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For human communities and individuals, these changes will be experi-
enced in part through the increasing likelihood and frequency of rapid-
onset hazards such as intense hurricanes, fi res, large storms, and fl ooding, 
and through slow-onset hazards such as erosion and drought (Oppen-
heimer et al. ). Anthropologists and other social scientists under-
stand, however, that exposure to hazards and experiences of disaster 
are fi ltered through underlying social conditions including access to po-
litical power, economic and social capital, social geographies of race and 
ethnicity, risks linked to gender and age, histories of colonization, and 
many other cultural and social conditions (Kelman, Gaillard, and Mercer 
; Lazrus ; Marino , ; Oliver-Smith ). Because of this, 
marginalized and vulnerable communities will experience hazards more 
acutely, creating socially constructed disaster situations that may result in 
death, diaspora, loss of infrastructure and property, and social disarticula-
tion, among other negative outcomes. Communities that are vulnerable to 
adverse outcomes of climate change are frequently also communities that 
have historically contributed least to greenhouse gas emissions—such as 
Shishmaref and Tuvalu. Thus, the combination of least developed, least 
culpable, and most likely to experience negative eff ects of hazards related 
to anthropogenic climate change make climate change-related disasters a 
critical ethical issue (Marino ), as well as an important human rights 
issue for the twenty-fi rst century (Adger ; Watt-Clouteir ). 
Thus climate change—its causes and consequences—exists not only as 
a set of biophysical outcomes, but also as a set of decisions, rules for deci-
sion making, networks of actors, pools of fi nancial resources, legal agree-
ments, publications, and communicative events. These sets of discourses 
determine how, which, whether, and when people will make changes to 
physical and social landscapes to prepare, mitigate, and adapt to chang-
ing ecological conditions. Both physical outcomes of climate change and 
climate change discourses enter a stratifi ed society (Marino and Ribot 
). Whether climate change discourses and resulting policies exacer-
bate inequity to power and decision-making, or whether climate change 
discourses provide opportunity to reimagine the power dynamics among 
sets of actors, is an area in need of greater empirical investigation.
Of course we know that climate change discourses and the actors who 
participate in them are heterogeneous, both within and across cultural 
contexts. As such, some situations in which international political actors 
discuss climate change create new opportunities for traditionally mar-
ginalized communities and leaders to make themselves heard. In , 
for example, Tuvaluan representatives criticized the text and procedure 
leading to the Copenhagen Accord produced by the Conference to the 
Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
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Change (UNFCCC), refusing to sign a nonbinding deal brokered by the 
United States, India, China, and South Africa (International Institute for 
Sustainable Development [IISD] ; Radio New Zealand ), leading 
to widespread protesting and international attention. In another exam-
ple, representatives from Shishmaref and other communities in Alaska 
met with President Barack Obama in  when he visited the state—a 
meeting spurred, in part, by the president’s personal investigation of cli-
mate change outcomes and acknowledgement of rural Alaska leaders 
and thinkers as being on the forefront of this global phenomena. In the 
Arctic in particular, Sheila Watt-Cloutier and the Inuit Circumpolar Council 
successfully moved the climate change agenda to include Inuit concerns 
and successfully positioned Inuit knowledge systems as critical to global 
climate conversations (Callison ). These examples point at an emerg-
ing vocality of historically marginalized populations in the climate debate.
While the above examples off er great promise, other research has 
demonstrated that international discourses on climate change and climate 
change adaptation have reentrenched pathways of inequity and exploita-
tion. This happens repeatedly when powerful actors simplify disaster ex-
periences for small island communities, such as those in Tuvalu, and small 
indigenous communities, such as those in Shishmaref. Media coverage 
often repackages these experiences as metaphors (e.g., conjuring ideas 
of a canary in a mine, a litmus test, or the drowning islands of Atlantis) and 
illustrate simplistic anecdotes that serve to justify the desires and actions 
of more-powerful institutions (Beymer-Ferris ; Farbotko and Lazrus 
; Marino ). In these instances, marginalized voices are diminished 
even as the exotic cache of these voices is used to sell newspapers and 
further preexisting agendas (Farbotko and Lazrus ). 
Investigating communicative events surrounding climate change and 
the adaptive capacity to anticipate and cope with climate-related disasters, 
as we do in this article, may contribute to establishing equity in climate 
change-related discourses, including mitigation interventions (e.g., inter-
national policy, funding for hazard mitigation and adaptation) (Marino and 
Ribot ). We hope to show how capitalizing on situated concepts of 
fl exibility in the face of uncertainty born both of a changing environment 
and of the social processes that lead to disasters can off er insights into 
supporting more inclusive forms of adaptive capacity planning and can 
open bureaucratic institutions to alternative pathways of engagement.
Shishmaref and Tuvalu
Shishmaref, Alaska, is a village on a low-lying, barrier sand island that is 
sandwiched between the Chuckchi Sea and the Shishmaref Lagoon. The 
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community is primarily Iñupiat, and self-identify as the Kigiqtamiut (liter-
ally, people of the island). The Kigiqtamiut have inhabited the extensive 
coastal areas around the island for at least three thousand years in family 
groups, each of which is identifi ed by diff erent land tenure and political 
affi  liation (Burch ). In contrast to Shishmaref’s Arctic setting, Tuvalu is 
composed of nine low-lying coral and atoll islands that form an arc across 
the Pacifi c Ocean just south of the equator. Approximately ten thousand 
residents live in the archipelago, and are descended from Polynesian voy-
agers who settled the islands roughly two thousand years ago when sea 
levels fell during a small ice age and exposed the atolls (Nunn ). 
Despite vastly diff erent geographical settings, both areas have expe-
rienced social and political constraints tied to colonization and both ex-
perience similar eff ects from extreme weather and storms. Shishmaref is 
threatened by fl ooding brought by fall storms that come off  the Chuck-
chi Sea; as storm intensity and erosion increase, these fl oods become 
more threatening to lives and homes. As oceanside bluff s erode, the like-
lihood of a large-scale disaster that claims lives and critical infrastructure 
increases. Erosion can be slow onset, or can be sudden and dramatic 
during a storm event. In  a large storm took approximately ten meters 
(thirty-two feet) of land in a single night. In total there have been six state 
fl ood disaster declarations issued for Shishmaref since  (Kinsman, 
DeRaps, and Smith ). Similar to Shishmaref, Tuvalu is also aff ected 
by storm activity. Cyclones and storm surges kai fenua (literally meaning 
to eat the island). In March  the winds and surge from Cyclone Pam, 
the season’s most intense tropical cyclone in the southern hemisphere, 
resulted in waves up to fi ve meters breaking over some of the Tuvaluan 
islands. Infrastructure was damaged, houses fl ooded, crops ruined, and 
families driven to evacuate. Annually, king tides also eat at the coast lines of 
the Tuvaluan islands. These perigean spring tides raise water levels higher 
than normal, and can be driven even higher by a full or new moon, storm 
surge, la Niña conditions, and climate change-driven sea level rise. The Tu-
valu Meteorological Service has recorded maximum tides of .  meters (oc-
curring on February , , and again on February , ), signifi cant 
in a country with an average elevation of just .  meters above sea level.
Seawalls and revetment projects have been common responses to 
encroaching waves in both places. Since  more than  million has 
been spent on seawall projects in Shishmaref. These protective revet-
ments have a life expectancy of fi fteen years if not properly maintained 
and twenty-fi ve if regularly maintained (Gray et al. ). There is disagree-
ment on the effi  cacy of the current seawall in Shishmaref (Mason et al. 
), but historically seawalls in Shishmaref have been infamously inef-
fective. One revetment project intended to protect the coast from greater 
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erosion failed a few weeks after it was constructed at great cost to both 
the state and the village (Mason et al. , – ; Mason et al. ). In 
Tuvalu, wave energy tends to scour the coast where seawalls have been 
installed, exacerbating the loss of land. In many places, seawalls have tum-
bled down and their components used for other structures including boat 
ramps. In a few cases, the seawalls become dams, preventing sea water 
that overtops the walls during high tides and storms from returning to the 
ocean. The trapped sea water kills vegetation and infi ltrates the narrow 
freshwater lens, leaving soil infertile for decades. Almost all stakeholders 
in Shishmaref and in Tuvalu agree that seawalls and other revetment proj-
ects are not a long-term solution to fl ooding and erosion. 
Given the common threats and inadequate infrastructure solutions in 
both places, community members in Tuvalu and Shishmaref are faced with 
extremely diffi  cult considerations concerning relocation (Marino ; 
Mortreux and Barnett ). Numerous documentary fi lms and popu-
lar media articles attempt to capture how people in Tuvalu feel about 
a future relocated from their home islands, illustrating an early climate 
refugee crisis. The lived experience of climate-related sea level rise and 
associated decisions, however, is complex. Tuvaluans resist the label of 
climate refugee (Farbotko and Lazrus ), even fi nding ways to cement 
connections to place in the face of discourses about relocation (Farbotko, 
Stratford, and Lazrus ). While there are currently no specifi c policies 
in place to aid migration in response to climate-related changes in Tuvalu, 
some people who have relocated to Australia or New Zealand—or who 
plan to do so—cite climate pressures among their reasons. In at least one 
case, the New Zealand court has recognized climate refugee status of a 
Tuvaluan family, granting the family residence (Farbotko, Stratford, and 
Lazrus ).
Shishmaref residents consistently and unanimously resist relocating to 
a more urban environment or merging with a preexisting village, but in 
 the community voted to reestablish the community on the mainland, 
within subsistence hunting territory (Schweitzer and Marino ). Recon-
structing a village on the mainland would require signifi cant state and/or 
federal support to develop critical public infrastructure such as schools, an 
airstrip, a post offi  ce, a medical clinic, and other infrastructure, as well as 
planning for this infrastructure. The burden of these costs has not yet been 
allocated in state or federal budgets, but residents are currently in talks 
with state and federal agencies to set out a plan for short-term protection 
of the island as it is today, and long-term planning for possible relocation.
Under these conditions, residents of both areas negotiate strategic de-
velopment and relocation planning with agency workers along hierarchies 
of government institutions and through programs of international aid, 
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as well as among local governments and family groups. It is within these 
negotiations and advocacy arenas that divergent experiences of risk and 
timeframes for adaptation emerge.
Task Duration
One evening, Shishmaref resident and friend of author Elizabeth Marino, 
Nancy Kokeok, was cleaning seal hides. Kokeok worked slowly and cau-
tiously, running the ulu (women’s knife) along the edge of the fi ne, spot-
ted animal hide. It’s a job that takes a delicate touch to get the soft pink 
blubber off  the sealskin with the sharp knife without nicking the skin it-
self. These skins are used for mukluks (boots), mittens, and hats—all of 
which need continuous swaths of skin to make them water proof. A hole 
interrupts these swaths and cannot realistically be sewn back together 
to make a full, waterproof piece—so this challenging skill of scraping is 
critical to making suffi  ciently warm Iñupiat clothing. It was getting cold 
and dark in the early spring, and Marino asked Kokeok if she was hurrying 
through her last seal so she could get inside and warm her hands, which 
were wet from the work. Marino was, in fact, hoping Kokeok would hurry 
up so that the inexperienced anthropologist could go inside and warm 
her hands, which were not wet from work. “What do you mean?” Kokeok 
responded. “It takes as long as it takes.”
The sentiment “it takes as long as it takes” is not uncommon in rural 
Alaska. Seeing a task through to completion demonstrates what outsid-
ers might call patience, but bespeaks a more ubiquitous understanding of 
due diligence, work, and fl exibility with time. The notion of seeing a task 
through to completion is a concept that is infused into life in rural Alaska 
and one that can grate against bureaucratic protocol. Of course individ-
uals break from a task when necessary, but task-driven engagement, as 
opposed the clock- and calendar-driven partitioning of time (Postill ), 
breaks the formal organizing structure of most meetings held by outsiders 
in Shishmaref. To see something through to completion requires a rela-
tionship with time that is less rigid and more amenable to surprises and 
unexpected diversions. The diff erences between task-driven engagement 
and clock-driven engagement are particularly striking with regards to no-
tions of speaking, being silent, and being heard.
In Shishmaref, an elder may get up to speak at a meeting about what 
may seem like a divergent topic; but it is common that when people speak 
they are given the fl oor until they are fi nished. Under these conditions, 
the divergent topic nearly always winds its way back to convey a profound 
insight to the conversation at hand. This relinquishment of the fl oor for 
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unspecifi ed amounts of time is not the organizing structure for most for-
mal engagements sponsored by outsiders—even among people who try 
and demonstrate cultural sensitivity in an Iñupiat context. Nicole Gombay 
writes about the awkwardness and profound discomfort of the audience 
at an Inuit studies conference when a senior Inuk, Peter Irniq, went over 
his allotted time during a luncheon speech and ran into the time when 
paper sessions were to start (Gombay )—and this audience was 
made up of people gathered to talk about Inuit society! Similarly, in Tu-
valu, elders speak fi rst when community members gather in the maneapas 
(open-air community houses). There, too, elders, especially members of 
the falekaupule (island leadership), weave together what initially appear 
to be disparate and seemingly mundane topics, even gossip, ultimately 
arriving at insightful conclusions that may not have been evident through 
a more direct style of oration (Besnier ).
During meetings like the example with which we opened this chapter, 
we also see the critical infl uence of the agenda as a cultural object of 
great power. These meetings often assume an agenda and chronological 
progression from one item to the next with limited and clearly defi ned 
time allocation for each topic. Under these conditions there is little room 
for conversations to diverge from agenda topics, for unknown and un-
expected topics to emerge, or for solutions to play out after discussions 
take as long as they take. It might, in fact, be antithetical to some notions 
of successful engagement to begin a meeting by announcing, through an 
agenda, when it will end.
We off er these examples of situated tasks to illustrate how daily life 
may be organized in ways that prioritize the task itself over the clock- and 
calendar-driven partitioning of time (Postill ) that dominates in of-
fi ces, board rooms, and laboratories around the world where climate-re-
lated science, discourses, and policies are often developed. However, as 
Postill demonstrates, we are careful not to assume that the temporality of 
tasks and schedules in Shishmaref or Tuvalu is fundamentally distinct from 
the clock and calendar time of global centers of science and planning, but 
that clock time is just one of many elements involved in scheduling and 
planning. In other words, activities are planned in ways that refl ect how 
time is made meaningful according to the tasks at hand or the situational 
context. Hall’s ( ) descriptions of monochonic and polychronic time 
have been infl uential in anthropology, contributing to our understanding of 
how people organize space and time to communicate nonverbally, includ-
ing the message conveyed through the particular ways in which a task may 
be accomplished. Interrogating the partitioning of time in disaster studies 
lends a richness to understanding how people interact with scheduling and 
planning and gives rise to the idea that a singular method of scheduling 
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may undermine solutions that could arise more easily under diff erent social 
conditions. In other words, decolonizing meeting spaces, and their unique 
notions of time, might actually lead to diff erent kinds of solutions.
Foresight: Is Prediction the Only Basis 
for Climate Change Knowledge?
Climate change information and knowledge created and disseminated by 
scientists and by global initiatives such as the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) are overwhelmingly about prediction. Knowing 
the future and what the future will bring seems essential in global climate 
change discourses for knowing how to prepare, what to mitigate, and 
where to put adaptation funding. Asking, “Where and when will the next 
storm be?” can seem like the only rational way to begin preparing for cli-
mate change, particularly when landscapes are becoming uninhabitable 
and migration is becoming necessary. A recent UK government-funded 
series of reports on climate change, among other issues, is titled Foresight 
Projects: and claims “Foresight uses the latest scientifi c evidence and fu-
tures analysis to address complex issues and provide strategic options for 
policy.” (The Government Offi  ce for Science , accessed April , ). 
Foresight is an integral part of our understanding of how to prepare for 
climate change in the coming centuries, and yet the idea of foresight as 
prediction or knowing the future is not universally embraced as a prereq-
uisite for preparedness (Taddei ). We note the concept of foresight 
makes particular presumptions about the construction and partitioning 
of time. As Bates writes, “Assumptions about time as a linear fl ow of con-
stant rate, with neat chronologies linking events in the past, present, and 
future are convictions that are deeply embedded in Western thought” 
( , ). In many climate change discourses, the future as a distinct, lin-
early defi ned, point is a deeply embedded conviction; adaptation planners 
can even take the additional cognitive leap of the future as being know-
able and predictable.
Climate change institutions and social discourses of climate change 
themselves are organized around these principles of the future being 
knowable (Taddei ). To build projections about the future global 
climate and its more local eff ects, climate modelers make assumptions 
about deterministic social and physical systems and about their relatively 
linear, and relatively knowable, evolution (Shackley and Wynne ). 
These assumptions are culturally embedded and socially negotiated. Fine 
explains, “Predicting the future is social, both in the act of prediction and 
in the organizational infrastructure that permits its acceptance” (Fine 
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, ). Lahsen ( ) describes the complexity involved in projecting 
the future climate, including the levels of certainty with which modelers 
imbue the models and model outputs and thus both how future time is 
measured and known.
Today, climate change research and policy-making organizations place 
enormous value and resources on a preoccupation with knowing the fu-
ture as the single most important mechanism for preparedness. The IPCC 
qualifi es predictions of change as more likely than not, likely, very likely, 
and virtually certain (Cubasch et al. ). The demarcation of degrees of 
certainty about the future is a perfectly adequate way to think about the 
climate system and within a scientifi c epistemology may lead to building 
adaptive capacity in places that are very likely to experience damage, for 
example. This likeliness of damage is one reason anthropologists work 
with and are interested in communities such as Tuvalu and Shishmaref in 
the fi rst place. On the ground in Tuvalu and Shishmaref, however, local 
notions of preparedness and adaptive capacity do not necessarily rest on 
knowing the future—though of course, local leaders, administrators, and 
scientists can and do engage these conversations. 
The degrees of certainty with which the future can be known are prob-
lematic outside of the context of the IPCC report, and especially when 
translated to local communities experiencing change. As Polynesians, 
many Tuvaluans interact with time in ways that make it hard for them 
to conceive of certainty about the future. According to some Polynesian 
knowledge systems, we walk through time in two directions. One may 
walk forward into the past (which we can see because we have experi-
enced it, therefore it is in front of us) and walk backward into the future 
(which we cannot see, and therefore is behind us) (Salmond ). The 
present in this temporal conception is a composite of future unknowns 
and past experiences that is shifting and negotiated. The past, in front 
of people, can serve as a guide in the ever-changing present. In this con-
struction, therefore, it is the past that guides, not the future, even and 
especially under novel conditions. The present is malleable and uncertain. 
During fi eldwork, people from Tuvalu talked about the changes they ob-
served in their environment as deviations from expectations based on 
oral histories and lifetimes of interacting with the weather, ocean, and 
water. Thus, coastal erosion and precipitation changes were known—not 
because of projections of the future, but because of comparisons with the 
past. While this is not a unique feature of Tuvaluan understanding, it does 
present a contrast with the presentation of information derived from cli-
mate models of future projections that we need to acknowledge; we must 
build a bridge between these ways of knowing in order to align priorities 
about planning.
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Similarly, in Shishmaref, predicting precise ecological futures can be 
problematic because assuming one knows what the future will be can be 
seen as a severe form of hubris (Wisniewski )—and while this does 
not eradicate a sense of what may come—taboos on knowing and being 
certain about the future place parameters on acceptable discourses and 
mechanisms for preparedness. These ethics are coded into the language 
used to talk about the future. One consultant in Shishmaref made this 
point, early in the research process: “When we talk about this sort of stuff  
[fl ooding in the future] it’s almost like we have to joke. You have to learn 
to talk to people here if you want to know about this stuff .”
Adaptive Capacity in an Uncertain World: 
Toka and Getting Ready
In Tuvalu and in Shishmaref we fi nd that preparing for uncertainty, not 
predicted outcomes, is a central organizing tool around which adaptive 
capacity is often built outside of bureaucratic settings. Many everyday 
practices provide preparedness for unanticipated events and are a way of 
coping with uncertainty—whether that is uncertainty that something will 
happen, or uncertainty when it will happen. In Nanumea, the northern-
most atoll of Tuvalu, the notion and practice of toka is about being ready. 
Toka is often used in the context of familial obligations during funerals or 
other unforeseen events including disasters—from droughts that reduce 
coconut availability to marine infestations that kill important subsistence 
species. If a family is toka, it is prepared with surplus items to fulfi ll food 
requirements to feed extended relatives following a death or to keep the 
family fed when harvests are slim. The importance of toka has faded with 
the introduction of the cooperative store and a few small businesses from 
which canned or frozen meat, noodles, and rice can be readily purchased 
at a moment’s notice—depending on when supplies are replenished by 
the infrequent boat visits. Given the unreliability of imported food sup-
plies, toka is still a strategy many families use.
Toka is not explicitly connected to the idea of disaster by people in 
Nanumea, yet it was brought up in fi eld interviews in response to actions 
that could be and are taken to mitigate the impacts on households of 
droughts, storms, or infestations when food or water supplies might be 
imperiled. Toka represents a way of being fl exible, given the uncertainty 
of the future. The rafters of open-air fales (houses) in the outer islands are 
often fi lled with aging coconuts that are a delicacy at the best of times, 
and an infusion of nutrients at the worst of times. These brown coconuts 
are a visible indication of whether a household is toka.
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Arguably, with the increased reliance on cash economy, people in 
Nanumea are becoming less fl exible—for example, people rarely have 
surplus cash due to multiple fi nancial demands from church obligations 
and school fees, so when people need to buy unanticipated supplies they 
are sometimes unable to do so. Confounding that constraint, in Tuvalu, 
especially in the outer islands, supplies in the island shop often run low, for 
example if a boat has not visited for several weeks or if someone else has 
had cause to purchase large amounts of imported food. Still, the concept 
of toka is present and can be used to frame a culturally relevant discourse 
of preparedness.
In rural Alaska, preparation for uncertainty is captured in a similar phrase, 
getting ready. Getting ready is an integral part of daily life and stands out 
as a particular relationship with the unknowable future. This concept of 
getting ready is a practiced, intricate part of daily life in Shishmaref, and is 
as ubiquitous as it is diffi  cult to grasp. Breakfast is always a full meal, a way 
of preparing for whatever the day will bring. You always take extra food 
when traveling. You watch, listen, and make yourself ready in the present 
for what might happen in the future. Bates argues that this preparedness 
does not negate conceptions of the future or ideas surrounding forecast-
ing and prediction, but rather that the future is, by its very essence, un-
knowable (Bates ). If the future cannot be fully known, preparedness 
must take place in the present for a spectrum of possible outcomes.
This explicit relationship with uncertainty and preparing for uncer-
tainty, however, is beginning to seep into scientifi c discourses as well. 
Some Western scholars and practitioners are starting to interpret the fu-
ture in ways less confi ned to the parameters of what is considered known 
and knowable, developing the notion of fl exibility. Flexibility is particularly 
useful in dealing with climate change, where models of local outcomes 
and how those outcomes will interact with social systems are extremely 
complex and diffi  cult to predict. In Western technical jargon this may be 
called the “precautionary principle.” That is, in situations when an activity 
threatens to harm the health of humans or the environment, precaution-
ary measures should be taken even if some cause-and-eff ect relationships 
are not fully established scientifi cally. In other words, do no harm under 
conditions of uncertainty.
In climate modeling of future climate-related changes, modeling that 
yields projection of the future, ensemble work is important. Several 
models of future climates are used in ensembles that indicate a range of 
possible outcomes based on each models’ outputs. This spread allows 
modelers to indicate directions and possible degrees of change and to 
move away from deterministic predictions. Yet the forward planning—
days, weeks, years, decades in advance—still embodies certain notions 
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of time and what is knowable and unknowable, even if uncertainties are 
acknowledged.
Despite these new discourses of uncertainty emerging in scientifi c set-
tings, in practice, climate change adaptation discourses are still heavily 
dependent on forecasting. In Shishmaref, for example, the Army Corps of 
Engineers has designated various village sites as having – , fewer than 
, or more than  years before fl ooding is likely to make places uninhab-
itable. Government planners see these numbers as essential determinants 
for setting priorities. These observations lead us to wonder what adaptive 
capacity built around uncertainty, rather than prediction, might look like.
Conclusion
Relationships to time and the future are not static, nor are they singu-
larly defi ned by cultural identity or geographical location. The question 
we pose here is how diff erent conceptual engagements with time may in-
fl uence strategies for preparedness and methods of building adaptive ca-
pacity. We see that they can infl uence preparedness and adaptive capacity 
profoundly, particularly around the idea of fl exibility and relationships to 
uncertainty and an unknowable future. Of course, Alaska Native and Tu-
valuan scientists and politicians are fully engaged participants in the IPCC 
and other central drivers of the foresight narrative, and as such fl uently 
inhabit diverse conceptualizations and vernaculars of time. Conversely, 
an emerging generation of anthropologists are consciously bringing at-
tention to nonhuman agency and actors, including weather and other 
ecological systems that render the future less and less knowable (Havey 
; Sillar ). 
By examining the cultural relationships with time that underpin fl ex-
ibility in the face of uncertainty in Shishmaref and the islands of Tuvalu, 
we are inspired to question assumptions about the need for certainty in 
planning. One implication of this insight is to reduce the emphasis on the 
need for more-precise climate projections about the future, and instead 
to prepare communities in the present for a suite of possible risks. Along 
the lines of arguing for the precautionary principle in climate adaptation 
(Lewis ) these fi ndings also help us see alternative and culturally rel-
evant ways of interacting with climate projections, and the agencies and 
agendas that are designed to address the impacts being projected. An-
other implication is how we can think of disasters not as discrete events, 
but as events embedded in and produced by the uncertainty of a changing 
climate on one hand, and of social vulnerability on the other. Systemic vul-
nerability—entrenched in political and economic processes with deep his-
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torical roots—is another source of uncertainty that extends the causes of 
disasters beyond any sort of discrete timeframe or singular driver. A fi nal 
outcome of this interrogation of time is an understanding that “managing 
the future” as a risk reduction strategy is a culturally constructed model. 
We can, then, posit the idea that there are other ways to handle risks in 
the present and the future, including orientations that deal more directly 
with historical inequities as a risk management strategy. 
The examples we provide here show that the meaning—and impli-
cations—of uncertainty shift between boardrooms and communities. 
Getting and being ready—whether for the vagaries of everyday life, for 
life-altering events such as funerals, or disasters—are ways of making 
uncertainty meaningful and productive through specifi c cultural practices 
that boost a person’s, household’s, or community’s ability to deal with 
the unanticipated. Here, we demonstrate what Gregory Button has pre-
viously called for from disaster anthropologists: how an ethnographic ap-
proach “can unveil the social, cultural, and political meanings inherent in 
the nature of uncertainty, which are too often ignored. By contextualiz-
ing uncertainty in the domains of culture, meaning and power, we cre-
ate [a] coherent idea of its role in society” (Button , ). Supporting 
grounded conceptions of fl exibility, based on particular relationships with 
time, can make local strategies of preparedness powerful antidotes to 
the power discrepancies and climate risks that render some communities’ 
futures particularly uncertain. In other words, contextualizing uncertainty, 
in this case, might shed light on and bolster support for strategies of pre-
paredness that have been there all along.
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Note
All translations in this chapter were completed by the authors.
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CHAPTER 
Tempests, Green Teas, and 
the Right to Relocate
The Political Ecology of Superstorm Sandy
MELISSA CHECKER
Until October , , Debbie and Sam Manus  lived on the East Shore of 
Staten Island in a neighborhood known as Oakwood Beach (King ). 
Comprising mostly bungalows constructed between  and , Oak-
wood Beach was the kind of neighborhood where people stuck around, 
worked on their homes, and passed them down to their children. Sam, 
for instance, purchased his childhood home from his siblings so that he 
could live in the house he loved, amid his family and neighbors. From  
to , the Manus’s renovated their house, piece by piece, as they could 
aff ord it. In the summer of  they fi nished the last renovation—a back 
deck. But their enjoyment was short-lived. Just a few months later, Hurri-
cane Sandy slammed into New York and New Jersey, laying the Manus’s 
dream house to waste. As Debbie described it, “We were trapped by fl ood 
waters that rose so high so quickly that we barely managed to escape up 
into a small crawl space in the attic of our home. … We struggled to stay 
calm for the almost twelve hours that we were there, watching the water 
levels rise to over  feet in our home, ending just below the ceilings, and 
the space we were hiding in.”  
Debbie went on to say that, from the crawl space, she and Sam “could 
hear each wave come in. You would hear a crash and dishes breaking and 
everything moving.” When they emerged from their attic on the morning 
of October , they found “everything was in a big pile. It was like a snow 
globe, like someone shook the house.” Three months later, the Manus’s 
joined approximately a thousand other residents of Staten Island’s East 
and South Shores in petitioning Governor Cuomo to buy out their homes, 
tear them down and return the land underneath them to wetlands. Still 
reeling from ’s Hurricane Irene,  petitioners believed that fl oods were 
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only going to worsen as storms became more frequent and severe. They 
wanted out.
Across the Island, on the North Shore, the National Hurricane Center 
reported storm tides (the combination of storm surge and the astronomi-
cal tide) of .  ft above Mean Lower Low Water (MLLW).  These waves 
washed a -ton oil tanker ashore (although property damage here was 
not nearly as severe as it was on the East and South Shores).  This heavily 
industrialized area contained at least twenty-one industrial sites with un-
controlled contamination, some of which were only seventeen feet away 
from residential properties.  Residents worried that fl ood waters could 
potentially dislodge contaminants and distribute them into the area’s 
dense residential neighborhoods. These neighborhoods housed the bor-
ough’s largest populations of low-income, immigrant, and people of color; 
moving away was not an option for most of these people. In  the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) named the North Shore as one of 
its ten environmental showcase communities due to the preponderance 
of chemical hazards in the area and residents’ socioeconomic status and 
lack of political clout.  (That designation, however, had done little to stop 
local offi  cials from permitting new industrial facilities on the North Shore, 
or to encourage them to install better fl ood barriers and buff ers).
Demographically and politically, the densely populated North Shore 
seemed worlds apart from the suburban East and South Shores. For in-
stance, low-income residents, many of whom were people of color, of 
the North Shore routinely voted for Democratic candidates in local and 
national elections (Kramer and Flanagan ). The rest of Staten Island, 
however, was a notorious bastion of conservatism in overwhelmingly lib-
eral, Democratic New York City. It was this area that spawned the city’s 
earliest and largest Tea Party groups (Kramer and Flanagan ). But 
despite these seemingly stark divisions, coastal residents came together 
to warn local offi  cials that the combination of rising sea levels, ongoing 
shoreline erosion, and a lack of adequate storm barriers were setting 
them up for a disaster.
Hurricane Sandy unbinds our notions of disasters. In addition to re-
vealing Staten Island’s complex dynamics, it illustrates the far-reaching 
webs of signifi cance in which disasters are caught up. This chapter shows 
how a changing global political economy shaped the borough’s divergent 
demographic and political terrains, as it also transformed Staten Island’s 
coastal ecology and produced the conditions of vulnerability that led to 
the storm’s widespread destruction. In addition, my contextual approach 
to the storm explains why displaced Staten Islanders overwhelmingly pre-
ferred to relocate rather than to rebuild, demanding that the state com-
pensate them for their storm-damaged properties and return the land to 
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wetlands. These demands stood in stark contrast to typical post-disaster 
activism in which survivors fi ght for the right to return (Adams, Van Hat-
tum and English ; Arena ; Bullard and Wright ), and they 
opposed the city’s resiliency plans that refused to back down from water-
front development. Indeed, I argue that residents’ holistic and in-depth 
understandings of the causes of the storm, and their awareness of the 
ways in which it connects to other disasters, suggest potential new trends 
in post-storm activism.
Anthropologist Anthony Oliver-Smith defi nes disasters as processual 
events that begin prior to “a specifi c, event-focused agent” and calls for 
disaster analysts to explode the boundaries of time and space that usually 
circumscribe disaster studies (Oliver-Smith , ). Following that call, 
this volume’s editors, Gregory Button and Mark Schuller (see introduction, 
this volume), emphasize the necessity of researching the broad historical, 
political, economic and geologic contexts of disaster events in order to 
fully understand the extent of their destruction, and possibilities for build-
ing future resilience. As Button and Schuller note, this perspective also 
off ers an essential counterpoint to media and academic representations 
of disasters, which portray them as discrete, isolated events. By drama-
tizing a disaster’s unique qualities, such depictions send mixed messages, 
both playing on public fears about a post-climate change future and giv-
ing the impression that devastating storms are freak occurrences (see 
the introduction). For instance, media reports about Superstorm Sandy 
emphasized the singular meteorological conditions that allowed several 
storm systems to collide. My examination, however, reveals that while the 
meteorological aspects of the storm might be unprecedented, its eff ects 
were utterly predictable, given a long history of ecological degradation. 
In addition to exploring the global political and economic conditions that 
fostered this degradation, I also show how Hurricane Sandy linked Staten 
Island to other technological and environmental disasters, from Hiroshima 
to Hurricane Katrina. In short, this chapter demonstrates the degree to 
which disasters are deeply entangled in extensive political and economic 
webs that stretch across time and space. Viewed in this way, disasters 
make visible the ways that local ecologies and communities, however far-
fl ung or historically distant from one another they may seem, are actually 
connected to each other.
I begin with a brief introduction to the political ecology of Staten Island’s 
northern and southeastern shorelines. I then address each geographic 
area in turn. Starting on the North Shore, I trace the historic proliferation 
of industry and the political decisions that facilitated that unrestricted 
growth, while also allowing builders to create an ample supply of nearby 
housing for immigrant workers. In the latter half of the twentieth century, 
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as deindustrialization reshaped many of the city’s waterfronts, industry on 
the North Shore continued to grow. Along with it, residents’ environmen-
tal risks from chemical contamination, fl ooding, and/or climate change 
also rose. Moving south, I then show how these same economic trends 
and processes produced very diff erent results. Here, residential and com-
mercial development skyrocketed in the late twentieth and early twen-
ty-fi rst century, thanks to a pro-development attitude among city offi  cials 
and the globalization of real estate investments. Although local residents 
consistently challenged the environmental consequences of this devel-
opment, their concerns were largely ignored—until Hurricane Sandy hit 
in . My concluding sections then focus on how residents’ responses 
to the storm consistently called attention to the multiple and interlocking 
links between political and economic trends, environmental degradation, 
and the storm’s disastrous aftermath.
A Tale of Two Shorelines
In  the New York Times quoted W. Burke Harmon, president of the Har-
mon National Real Estate Corporation, referring to Staten Island as “this 
forgotten borough that has suddenly stepped into the limelight.”  Har-
mon was referencing the vast potential for development on the borough, 
which at the time remained largely agrarian and sparsely populated (see 
Steinberg ). Thirty years later the nickname resurfaced when mayoral 
candidate Edward Corsi spoke at a rally on Staten Island. Corsi condemned 
the Tammany government for ignoring the specifi c needs of Staten Is-
land residents, including putting an end to the excessive smog that was 
wafting over from New Jersey and covering the Island (Zuckerman ). 
The nickname stuck, as did the general conditions Corsi decried. In , 
Staten Islanders were represented by three out of fi fty-one New York City 
Council members, and pollution continued to plague the northern third of 
the Island, known as the North Shore.
Beryl Thurman, president of the North Shore Waterfront Conservancy 
of Staten Island (NSWC), liked to joke that her neighborhood “was like 
an industrial Girls Gone Wild” video. The North Shore’s dense residential 
neighborhoods were bordered by a narrow stretch of waterfront that 
twenty-one contaminated properties, including two private waste trans-
fer stations, a Department of Sanitation garage, a sewer treatment plant, 
an industrial salt company, and several bus depots. Most of these sites 
sat on top of older industrial sites that had operated prior to environmen-
tal regulations and thus contained high levels of dangerous chemicals. 
Accordingly, seven properties on the North Shore were scheduled for 
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state-sponsored remediation and another four appeared on the federal 
Superfund list. What’s more, the Kill Van Kull (a thousand-foot-wide tidal 
strait that divided this part of the North Shore from Bayonne, New Jersey) 
was itself contaminated. As the principal access to the Staten Island Port 
and the Port Newark-Elizabeth Marine Terminal, the Kill also hosted hun-
dreds of ships each day that spilled oil into its waters and polluted the air 
(Checker ). The antiquated Port Richmond Sewage Treatment Plant 
discharged millions of gallons of storm overrun into the Kill Van Kull each 
year. Since  the Kill had been part of a federal Superfund cleanup due 
to its high levels of dioxins, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), mercury, di-
chlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT), pesticides, and other heavy metals.  
The North Shore was also the borough’s densest district, historically at-
tracting large numbers of immigrant groups to work in nearby industries. 
The immigrant population remained, even as industrial jobs dried up. In 
  percent of households on the Island’s North Shore were white 
non-Hispanic,  percent were African American non-Hispanic,  percent 
were of Hispanic origin, and  percent were Asian (New York City Depart-
ment of City Planning ). These groupings included large populations 
from Liberia, Sri Lanka, Albania, Pakistan, China, and Mexico (Mansour 
). In addition to being the borough’s most ethnically and racially di-
verse district, the North Shore was by far its poorest. In  the poverty 
rate on the \ North Shore was .  per cent compared to .  percent on 
Staten Island as a whole. (Jorgensen ). 
But if one followed Staten Island’s coastline east and then south, an 
entirely diff erent physical and social landscape was revealed. Industrial 
properties and strips of vacant land gave way to beaches, shorefront 
neighborhoods, small single-family homes, and tree-lined streets. Here, in 
the borough’s mid-Island and South Shore districts, incomes were solidly 
working and middle class. Average pre-Sandy home values on the South 
Shore hovered around , , considerably less expensive than the 
city’s overall average home price of , . This aff ordability historically 
made the area a magnet for public sector employees.  In ,  percent 
of residents in these neighborhoods were employed by New York City 
as teachers, police offi  cers, and fi refi ghters (Kramer and Flanagan , 
). These Staten Islanders also stood out for their political views, which 
leaned far more to the right than those of most New Yorkers. A report by 
the Center for the Study of Staten Island found that  percent of Staten 
Islanders called themselves conservative, in comparison with  percent 
of New Yorkers. Eighty-eight percent of those conservatives lived in the 
mid-Island and South Shore districts (Mansour ). Importantly, in  
.  percent of all Staten Islanders were registered as Republicans com-
pared to  percent of the city’s total population (Kenney ). These 
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statistics earned the entire Island a reputation for being a bastion of Re-
publicanism, despite the North Shore’s tendency to vote Democratic. 
Racial and ethnic diversity lined up with these political views. That is, ac-
cording to the  census, approximately  percent of households in the 
mid-Island and South Shore districts were white and  percent were His-
panic.  In  the New York City Planning Department reported, “South 
Staten Island had the lowest concentration of immigrants of any section 
in New York City, with only  percent of its population born abroad” (as 
quoted in Sherry ). Yet, in recent years, immigrant populations were 
increasing. For instance, the South Shore saw a –  percent increase in 
its Hispanic population between  and . Many of these newcom-
ers were working-class and middle-class home buyers (Lavis ). At the 
same time, although Staten Island was a changing borough, its geographic 
position and its demographic and political history positioned it as isolated 
from the rest of the city. In turn, this outsider-ness rendered the exploita-
tion of the Island’s natural resources invisible to most New Yorkers. In the 
next section I show how this very invisibility made Staten Island essential 
to the city’s overall economic development strategy.
A Global History of the North Shore
Located a fi ve-mile boat ride across the New York Harbor from southern 
Manhattan, and providing easy access to East Coast shipping channels, 
the North Shore has been tied to global politics and economics for over a 
century. One of the oldest of New York’s settlements, during the colonial 
era and into the nineteenth century the North Shore served mainly as a re-
sort area for the city’s hoi polloi. In addition, the area hosted Snug Harbor, 
a haven for, as Robert Richard Randall put it in , “aged, decrepit and 
worn out sailors,”  and a cluster of farm buildings that provided housing 
for the city’s poor, infi rm, mentally ill, and developmentally disabled (Lam 
) In a way, this story of harboring early New York’s elderly and/or dis-
abled citizens foreshadows the area’s postindustrial use as a repository 
for noxious and unwanted facilities.
Once the industrial era ramped up, the North Shore’s provincial uses 
were quickly replaced by industrial ones. Resort homes disappeared, and 
the Kill Van Kull became an important channel for commerce as it pro-
vided a passage for marine traffi  c between Upper New York Bay and the 
industrial towns of northeastern New Jersey. The installation of a local rail 
system in  connected the North Shore to the B&O railway, which car-
ried freight into New Jersey and beyond. The  opening of the Panama 
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Canal transformed maritime trade across the world by connecting the At-
lantic and Pacifi c Oceans. In  the U.S. government ensured the port’s 
global signifi cance by establishing it as a foreign trade zone, allowing tax-
free trade (Tiefrenbrun ). As the port fl ourished, its prosperity spilled 
over to the immediate, surrounding area. Ship-repair and building yards 
proliferated, as did manufacturing industries, including a linoleum plant, a 
Proctor and Gamble factory, and an Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) linseed 
oil plant (NSWC ).
The North Shore’s centrality to maritime trade helped some of these 
manufacturers to globalize and cement their position in international geo-
politics. In fact, a unique series of events linked the ADM linseed oil plant 
to the advent of nuclear science, which in turn indelibly altered the envi-
ronmental, economic, and geopolitical landscape of countries throughout 
the world (Button ; see also Masco ). In the late s ADM’s 
owners made an agreement with African Metals Corporation to store raw 
uranium from the Belgian Congo in their three-story warehouse located 
near the base of the Bayonne Bridge. The Metals Corporation then sold 
the uranium to an Army colonel working on behalf of the U.S. govern-
ment. The Army planned to use it in a new top-secret initiative, known 
as the Manhattan Project (Zoellner ). At some point during its stay 
on Staten Island, a signifi cant portion of the uranium spilled, either from 
leaky barrels or during a transfer. The spill was covered over, fi rst with top-
soil and then with pavement (NSWC ). ADM sold the property, and it 
subsequently changed hands numerous times. At some point a chain-link 
fence was erected to enclose the spill site; otherwise, no remedial action 
was taken. In the early s the U.S. Department of Energy sent rep-
resentatives from the Oak Ridge National Laboratory to survey the site. 
Oak Ridge reported high levels of radium and uranium, but no action was 
taken. A later study by the New York State Department of Environmental 
Conservation confi rmed those fi ndings; however, once again, no action 
was taken (Checker ; see also Metropolitan Waterfront Alliance ).
Nearby residents reported that they had always heard rumors about 
the radioactive site, although none of the agencies studying it ever con-
tacted them. In  Beryl Thurman was conducting research on con-
taminated sites around the area and uncovered documents reporting the 
above history. Concerned that the site fl ooded frequently during heavy 
rains, Thurman began to contact state and federal agencies. About a year 
later, the EPA responded and agreed to conduct a third study of the prop-
erty. This time they found levels of radium and uranium approximately 
two orders of magnitude greater than the levels initially reported in  
(Checker ). After another year of sustained pressure from local activ-
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ists, and negotiation with the U.S. Department of Energy, the EPA agreed 
to clean the site, subject to a congressional funding allocation, which to 
date has not been fulfi lled.
For North Shore residents the dangers of living near long-buried ura-
nium intimately connected them with Native Americans as well as with 
other communities in nations impacted by nuclear weapons manufacture. 
For instance, in  a Japanese fi lm crew traveled to the North Shore 
to fi lm part of a documentary about the legacy of the atomic bomb. Ad-
ditionally, European journalists or fi lmmakers contacted Beryl Thurman 
every so often to discuss what they call “the Manhattan Project site.” 
In August , to mark the sixty-sixth anniversary of the bombings, the 
Unitarian Church of Staten Island planned a memorial service, which in-
cluded Japanese musicians and Native American drummers. These groups 
were liked through various kinds of technological disasters, as well as the 
shared experience of being considered expendable by their national and 
local governments.
The Production of Expendability
If federal policies and practices established the North Shore’s place in a 
global trade economy, state and local policies ensured that it supplied 
cheap land to private industries and for public utilities and services. As 
industrialization took hold of New York City, manufacturing businesses 
and new immigrant neighborhoods fl ourished, often side by side. Even-
tually, elite families grew alarmed by the haphazard industrialization and 
immigrant-ization of the city, and they pressured political leaders to take 
steps to curtail it. In  New York City passed its fi rst set of zoning laws, 
dividing the city into residential, business, or unrestricted (usually indus-
trial) uses. Although zoning laws were meant to protect residents from 
noxious industries, sociologist Julie Sze argues that they mainly protected 
the property values of the affl  uent (Sze , ). For instance, in contrast 
to the controlled growth of residential zones, unrestricted zones came to 
house both industries and massive public housing projects. According to 
historic records, living near industries gave public housing residents “ad-
vantageous opportunities for walking to work” (New York City Planning 
Commission, Division of Master Plan, , , as quoted in Maantay , 
). While residential zones remained relatively stable, unrestricted zones 
grew increasingly dense. By the mid-twentieth century, over half of the 
city’s inhabitants lived in these districts (Sze , ).
Recognizing the need to revise its codes, in  city leaders imple-
mented a new set of zoning laws. This time they specifi ed three kinds of 
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districts—residential, commercial, and manufacturing (called M zones). 
The last had substandard or derelict housing and was suitable for urban 
renewal. As a result, entire swaths of working-class neighborhoods were 
classifi ed as manufacturing, even if they were solidly residential (Maan-
tay , ; see also Angotti ; Sze ). Although city leaders as-
sumed that residents living in M zones would eventually move out of 
them, the zoning designation itself undermined fi nancial opportunity. M 
zones were redlined by banks and insurance companies, making it diffi  cult 
to get home improvement loans, mortgages, or home insurance (Maan-
tay ). As manufacturing declined across the city, policies and prac-
tices such as planned shrinkage and the Blighted Areas Plan deliberately 
cut their city services to M zones in order to distribute resources to the 
city’s central business districts and white middle and upper-middle class 
enclaves (Greenberg , ). Geographer Julianna Maantay explains 
that, as the conditions of M zones continued to deteriorate, their largely 
minority residents became increasingly trapped in poverty and had little 
choice but “to live in or near M zones having high concentrations of nox-
ious uses” (Maantay , ; see also Angotti ).
Decades after the s-era zoning reforms, North Shore residents con-
tinued to live cheek by jowl with industries, without buff ers to protect 
them from contaminants (Maantay , ; see also Angotti ; Sze 
). Moreover, as new industries replaced older ones, those contam-
inants multiplied. Unlike other city neighborhoods in the last half of the 
twentieth century, the North Shore never really deindustrialized, although 
the nature of its industries changed. Smaller businesses and municipal ser-
vices moved in while large factories relocated their operations overseas 
or to southern states. For instance, a Sedutto’s Ice Cream factory was 
located on a site where lead paint had once been manufactured. Similarly, 
the Port Richmond Sewer Treatment Plant took the place of an oil tank 
storage facility. Dozens of companies changed hands multiple times, turn-
ing the North Shore’s waterfront into a toxic layer cake (NSWC ).
The area’s M zone designation facilitated this turn-over by allowing in-
dustrial properties to change hands without having to obtain new zoning 
approvals or to install buff ers to protect residents from contaminants. In 
addition, the North Shore’s access to trucking routes, rail lines, and other 
East Coast ports continued to attract manufacturing businesses. Finally, as 
the city emphasized gentrifi cation in certain areas, it intensifi ed industri-
alization in others (see Brown-Saracino ; Lees, Slater and Wyly ). 
For instance, Robert Fitch fi nds that as early as the s New York City 
leaders made a deliberate attempt to disinvest in, and displace, industry, 
especially in Manhattan. He states, “New York rid itself of everything that 
blocked its potential to become the biggest and best FIRE [fi nance, insur-
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ance, and real estate] and producer services city in the world” (Fitch , 
– ).
In Manhattan, city leaders accomplished this goal in a number of ways. 
As Sharon Zukin’s ( ) study of the neighborhood south of Houston 
Street (known as SoHo) details, in the early s, city offi  cials rejected a 
proposal for urban renewal clearance and new housing in SoHo because 
its local industries were still thriving. Yet, as the nearby Wall Street area 
proliferated with corporate offi  ce buildings, city planners began to eye 
SoHo as prime residential real estate. Accordingly, offi  cials tacitly encour-
aged landlords to convert manufacturing spaces to residential lofts (see 
also Curran and Hanson ; Marcus ). Not only did they look the 
other ways as these conversions took place, but the strict enforcement of 
noise constraints and other regulations helped to displace manufacturing 
fi rms and make way for more residential conversions (see Zukin ; 
Buck et. al. ; Curran and Hanson ; Curran ; Harvey ; Mar-
cuse, ). Between  and , New York lost a fourth of its factories 
and one-third of its manufacturing jobs (Levinson , ). 
As industries were pushed out of gentrifying neighborhoods, many of 
them relocated to M zones in the city’s outer boroughs (Curran ). 
Thus, the displacement of manufacturing businesses from Manhattan, 
combined with the North Shore’s port, ensured that it remained a repos-
itory for heavy industry, despite its dense residential population. In the 
next section I describe how Staten Island’s eastern and southern shore-
lines came to play a strategic role in the city’s economic development, 
albeit in a very diff erent way.
Global Capital and Hyperdevelopment
During the post-World War II period, as droves of white New Yorkers left 
the city for the suburbs, Staten Island’s South and East Shores played 
a strategic role in helping to navigate fi scal crisis. As part of New York 
City, Staten Island had far fewer land-use restrictions than most suburban 
areas. At the same time, it contained large swaths of undeveloped land. 
Thus, developers could cram more homes into smaller tracts of land, and 
make them aff ordable to a wider range of buyers. Moving to the Island 
also appealed to those who wanted to stay close to work and extended 
family (Jackson ; Ross and Levine ). Finally the population in these 
parts of Staten Island was still overwhelmingly white, attracting those 
would-be suburbanites looking to escape the changing demographics of 
their inner-city neighborhoods. Thus, this part of Staten Island became “a 
paradise for the home building industry” (Danielson and Doig , ) 
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and for homebuyers who sought greener (and whiter) pastures. Once the 
Verrazano Bridge was completed in , thousands of Irish and Italians 
crossed the bridge to buy homes in the mid-Island and South Shore sec-
tions of Staten Island (Kramer and Flanagan ). These families could 
enjoy the single-family dwellings, driveways, shopping malls, and homoge-
neity that the suburbs off ered, while easily returning to Brooklyn to attend 
to family needs.
The prosperity of the early s triggered another residential develop-
ment boom, largely in piecemeal fashion, as local builders tore down vaca-
tion bungalows and subdivided existing lots to make room for year-round 
homes that were even more densely packed. According to urban planner 
Tom Angotti, around this time, giant, multibillion-dollar investment fi rms 
began to overtake the city’s locally based real market. These fi rms quickly 
developed powerful alliances with New York City Hall and gained substan-
tial infl uence (Angotti ). On Staten Island city agencies granted more 
and more permits for closely packed condominiums and master-planned 
communities, some of which were just feet from the high-tide line (Ru-
dolf et al. ). For instance, Port Regalle, a -unit condominium project 
on the tip of Great Kills Harbor, was built by the Lockton Corporation, a 
Manhattan real estate development fi rm. Captain’s Quarters, which also 
sits directly on the water, was built by Muss Development, one of New 
York City’s largest real estate developers. Both of these developments 
were badly damaged during Sandy. At Port Regalle, two elderly residents 
drowned while attempting to fl ee after failing to heed evacuation warn-
ings until the storm was already upon them (Rudolf et al. ).
The city permitted both developments despite opposition by local 
conservation groups. As Richard Lynch, a Staten Island biologist and 
environmental activist said, “It’s literally been a pitched battle between 
conservationists and the developers” (as quoted in Rudolf et al. ). 
Especially after a  nor’easter caused severe fl ooding, local residents 
started to agitate for better fl ood protections and storm management. 
After much agitation, in  the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers installed 
some berms and other measures to mitigate beach erosion, although 
some of those protections began to come undone by the end of the de-
cade (Rudolf et al. ). Residents fought hard for better infrastructure. 
In particular, Dee Vandenburg, president of Staten Island Taxpayer’s As-
sociation told me in August, , “We have no sanitary sewers, no storm 
sewers.”
In lieu of storm sewers, plentiful vacant lots had always soaked up ex-
cess storm water runoff . But the constant subdividing of lots and infi lling 
of vacant land cleared the vegetation and wetlands that acted as natural 
sponges, soaking up storm water. As William J. Fritz, geologist and presi-
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dent of the College of Staten Island told the Huffi  ngton Post, “We’ve hard-
scaped those sponges, so that they no longer naturally slow down the 
impact of that incoming surge” (Rudolf et al. ). In  the New York 
City Council responded to residents’ concerns by passing new zoning rules 
meant to stem unchecked growth. But city offi  cials continued to grant 
variances that allowed dense new developments, and even state agencies 
allowed development adjacent to wetland areas. Between  and  
nearly seven hundred new structures went up in a high-risk storm surge 
zone on Staten Island (Benimoff  ). Indeed, by the time Sandy hit New 
York, Staten Island’s South and East shorelines had been laid bare of storm 
protections.
For those coastal residents who fought for better storm protections 
only to be ignored by government offi  cials, Sandy’s destruction was all the 
more poignant. The following story (told to the author by Dee Vandenburg 
in September, ) illustrates this point. In , Mike, a South Shore resi-
dent, discovered that the New York Department of Environmental Conser-
vation was considering a permit application to turn a vacant lot next to his 
house into a new housing development. Mike corralled his neighbors and 
local civic organizations to fi ght to preserve the lot, which was next to a 
wetland and held water during heavy rains. They lost the battle, however, 
and the development proceeded. Two years later, Hurricane Sandy wiped 
Mike’s house right off  its foundation. Like many Sandy survivors, Mike 
waited nearly a year to get an insurance assessment of the damage to his 
home. Noting the irony of the situation, Vandenburg said ruefully, “The 
insurance company keeps going out there to give [ Mike] an estimate on 
his house. Every time, they call him because they can’t fi nd it. [Mike] has to 
keep telling them, ‘That’s because it’s not there. It’s gone.’”
In sum, the opportunity for suburban-style development in Staten Is-
land’s mid-Island and South Shore neighborhoods made it an essential 
component of the city’s strategy to combat white fl ight in the s and 
s. A decade or so later, the globalization of fi nance capital available 
for real estate further amplifi ed the pace of this development. The con-
sequences of this growth, however, were severe. As local residents pre-
dicted, developing in wetland areas and the absence of storm sewers 
obliterated fl ood protections and left the area vulnerable to fl ooding from 
storms and other weather events.
Environmental Gentrifi cation
While the environmental consequences of rampant residential develop-
ment were clear to Staten Island’s coastal communities, the implications 
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of waterfront over-development in other parts of the city have been more 
controversial. The availability of global capital, coupled with a prodevel-
opment mayoral administration, fueled a citywide building boom during 
the early s. Former Mayor Michael Bloomberg vowed to rebrand 
New York as a luxury city (Brash ), seeing to it that between  
and  one-third of the city was rezoned to make way for new, lux-
ury apartment buildings (Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Pol-
icy ). In particular, Bloomberg directed the New York City Economic 
Development Corporation to provide millions of dollars in subsidies to 
waterfront development in Manhattan, Brooklyn, and Queens; these bor-
oughs converted former manufacturing zones into loft-, condominium-, 
and commerce-fi lled areas that catered to the lifestyles of the creative 
class,  or the upwardly mobile gentrifi ers who could aff ord to live in the 
luxury city (Brash ; Greenberg and Aronczyk ; see also Hackworth 
; Lees, Slater and Wyly ; Schlichtman and Patch ).
The concept of sustainability was a central component of this develop-
ment, in part because it suggested a particular kind of progressivism and 
sophistication with which members of the creative class identifi ed (see 
Greenberg ). Moreover, Michael Bloomberg was already a famed war-
rior in the global fi ght against climate change. Stressing sustainability, his 
mayoralty created bike lanes and street trees, installed green and white 
roofs, and took other measures designed to reduce the emissions that 
contribute to global warming. However, Bloomberg was equally famous 
for refusing to retreat from waterfront development. Notable climate 
scientists, meanwhile, frequently warned that the city’s waterfronts were 
increasingly at risk from rising sea levels and storm surges (Navarro ). 
Further pointing out the degree to which waterfront development has 
eroded natural habitats, and caused nutrient pollution, historian Ted Stein-
berg calls the massive coastal fl ooding during Hurricane Sandy a “self-
inflicted calamity” (Steinberg ).
The implications of contemporary redevelopment are especially felt 
by those living in nongentrifying areas like the North Shore. Elsewhere 
I defi ne the joining of environmental improvements and sustainability 
measures to high-end redevelopment as “environmental gentrifi cation” 
(Checker ). As formerly industrial waterfronts are cleaned up and 
greened for incoming, affl  uent residents, noxious facilities are displaced 
to those neighborhoods not slated for redevelopment, and which already 
host a disproportionate number of toxic facilities. Among other things, 
environmental gentrifi cation highlights the way that popular political 
rhetorics and discourses about sustainability actually add to the environ-
mental risks and burdens carried by low income communities of color 
(see Checker , ). The following case describes the gentrifi cation of 
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Gowanus, Brooklyn and exemplifi es how environmental gentrifi cation in 
one neighborhood leads to environmental degradation in another.
Completed in , the Gowanus Canal connected the Upper New York 
Bay to Brooklyn’s maritime and commercial shipping activity. Soon, fac-
tories, warehouses, tanneries, coal stores, and manufactured gas refi n-
eries sprang up alongside the Canal, and the neighborhoods surrounding 
it grew rapidly. These new populations generated more sewage, which 
drained downhill into the Gowanus. By World War I the Gowanus was the 
nation’s busiest commercial canal and, arguably, its most polluted. In the 
s the amount of dredging required to maintain the Canal made it no 
longer viable. In addition, the rise of the freight trucking industry was ren-
dering the need for the Canal obsolete. Throughout the s and s 
industries declined until the Canal had become more of a dump site than a 
waterway. Its putrid waters, contaminated with toxic chemicals, sewage, 
and debris, became legendary (Pearsall ).
Throughout the late s and early s gentrifi cation overtook all of 
downtown Brooklyn except for the areas adjacent to the Gowanus Canal. 
The waterway’s reputation and reported stench continued to deter inves-
tors. But toward the late s, artists who had been priced out of their 
gentrifi ed neighborhoods found that the cheap rents and ample spaces of 
Gowanus outweighed its smells and noxiousness. As they settled in, pop-
ular cafés, clubs, art galleries, and restaurants followed. In  the city 
caught on to this trend and launched an aggressive campaign to rezone 
parts of the neighborhood. Here again, with global fi nancing behind them, 
real estate developers began to make grand plans for Gowanus (Navarro 
; see also Pearsall ). The city facilitated these plans by off ering 
incentives to those who wanted to purchase and redevelop contaminated 
properties (see Checker ).
Meanwhile, long-term Gowanus residents had been lobbying the EPA 
to clean the Canal since the s. In  the EPA fi nally heard their pleas 
and announced a plan to add the Canal to the federal Superfund list. The 
Bloomberg administration, however, stridently opposed the designation, 
arguing that it could scare away developers and stigmatize the area (Na-
varro ). Instead, the city proposed its own plan, a piecemeal strategy 
that relied on private development (funded partially through tax incen-
tives) to clean contaminated properties around the Canal, and federal and 
state dollars to clean the water. After a protracted series of public meet-
ings and delays, the EPA plan prevailed. While the city’s grand rezoning 
plan was shelved, individual developers could apply for and receive single 
variances that enabled them to build large, multifamily apartment com-
plexes. Soon, plans were in the works for a -residence condominium at 
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the edge of the canal, and a -apartment rental compound alongside it 
(Navarro ). Interestingly, the city’s fears about the Superfund stigma 
seemed unwarranted. In  a , -square feet Whole Foods Market 
opened, complete with an in-house record shop, bike repair station, roof-
top beer garden overlooking the Canal, and the only commercial rooftop 
greenhouse in the entire country. Median rent in Gowanus increased .  
percent to , , twice as much as Brooklyn as a whole in , and the 
median sales price rose to , , up .  percent from the year before 
(Kaysen ). The upcoming Gowanus Canal cleanup seemed to amplify 
development, rather than impede it.
Reindustrialization and Vulnerability
In  the EPA announced that it planned to dispose of dredged materials 
from the Canal by transporting the least toxic portion of the sediment to 
a barge just off  the shore of Red Hook, a neighborhood about a mile from 
Gowanus (also gentrifying at a rapid pace). There, the sediment would be 
mixed with concrete and repurposed as construction materials. (Berger 
). Red Hook residents, however, ferociously opposed the plan. Even-
tually, the EPA announced that neither Gowanus nor Red Hook would bear 
the environmental burden of treating Gowanus sludge. In fact, the agency 
promised to ship the waste out of Brooklyn entirely (Musumeci ).
Not coincidentally, several months later, North Shore residents learned 
of a permit application to expand operations at Flag Container Service so 
that the facility could start bringing in dredged spoils from across the fi ve 
boroughs and process it into concrete mixtures (Rizzi ). Making mat-
ters worse, the facility would be located right near the site of a new plaza 
and green space being planned as part of a community-based initiative.
North Shore residents recognized that, as one of the few heavily indus-
trialized waterfronts left in the city, they were bearing the brunt of gentri-
fi cation. As activist Victoria Gillen commented in August, , “Wonderful 
Hipster Havens are created; Water-front parks off er diversion to the res-
idents of new “luxury” units. Where do the displaced heavy industrial 
fi rms go? … Bottom line: the areas with people of color, people without 
tremendous economic resources, are paying the price for Bloomberg’s 
projects—while our taxes support these changes, we do not share in the 
benefi ts, and fi nd ourselves, here on Staten Island, once again a dumping 
ground for the City’s unwanted garbage.”  In sum, the globalization of 
real estate investment, along with pro-development policies, fueled a real 
estate boom across most of the city’s waterfronts. Displaced industries 
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then concentrated in those neighborhoods that had been left out of the 
boom.
These shifts accompanied other kinds of shifts in global trade. For in-
stance, in  the Panamanian government began widening the Pan-
ama Canal so that it could accommodate enormous cargo ships, known as 
Post-Panamax vessels. Although the larger ships already served Chinese, 
European, and U.S. West Coast ports, the Canal was too narrow to allow 
them to pass through to U.S. East Coast and Gulf Coast ports, putting 
these ports at a serious trade disadvantage. In anticipation of the Canal’s 
long-awaited widening, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 
(PA) initiated two major projects to expand Staten Island’s ports to ac-
commodate Post-Panamax ships. First, they issued a permit to raise the 
Bayonne Bridge; and second, they proposed to expand the Staten Island 
port into seventeen acres of regulated wetlands.
Unsurprisingly, both proposals came under fi re from North Shore ac-
tivists. First, they pointed out that the bridge-raising project could disturb 
local contaminants (in particular, much of the construction was taking 
place directly adjacent to the radioactive ADM site). Second, the project 
risked the health of thousands of local residents, truck drivers, and port 
workers who would be exposed to pollutants during the construction 
period as well as from the new ships. Studies estimate that just one of the 
gigantic ships spews out as much cancer-causing pollutants as  million 
cars every year (Cannon ). Both the completion of the bridge and 
the expansion of the port would bring larger ships closer to North Shore 
neighborhoods. Finally, the proposed expansion encroached on the west-
ern edge of Arlington Marsh, the largest tidal wetland and one of the last 
remaining natural wetlands in New York City (Sherry ). By extending 
the bulkhead and channeling the creek that fl owed through the marsh 
area, the project would also likely aff ect tidal fl ow to other important wet-
lands (Schwartz ).
The campaign to save Arlington Marsh drew support from across the 
borough, bringing North Shore activists together with their South and 
East Shore counterparts. The campaign emphasized the importance of the 
Marsh to the Island’s entire ecosystem, which was already made vulnera-
ble by decades of residential and industrial development. In other words, 
the dangers of overdevelopment and impending climate change aff ected 
all of the Island’s coastal communities. Beryl Thurman articulated these 
concerns in an e-mail to her usual list, which included the New York City 
Council; the mayor; offi  cials from city, state, and federal environmental 
regulatory agencies; and assorted civic leaders. Thurman wrote, “What 
preventive measures can New York City provide to protect the coastal 
communities before a severe Nor ‘ Easter [sic], or class  to  Hurricane hits 
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license, thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched.
Tempests, Green Teas, and the Right to Relocate • 
Staten Island? … It can and will happen, it’s just a matter of when.” Nota-
bly, this e-mail was dated June , , over two years before Sandy hit.
After the Storm
Even the prescience of Beryl Thurman’s e-mail about the dangers of cli-
mate change could not predict the extent of the destruction wrought 
by Hurricane Sandy. On the East and South Shores of Staten Island, peak 
storm tides rose as high as sixteen feet and spread three-quarters of a 
mile inland (NYRCRP ). Twenty-three of New York City’s forty-three 
deaths caused by the storm occurred on the South and East shores, and 
thousands of households in those areas were displaced. In mid-October 
, nearly a year after Hurricane Sandy hit, I attended a public workshop 
sponsored by New York Rising, the state’s storm recovery program. The 
workshop was held in a high school gym in Midland Beach, one of the 
areas hardest hit by the storm. Throughout the gym, the state had set up 
stations based on diff erent categories of recovery—infrastructure, hous-
ing, transportation, natural resources, and so on. Attendees were asked to 
go to the stations, write down their suggestions on sticky notes, and stick 
them on posters displayed at each station. By the end of the meeting, the 
posters were fi lled with sticky notes with statements such as, “Give us 
what we’re entitled to,” “We paid insurance for a house that’s gone,” “Ac-
celerate the blue belt,” “Without proper drainage, what good is anything 
else?,” and “They never should have let them build over there.”
By the date of the meeting, almost no residents had settled their recov-
ery claims, or received money from the city’s Build it Back Program, which 
was meant to help eligible applicants make up the diff erence between 
insurance payouts and costs of repairs. Although more than fi ve thou-
sand Staten Islanders registered for the program, six months later, only a 
handful had reached the second phase of the process, home evaluations, 
and no one had received any funds.  Meanwhile, many displaced home-
owners were still paying mortgages on their houses, as well as rents on 
their temporary homes. As well, thousands of storm survivors complained 
that their private insurance companies had barely paid out on their claims. 
“A lot of people are only getting half of their policy. So they’re getting 
,  but they need more like , ,” said Nicole Romano-Levine, 
president of the New Dorp Civic Association. She went on to explain that 
insurance payouts were based on national averages that were far below 
the costs of construction in New York City.
But the main issue on meeting-goers’ minds was buyouts. In February 
, three months after the storm, Governor Cuomo had announced the 
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state program that off ered homeowners in Fox Beach, Oakwood Beach 
and Ocean Breeze, all of which suff ered severe storm damage,  per-
cent of the prestorm value of their homes. The state would demolish the 
houses and leave the properties undeveloped, returning the land to wet-
lands. But a few weeks later, the city put forward its own acquisition plan. 
In this case, though, it off ered homeowners poststorm home values plus 
a relocation bonus. The city also intended to redevelop land it acquired to 
be more storm-resilient. Over a thousand Staten Islanders signed petitions 
to be included in the state’s program, but few supported the city’s acqui-
sition program. Just before the meeting, however, the state announced 
that it would not be expanding its buyout program beyond the areas al-
ready mentioned, although the city would continue to acquire certain 
storm damaged properties.
A sense of betrayal pervaded the meeting, as residents listed all of the 
ways that development had chipped away at their storm protections. A 
woman named Joanne, for instance, remembered that sometime around 
 she awoke to fi nd the city taking down a bunch of trees across the 
street from her house to create a soccer fi eld. “As soon as we saw the 
trees come down, we got nervous,” she said. Joanne, whose family had 
lived in a community called New Dorp for four generations, did not want a 
buyout herself, but she supported her neighbors who were signing up for 
them. “I want people to have the option,” she explained.
Other residents believed that the city should have never allowed de-
velopment in wetlands. “We can’t take a beating every year,” said Dim-
itri, who along with his neighbor, Alex, purchased townhomes in . 
Their townhouse development was just a few blocks from the Lower New 
York Bay in a former marsh. “We suspected [the development] was in a 
wetlands when we bought,” they said, but they assumed since the city 
had permitted a development there, “it was safe.” But every year, they 
experienced fl oods. Both men signed a petition asking to be added to 
Governor Cuomo’s buyout program. For them, it made perfect sense that 
the government should relocate them since it was the government that 
had betrayed them in the fi rst place. “Rising sea levels makes it all worse,” 
said Alex.
In a sense, residents believed that the whole system of homeowner-
ship had failed them. For years they invested in homeownership and the 
complex of institutions—insurance, property taxes, mortgages, and so 
on—that it entails. Now, they were unable to collect on their investments. 
As Debbie Manus said, “We did everything right, and now you’re telling 
us that we’re not entitled [to relief].” Others agreed, saying, “It doesn’t 
seem like they care about the homeowner,” and “The middle-class work-
ing homeowner is falling through the cracks here.”
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Conclusion
Studies of the aftermath of disasters in the United States reveal similar 
levels of frustration, disaff ection, and betrayal as survivors encounter laby-
rinthine bureaucracies (Arena ; Bullard and Wright ; Button ; 
Reed ). In most of these cases, people struggle to return to and re-
build their original homes. But Sandy survivors were diff erent. They fought 
to relocate from, rather than return to, their homes, no matter how deep 
their attachments had been. I argue that these responses refl ect several 
recent political and economic shifts.
Across the Island, residents’ foretelling of the risks of overdevelop-
ment, and their inability to stop it, created a common sense of skepticism. 
While East and South Shore activists continued to support and campaign 
for Republicans, and North Shore activists consistently voted Democratic, 
all of these Islanders’ agreed that in certain ways their shared experiences 
overrode party partisanships. For instance, when I asked one South Shore 
activist how she reconciled her diff erent political views with those of her 
colleagues on the North Shore, she answered, “The diff erences don’t mat-
ter. This is a dire situation. It crosses party lines all over the place.”
Historically, home ownership had insulated Staten Island’s middle-class 
residents from the vulnerabilities facing the low-income and minority resi-
dents of the North Shore. But an era of late-stage global capitalism ensured 
that only the very wealthy and privileged were protected from the dangers 
of rising sea levels and increasing storms. The recognition of this situa-
tion eff ectively ruptured the social contract between middle-class home-
owners and a government they saw as increasingly controlled by fi nancial 
interests. Perhaps the case of Staten Island shows us that in the wake 
of this rupture, new forms of dis-sensus politics may arise to off er cru-
cial alternatives to an unjust, exploitative, and inherently disastrous 
system.
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and associate professor of anthropology and environmental psychology 
at the City University of New York Graduate Center. Her research inter-
ests focus on environmental justice, urban sustainability in the United 
States, the social justice implications of the green economy, and social 
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the Global City: Myth and Practice ( , coedited with Cynthia Isenhour 
and Gary McDonogh) and Local Actions: Cultural Activism, Power and Public 
Life ( , coedited with Maggie Fishman), and has authored numerous 
academic articles and book chapters as well as articles for popular maga-
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Notes
I would like to thank the editors of this volume, anonymous reviewers and, most of all, 
the residents and activists of Staten Island for their contributions to this essay.
 . I have used pseudonyms unless permitted otherwise by the person quoted. 
 . This quote is taken from a letter to Governor Cuomo, written approximately three 
months after the storm. The letter is posted on the following website: http://fox
beach .com/stories/. 
 . Residents whose homes were damaged during Irene claimed that they never 
received insurance reimbursements or Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) recovery money.
 . MLLW is the standard against which storm tides are measured (Blake et al. 
). 
 . Geologists agree that the diff erential damage had much to do with the fact that 
the storm was funneled through Raritan Bay, between southeastern Staten Island 
and New Jersey, as it made its way toward the Atlantic coast. Combined with the 
strong winds, the storm surge kept waters from receding during low tide as they 
normally would (Gammon ).
 . Research conducted in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina found that fl ood wa-
ters dislodged and distributed heavy metals in some places; in others, Katrina’s 
waters breached retaining walls and other barriers meant to seal in toxic chemi-
cals (Rotkin-Ellman et al. ; Valhouli ; Zahran et al. ).
 . See US EPA . 
 . Popik .
 . U.S. EPA .
. Data obtained from: http://www.city-data.com/neighborhood/Midland-Beach-
Staten-Island-NY.html 
. Data obtained from: http://www.city-data.com/neighborhood/Midland-Beach-
Staten-Island-NY.html 
. Randall as quoted on the Snug Harbor website. See http://snug-harbor.org/
about-us/history/ 
. Economist Richard Florida coined this term to refer to upwardly mobile profes-
sionals who work in a range of post-industrial jobs including fi nance, insurance, 
law, education science, engineering, computer programming, research, as well 
as arts, design, and media. He predicted that these people would drive economic 
growth in st century cities (Florida ).
. This quote is taken from an unpublished response to an editorial in Architects 
Newspaper (Iovine ). The response was written and circulated (via email) by 
Victoria Gillen the day after the editorial’s publication.
. Fourteen thousand people applied for assistance from the Build it Back Program. 
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But in , two years after the storm, only  construction projects had been 
started and  reimbursement checks had been sent out, up from zero in Janu-
ary of that year (Wolfe ).
. In the end, no further land acquisitions were protected from further development.
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